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OUTLINE OF  
ABHINAVAGUPTA'S  
AESTHETICS

V. M. KULKARNI

M.A., Ph. D.

SARASWATI PUSTAK BHANDAR

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- (iii-iv) Prakrit Verses in Sanskrit Works on Poetics, Vol. I and II
- (v) Some Aspects of the Rasa Theory
- (vi) Śṛṅgārābhāvacandrikā, of Vijayavarṇi, a work relating to Alamkārasāstra.
- (vii) Jayadeva's Gītagovinda with King Manānika's Commentary  
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- (viii) Kāvyaṇuśāsana of Ācārya Hemacandra ed. in collaboration with Prof. R. C. Parikh, pub. by Mahavira Jaina Vidyalaya, August Kranti Marga, Mumbai.
- (ix) The Story of Rāma in Jain Literature
- (x) Bhoja and The Harivijaya of Sarvasena.














# OUTLINE OF ABHINAVAGUPTA'S AESTHETICS

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Dedicated  
To  
The Late Madhavi

**Dedicated  
To**

The Late M. Hiriyanna  
The Late R. B. Athavale  
The Late M. V. Patwardhan  
And  
J. L. Masson



Dedicated  
To

The Late M. Hanyans  
The Late K. B. Athavale  
The Late M. V. Parvathian  
And  
J. L. Mason



## Preface

In the two splendid commentaries, *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* and *Abhinavabhāraṇī* on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, Abhinavagupta sets forth his theory of *rasa*. It is rightly regarded as his major contribution not only to Sanskrit literary criticism but also to Sanskrit Aesthetics as a whole. M. Hiriyanna observes in his Foreword to Dr. V. Raghavan's book *The Number of Rasas*: "The conception of *rasa* though it is here dealt with chiefly in its relation to poetry, is general and furnishes the criterion by which the worth of all forms of fine art may be judged." Elsewhere too he says: "Though the theory applies equally to all the fine arts, it has been particularly well-developed in relation to poetry and drama."

In the chapter called *Rasādhyāya* (*Nāṭyaśāstra*, Ch. VI) Bharata declares: '*na hi rasādṛte kaścid arthaḥ pravartate*' – meaning "every activity (on the stage) is aimed at the creation or generation of *rasa*". Immediately after this statement he sets forth his famous *rasa-sūtra*: *Vibhāvānubhāva-vyabhicāri-samyogād rasa-niṣpattiḥ*, that is, "out of the union or combination of the *vibhāvas* (determinants), the *anubhāvas* (consequents) and the *vyabhicāribhāvas* (transitory feelings) *rasa* arises or is generated".

Now, the ancient writers on dramaturgy, whom Bharata also follows, invented an entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction between real life and life in the creative imagination—in the realm of literature—the real world and the world of drama. The *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* belong only to art and not to real life. They, however, correspond to the *kāraṇas*, the *kāryas* and the *sahakārikāraṇas*. The *rasas* correspond to the *sthāyibhāvas* (the dominant or permanent emotions.) The *vibhāvādis* are therefore called *alaukika* (nonworldly, extrawordly or transcendental.)

The four exponents of the *rasasūtra*, Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa, Śrīśaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭanāyaka and Abhinavagupta differ amongst themselves in their interpretation of the two words, *samyoga* and *niṣpatti*. They take the word *niṣpatti* to mean *utpatti* (production, generation), *anumiti* (inference), *bhukti* (aesthetic enjoyment) and *vyakti* (manifestation, suggestion) respectively. They understand by the word *samyoga*, it would seem, *utpādyā-utpādaka-bhāva*, *jñāpya-jñāpaka-bhāva*, *bhojya-bhojaka-bhāva* and *vyāṅgya-vyāñjakabhāva* between *vibhāvādis* and *rasa* respectively. That is to say, (i) The *rasa* is what is produced and the *vibhāvādis* are the causes that produce *rasa*; (ii) the *rasa* is what is inferred and the *vibhāvādis* are the characteristic marks or signs; (iii) the *rasa* is what is to be enjoyed (aesthetically); and finally (iv) the *rasa* is what is suggested and the *vibhāvādis* are the factors which suggest the suggested meaning.



Abhinavagupta presents the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Bhaṭṭanāyaka; each view is followed by its criticism. Finally, he sets forth his own view in great detail. In spite of the criticism of the earlier writers' views Abhinavagupta acknowledges his debt to them before introducing his own position. He informs us that he has built his own theories on the foundations laid by them; and that he has not (completely) refuted their views but only refined them :

*tasmāt satām atra na dūṣitāni matāni tānyeva tu śodhitāni.*

Again, in the course of the exposition of his own *siddhānta* he accepts the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka and Vijñānavādins in a modified form : *eṣaiva copacayāvasthāstu deśādyanīyantraṇāt; anukāro'pyastu bhāvānugāmitayā karaṇāt; viśayasāmagryapi bhavatu vijñānavādāvalambanāt.*

("We may say equally well that it consists of a state of intensification—Lollaṭa's doctrine—using this to indicate that it is not limited by space, etc; that it is a reproduction—using this word to mean that it is a production which repeats the feelings – lit., "to mean that it is an operation temporally following the feelings." – This is the view of Śaṅkuka; and that it is a combination of different elements - this conception being interpreted in the light of the doctrine of the Vijñānavādin.)

– As translated by R. Gnoli

In view of these statements made by Abhinavagupta it was thought unnecessary to deal with the views of earlier writers at length in this treatise but briefly refer to them and concentrate on Abhinavagupta's position in regard to *rasa-niṣpatti* (production or generation of *rasa*) and *rasāsvāda* (aesthetic enjoyment of *rasa*), the nature of *rasa* and other related matters.

Abhinavagupta in the two commentaries has discussed a series of questions relating to beauty and *rasa* : What is the nature of beauty ? Whether it is subjective or objective or subjective-cum-objective. Whether the permanent emotion itself is *rasa-sthāyyeva rasaḥ* – or *rasa* is altogether different from the permanent emotion – *Sthāyivīlakṣaṇo rasaḥ*. Whether *rasa* is *sukha-duḥkhātma*, i.e., some *rasas* are *sukhātma* (pleasurable) and some others *duḥkhātma* (painful). Or whether all the *rasas* are *ānandarūpa* (characterised by bliss, perfect happiness). Whether *rasa* is *laukika* (wordly) or *alaukika* (nonwordly, transcendental). Then there is the question of *sāttvikabhāvas* (*aśru*=tears, *sveda*=perspiration, etc., involuntary states). Whether they are physical manifestations (*jaḍa* and *acetana* in nature) or sentient (*cetana*) in their nature & internal ? In other words, whether the



*sāttvikabhāvas* are like *bhāvas* (*rati*-love, *hāsa*-laughter, etc.; and *nirveda* – world weariness, *glāni*-physical weakness, etc.) or like *anubhāvas* – the external manifestations of feeling (mental state) such as sidelong glances, a smile, etc., or whether they are of dual nature? Another important question regarding *rasa* as discussed by Abhinavagupta, is about the *āśraya* (location or seat) of *rasa*. Could it be the poet himself or the character (say, Rāma, Duṣyanta, etc.) or the actor who plays the role of Rāma, Duṣyanta, etc., or the spectator himself? Further, whether the *rasas* are meant to provide sheer pleasure (*priti*) to the spectators or are also meant to give (*moral*) instruction in the four ends of human life (*puruṣārthas*)?

Naiyāyikas like Mahimabhaṭṭa vigorously oppose Ānandavardhana's newly invented *śabdavṛtti* (power or function of word) called *vyañjanā* which is readily accepted and defended by Abhinavagupta, and assert that the purpose for which *vyañjanā* is invented is best served by the process of inference (*anumiti*, *anumāna*). With the sole intention of enabling readers to judge for themselves how far the criticism of Mahimabhaṭṭa directed against Abhinavagupta is fair and just, the views of Mahimabhaṭṭa on how *rasas* arise and they are enjoyed by *sahṛdayas* are presented at the end of Abhinavagupta's exposition.

Here I take the opportunity of gratefully acknowledging my indebtedness to A. B. Keith, M. Hiriyanna, V. Raghavan, J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan. I am especially grateful to J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan on whose two works, one on *Śāntarasa* and the other on *Aesthetic Rapture*, I have freely drawn.

Now it is my pleasant duty to thank those who have helped me in bringing out this monograph. I am grateful to Dr. G. S. Bedagkar, formerly Professor of English, Elphinstone College, Mumbai and Principal, Vidarbha Mahavidyalaya, Amaravati for going through this monograph and making useful suggestions. I am also very happy to record my sincere thanks to my dear friend, Prof. Sureshbhai J. Dave for all his kind help in seeing this publication through. I have also great pleasure in thanking Smt. Mrudula Joshi for editorial assistance. I sincerely thank my friend, Shri Ashwinbhai Shah, Proprietor, his colleague Shri Hirabhai Vora, Saraswati Pustak Bhandar for readily agreeing to publish this monograph in Saraswati Oriental Series. I also thank the Printers, Dhruvil Graphics for the beautiful printing and attractive get up.

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# SANSKRIT THEORY OF BEAUTY

## INTRODUCTION :

In the West the theory of beauty or aesthetics or the inquiry into the character of beauty in Nature as well as in art, has come to be recognised there as a regular part of philosophy. Western philosophers study the problem of the beautiful in relation to the good and true. Controversies have prevailed regarding the questions : what are the characteristics of beauty ? Whether it is objective or subjective, whether the artist (including the poet) as creating beauty must preach morality ? or whether his province is different from a preacher of morality ? Various theories of beauty have been propounded by Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Coleridge, Schopenhauer, Hegel, Croce and others. Their philosophical discussion of these questions makes aesthetics like ethics an important branch of *philosophy*.

In India, however, the study of aesthetics does not form a branch of philosophy. It was carried on by a distinct class of thinkers, literary critics, who were not, generally speaking, professional philosophers. Naturally, they nowhere systematically discuss in their works the essential characteristics of art in general and of the fine arts in particular. They deal mainly with beauty in creative literature, one of the fine arts. Further, they do not explicitly or emphatically speak of the distinction between the Fine Arts and the "Lesser" or "Mechanical" Arts – the Fine Arts comprising Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music, Poetry (including the Drama) and Dancing, and the "Lesser" or "Mechanical" or "Useful" Arts of the smith, the carpenter, the potter, the weaver, and others like them. According to the Western critics, "The distinction which separates these two classes is based upon the fact, that broadly speaking the arts of the first class minister to the enjoyment of man, while those in the latter minister to his needs. They are both alike manifestations of the development of man; but the Fine Arts are concerned mainly with his moral and intellectual growth, and the Lesser Arts with his physical and material well-being. "Nor do they speak of the two classifications of the Arts. "The first (classification) divides them into the Arts of the "Eye" and the Arts of the "Ear", according as they respectively use one or other of the senses of sight or hearing as their primary channel of approach to the mind. Thus grouped we get the arts of Architecture, Sculpture and Painting placed in broad contrast to the Arts of Music and Poetry. By the second (classification) they are arranged with reference to the greater or lesser degree in which they severally depend upon a material basis for the realisation of their respective purpose. "Nor do they venture upon a definition of Art, applicable to all the (Fine) Arts. They merely attempt a definition of one of the Fine Arts, namely, poetry (or Creative



literature as such) and investigate into the source of literary beauty. Finally, they arrive at the conception of *rasa* as the first and foremost source of Beauty in Literature. Modern scholars like M. Hiriyanna say "...the numerous works in Sanskrit on poetics which, though their set purpose is only to elucidate the principles exemplified in poetry and the drama, yet furnish adequate data for constructing a theory of fine art in general." And, "The conception of *rasa* is general and furnishes the criterion by which the worth of all forms of fine art may be judged."<sup>1</sup> There is the other view too, expressed by some scholars in their modern writings that in the context of other fine arts the term *rasa* is used by metaphorical extension only and the *rasa* theory is not applicable to other fine arts. There is much that could be said in favour of and against these two conflicting views. But without entering into this controversy let us revert to aesthetics investigation carried on by the Sanskrit *ālaṃkārikas* in relation to the fine art of poetry (including the drama), which is placed among all the fine arts 'highest in order of dignity.'

In the growth or development of Sanskrit literary criticism we discern two distinct stages : The first stage is represented by the early writers on poetics who preceded Ānandavardhana, and the second by Ānandavardhana, his able commentator Abhinavagupta, and reputed followers like Mammaṭa, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and others, not so reputed. Bhāmaha, Daṇḍin, Ubhāṭa, and Rudraṭa – these early *ālaṃkārika*-s are regarded by common consent as the protagonists of the view that in *kāvya* (poetry, creative literature) it is the *alaṃkāras* that enjoy the pride of place. They were aware of the *Pratīyamāna* sense but they were not aware of Ānandavardhana's theory that *pratīyamāna* sense or *dhvani* is the soul – the essence of poetry. They, however, include this *pratīyamāna* sense in their definitions of figures like *aprastuta-prāsaṃsā*, *samāsokti*, *ākṣepa*, *paryāyokta*, etc. deal with other sources of beauty, namely, *guṇas* like *mādhurya* (sweetness), *vṛttis* (dictions) like *upanāgarikā* (the cultured) and the like.<sup>2</sup> They fail to notice the central essence of *kāvya* as their attention is concentrated for all practical purposes on its 'body' – the outward expression or externals of poetry, viz. *śabda* (word), and *artha* (sense). Certain forms of these are regarded as *doṣa*-s and certain others as *guṇas*; and they hold that what confers excellence on poetry is the absence of the one and the presence of the other. No doubt, there are minor differences in certain matters among these *ālaṃkārikas*. For instance, some like Udbhāṭa make no distinction between *guṇas* and *alaṃkāras*. Vāmana, however, makes a clear distinction between them. Daṇḍin defines and distinguishes between the *Vaidarbha* and the *Gauḍa* styles. Bhāmaha holds that there are no such two distinct styles. These and such other minor differences apart, these *ālaṃkārika*-s reveal

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1. *Art Experience*

2. *Alaṃkārasarvasva* NS edn. 1939, pp. 3-9.



cognate ways of thinking. We may, therefore, regard them as, on the whole, representing the first stage in the growth of literary criticism and aesthetics.

It is Ānandavardhana, the author of *Dhvanyāloka*, an epoch-making work, who completely revolutionized the Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics by his novel theory that *dhvani* (suggestion) is the soul of poetry—the very essence of creative literature. This novel theory he formulated and clearly expounded for the first time. His statement in the opening *kārikā* — “*kāvyaśyātmā dhvanirīti budhair yaḥ samāmnātapūrvah*” is not to be taken literally. He makes this statement with a view to investing it with authority. He distinguishes between two kinds of meaning — the *vāc्यārtha* (including the *lakṣ्यārtha* or *gaunārtha*) and the *vyāṅgyārtha*, the expressed or denoted meaning and indicated meaning on the one hand and the suggested meaning on the other and holds that the expressed meaning (as well as the indicated meaning) and the words in which it is clothed, constitute the mere body of *kāvya*. They together are the outward embodiment of the suggested meaning — the outward element of *kāvya* and not its inner soul—emotion. He attempts to estimate or judge the worth of a poem by reference to this central essence rather than to the expressed meaning. The words and the expressed meaning are really speaking, external features but these alone appealed to the earlier writers on poetics. They misjudged the true importance of the central essence of poetry and assigned to it a subordinate place. Ānandavardhana concentrates his attention on the suggested meaning which forms the real essence of poetry. Whatever in sound (word) or sense subserves the poetic end in view (*rasa*, *bhāva*, etc.) is a *guṇa*; whatever does not, is a *doṣa*. *Doṣa-s* and *guṇa-s* are relative in character. There is no absolute standard of valuation for them. They are to be judged only in reference to the inner or suggested meaning which forms the poetic ultimate.

The suggested meaning is three-fold :

1. a bare idea, fact (*vastu*), 2. a figure (*ālaṃkāra*) and 3. *rasa*, *bhāva* and the like. If the earlier or older *ālaṃkārika-s* concentrated on an analysis of the outward expression of *kāvya*, Ānandavardhana occupied himself with what this expression signifies or suggests. The expression is important to him as only a means of pointing to the suggested meaning. Ānandavardhana's theory of *rasādi-dhvani* exactly corresponds to the Upaniṣadic doctrine of *ātman*. The earlier *ālaṃkārika-s* mistake the body (*śarīra*) of poetry for its soul (*ātman*)—the externals of true poetry for its essence.

### Poetry versus Philosophy :

The *ālaṃkārika-s* often draw our attention to the dichotomy or distinction between poetry and philosophy. We have the oft-quoted verse from Bhāmaha on this distinction :



"Even a stupid man can learn the *śāstra*—philosophy from the teachings of the teacher. But poetry is only given to the person who has imaginative (or creative) genius—*pratibhā* and that only once in a while."<sup>3</sup>

Another well-known verse, probably from Bhaṭṭa Tauta's *Kāvya-kautuka*, now lost, clearly distinguishes between *śāstra* and *kāvya*, Philosophy and Poetry :

"There are two paths of the goddess of speech : one is the *śāstra* (Philosophy) and the other is *kavikarma* (Poetry). The first of these arises from intellectual ability (*prajñā*) and the second from genius (*pratibhā*)."<sup>4</sup>

He (Bhaṭṭa Tauta) also refers to the twofold gift of the poet, of seeing visions of striking beauty (*darśana*) and of communicating to others through appropriate language the visions he sees. Rudraṭa defines *śakti* which is synonymous with *pratibhā* as follows :

"*Śakti* is that whereby in a mind, that is free from distractions, subjects of description always flash and words that are perspicuous shine forth."<sup>5</sup>

Rājaśekhara defines *pratibhā* as :

"*Pratibhā*" is that which causes to appear in the mind (of the poet) appropriate words, meanings or ideas, *alamkāras*, diction and style (*uktimārga*) and other similar things as well."<sup>6</sup> He divides *pratibhā* into two kinds: creative (*kārayitṛī* — that with which poets are gifted) and appreciative (*bhāvayitṛī*—which belongs to *sahṛdaya*—s, sensitive and sympathetic critics or readers).

Abhinavagupta quotes the following definition of *Pratibhā* :

"(Creative) imagination is that form of intelligence which is able to create new things."<sup>7</sup> He further adds: "the speciality of a great poet's creative imagination consists in the ability to produce poetry that is endowed with beauty and clarity due to the onrush of emotional thrill in the heart." Elsewhere he defines *śakti* in almost identical terms.<sup>8</sup>

The most famous definition of *pratibhā* occurs in the following passage quoted by Vidyācakravartin, in his *Sampradāyaprakāśinī* :

"*Smṛti* is that which refers to an object of the past. *Mati* refers to something that is still in the future. *Buddhi* deals with that which is present and *prajñā* belongs to all

3. *Kāvya-ālmkāra* 1.5

4. द्वे वर्त्मनी गिरां देव्याः शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।

प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोरद्यं प्रतिभोद्भवमन्तिमम् ॥

5. Rudraṭa : *Kāvya-ālmkāra* 1.15

6. *Kāvya-mīmāṃsā*, Baroda edn. 1934, p. 11

7. प्रतिभा अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा ।—KSS, Benares edn. 1940, p. 92

8. शक्तिः प्रतिभानं वर्णनीयवस्तुविषयनूतनोद्देशशालित्वम् । — *ibid*, p. 317



the three times (past, present and future). *Pratibhā* is that (form of) intelligence which shines with ever fresh delineations of pictures of the matters to be described with 'ullekha' or ever fresh flashes of ideas (with 'unmeṣa')<sup>9</sup>

Mahimabhaṭṭa describes the nature of *pratibhā* in a striking manner :

"*Pratibhā* is that intellectual function of the poet whose mind is concentrated (or fixed) on thinking about words and meanings that are appropriate to *rasa* (to be portrayed in the poem). It arises for a moment from the contact of the poet's mind with the essential nature (of his own *ātman*)."

"It is that which makes the things that exist in all the three worlds seem as if they were right before one's very eyes, and hence it is known as the third eye of Śiva."<sup>10</sup>

In brief, "*Pratibhā* is that power whereby the poet sees the subjects of his poem as steeped in beauty and gives to his readers in appropriate language a vivid picture of the beauty he has seen. It is a power whereby the poet not only calls up in his reader's heart the impressions of the past experiences, but whereby also he presents ever new, wonderful and charming combinations and relations of things never before experienced or thought of by the plain or ordinary man. A poet is a seer who sees visions and possesses the additional gift of conveying to others less fortunate through the medium of language the visions he has or the dreams he dreams."<sup>11</sup>

We have dwelt on *pratibhā* for long for the simple reason that it is regarded if not universally, generally, as the sole cause of poetry. Whatever is touched by the magic wand—power of *pratibhā* becomes *a-laukika*, sui generis, unique; the world of beauty, the poet's creation is altogether different and distinct from our everyday world. What renders the poet's creation unique is his *pratibhā*. In other words, creative literature whose hall-mark is originality is the art of *pratibhā* (genius). And by extension we might as well say that like Creative Literature, Architecture, Sculpture, Painting, Music and Dancing are also the arts of *pratibhā*.

*Pratibhā* is undoubtedly as already said, the sole cause of poetry but to appreciate this poetry you require a reader who is also gifted with *pratibhā*. Abhinavagupta

9. स्मृतिर्व्यतीतविषया मतिरगामिगोचरा ।

बुद्धिस्तात्कालिकी प्रोक्ता प्रज्ञा त्रैकालिकी मता ॥

प्रज्ञा नवनवोल्लेख—(पा. भे. नवोन्मेष-) शालिनी प्रतिभा मता ।

तदनुप्राणनाज्जीवद्वर्णनानिपुणः कविः ॥

10. *Vyaktiviveka* ii-117-118.

11. P. V. Kane, *The History of Sanskrit Poetics*, 1951 edn. pp. 334-335



recognises this affinity of nature between the poet and the reader of poetry when he declares in the *maṅgala śloka* at the commencement of *Locana* :

“Victorious is the essence of speech called *kavi-saḥṛdaya*, (the inevitable pair involved in all aesthetic activity) the poet, the artist, and the discerning enjoyer, the critic.”<sup>12</sup>

Of the pair, the word *saḥṛdaya* cannot be easily rendered in English. It literally means ‘one of similar heart’ – ‘one who is of the same heart’, of like heart with the poet. It may be taken to signify a person whose insight into the nature of poetry is, in point of depth, next only to that of the poet. Abhinavagupta thus defines the *saḥṛdayas* : “Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their own hearts—those (people) are known as *saḥṛdayas*—sensitive spectators.”<sup>13</sup>

We thus find what place of supremacy *pratibhā* enjoys in the realm of creative literature, one of the fine arts and we might go a step further and assert, in the sphere of all the fine arts.

#### Poets on the Nature of Beauty :

Everyone of us is familiar with the two oft-quoted *subhāṣita* type *śloka-s* :

“There is nothing in the world which is inherently beautiful or ugly. A thing which one likes becomes a thing of beauty to him.”

And

“Curds is sweet or pleasant or agreeable to taste, so is honey, so are grapes and so too nectar. Of these pleasant or agreeable things that thing alone, to which he is attached, is a pleasant or agreeable thing to him.”<sup>14</sup>

12. सरस्वत्यास्तत्त्वं कविसहृदयाख्यं विजयते ।

— KSS edn. (1940) Benares, *maṅgala-śloka* to *Locana*, 4th quarter.

13. येषां काव्यानुशीलनाभ्यासवशात् विशदीभूते मनोमुकुरे वर्णनीयतन्मयीभवनयोग्यता ते स्वहृदयसंवाद-  
भाजः सहृदयाः । — *ibid*, pp. 38-39

14. किमप्यस्ति स्वभावेन सुन्दरं वाप्यसुन्दरम् ।

यदेव रोचते यस्मै भवेत्तत्तस्य सुन्दरम् ॥

एवम्

दधि मधुरं मधु मधुरं द्राक्षा मधुरा सुधापि मधुरैव ।

तस्य तदेव हि मधुरं यस्य मनो यत्र संलग्नम् ॥ — *Subhāṣita* (anonymous ?)



Again,

“What affords aesthetic repose is alone really beautiful. For, the *Āśoka* trees are pleased–thrilled with rapture – (and put forth flowers) – by kicks (from beautiful young women.)”<sup>15</sup>

And

“What is not agreeable to one, one has no longing for it although it be beautiful. *Sarajinī* (the lotus flower) does not indeed covet the (nectar–rayed) moon–although beautiful.”<sup>16</sup>

These poets want to drive home the truth, as they see, that beauty is not a natural quality of things–not a physical character of things like their size or weight or movement, not a property of things independently of us. It is a property lent them by the human mind. In other words, they, it would seem, support the view that beauty is subjective.

But the charming *subhāṣita*–like *arthāntaranyāsas* such as Bhāsa’s :

“Beauty gladdens every eye.”<sup>17</sup>

Kālidāsa’s :

“What indeed, is possibly not an embellishment to lovely forms ?”<sup>18</sup>

Bhāravi’s :

“What is beautiful needs no external beauty–aid.”<sup>19</sup>

And,

“Any change of the beautiful looks beautiful.”<sup>20</sup> Or Kālidāsa’s statement in *Mālavikāgnimitra* :

“Beauty under all conditions develops fresh charms. In every posture, the beauty of the form is always seen at an advantage.”<sup>21</sup> Or Bhartṛhari’s observation in his *Śṛṅgāraśataka* (v. 40) :

“I truly swear that in all the seven worlds there is nothing more beautiful than *nitāmbinīs*–(women with large and handsome hips) lovely women.”<sup>22</sup>

15. Rāmacandra : *Mallikā–Makaranda* iii. 2, L. D. Institute of Indology, Ahmedabad, 1983

16. *ibid* v–4

17. सर्वजनमनोऽभिरामं खलु सौभाग्यं नाम । – *Svapnavāsavadattam* ii. (p. 16) G. K. Bhat’s edn.

18. किमिव हि मधुराणां मण्डनं नाकृतीनाम् । – *Śākuntala* I–20.

19. न रम्यमाहार्यमपेक्षते गुणम् । – *Kirātārjunīyam* IV–23.

20. रम्याणां विकृतिरपि श्रियं तनोति । – *ibid* VII.5.

21. अहो सर्वास्ववस्थासु चारुता शोभां पुष्यति ।

22. लोकेषु सप्तस्वपि तथ्यमेतत्

नान्यन्मनोहारि नितम्बिनीभ्यः ।



Māgha's famous line describing the nature of *ramaṇīyatā* (Beauty) :

"Ever new winsomeness is the essential characteristic of beauty." In other words, Beauty is what reveals or presents ever new aspects everytime it is contemplated."<sup>23</sup>

These *arthāntaranyāsa*-type statements, it would seem, support the view that beauty is objective.

Now let us consider the view, that *ālaṃkārikas* take of beauty.

### **Ālaṃkārikas on the Nature of Beauty :**

To the older *ālaṃkārikas* (literary critics, thinkers) like Bhāmaha, Udbhaṭa, Rudraṭa who name their works as *Kāvyaālaṃkāra*, *alaṃkāra* is a beautiful expression, the distinguishing feature of poetry. According to them, even the *rasas* subserve beauty of expression, Daṇḍin although he calls his work *Kāvyaadarśa*, 'Mirror of Poetry', pays the greatest tribute to *alaṃkāra* when he unequivocally declares:

"And whatever – junctures (*sandhis*) and their sub-divisions (*sandhyaṅgas*), dramatic styles (*vṛttis*) and their varieties (*vṛtṭyaṅgas*), characteristics or beauties (*lakṣaṇas*), (dramatic ornaments – *nāṭyaālaṃkāras*), etc., have been described at length in another *śāstra* (= Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*) all is accepted or approved of by us as *alaṃkāras*."<sup>24</sup>

Bhoja, after Daṇḍin, considers *guṇas*, *alaṃkāras*, *rītis*, *vṛttis*, *sandhis*, *lakṣaṇas*, *rasas*, language, metre, form of composition namely epic, drama, etc., as *alaṃkāra*. Kuntaka, who describes his work as *Kāvyaālaṃkāra*, regards his *Vakrokti* as continuation of *alaṃkāra*. It is Vāmana who names his work *Kāvyaālaṃkārasūtrāṇi*, and who follows Daṇḍin, realises the full significance of the term *alaṃkāra* and says explicitly :

"*Alaṃkāra* is Beauty."<sup>25</sup>

So, Sanskrit *alaṃkāraśāstra* (Sanskrit Poetics) in a sense—in a very limited sense—would correspond to the Western name Aesthetics which embraces the critical appreciation of literature and other fine arts including sculpture, painting and music.

The words for beauty are *saundarya*, *camatkāra*, *cārutva*, *śobhā*, *ramaṇīyatā*. The words *vicchitti*, *vaicitrya* and *vakratā* finally mean beauty.

Ānandavardhana uses very often the word *cāru* for the beautiful and Abhinavagupta frequently uses the words *cāru*, *sundara* and *saundarya* with reference to poetry in his

23. क्षणे क्षणे यन्नवतामुपैति तदेव रूपं रमणीयतायाः । — *Śiśupālavadha* IV. 17.

24. यच्च सन्ध्यङ्ग-वृत्त्यङ्ग-लक्षणाद्यागमान्तरे ।

व्यावर्णितमिदं चेष्टमलङ्कारतयैव नः ॥ — *Kāvyaadarśa* II.367.

25. सौन्दर्यमलङ्कारः । — *Kāvyaālaṃkārasūtrāṇi* 1.1.2.



commentary *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta say explicitly that what makes a poem is 'beauty' and not merely *dhvani* (although *dhvani* is called the essence—the soul of poetry). In the course of his *Vṛtti* on III.-33 Ānandavardhana says that the suggestiveness intended by him, namely that which is a real source of beauty—that which can afford aesthetic repose (to the reader) is not present in such examples as *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*, *agnirmāṇavakaḥ* and "mañcāḥ krośanti" (Cots cry) because they do not possess sufficient beauty—they are not sources of beauty.

Thus what is essential to poetry is the creation of beauty. Abhinavagupta fully agrees with Ānandavardhana when he says :

"Objection : How can there be a secondary use of words without suggestion, for earlier you yourself said '*mukhyām vṛttim parityajya*' etc. There is no secondary usage of words without a purpose, and you yourself have said that the function of *vyañjanā* is always responsible for conveying the element in the form of the purpose (of the secondary usage). In order to answer this objection, Ānandavardhana says that the suggestiveness intended by him, namely that which can afford aesthetic repose (to the reader) is not present (in such examples as *gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ* and *agnirmāṇavakaḥ*) (because they do not possess sufficient beauty)." <sup>26</sup> Earlier, while commenting on *Dhvanyāloka* I.1. Abhinavagupta has already said :

"*Dhvani* is essentially extremely lovely-beautiful. And this essential feature of *dhvani* distinguishes it from secondary usage. For in the examples of secondary usage like 'the boy is a lion', 'there is a settlement of cowherds on Gaṅgā,' there is no beauty at all." <sup>27</sup>

Again in the course of commenting on *Dhvanyāloka* I.13 (P. 105) Abhinavagupta notes that beauty is really essential to poetry :

"As for what has been said (by a critic) : Then the perception of beauty will be the soul of poetry', we actually accept this. The only dispute—between you and us—is about the name (namely, whether to call this *cārutvapratīti* or to call it *dhvani*)."<sup>28</sup>

"Beautiful" means 'that which gives rise to aesthetic repose'. In its absence the function of suggestion does not unfold itself, because, recoiling backwards, it comes to rest in the literal sense itself (i.e. it spends its power in justifying the literal sense). It

26. *Locana*, p. 432.

27. 'अतिरमणीयम्' इति भाक्ताद् व्यतिरेकमाह — 'न हि सिंहो बटुः', 'गङ्गायां घोषः' इत्यत्र रम्यता काचित् ।  
— *Locana*, p. 37

28. यच्चोक्तं 'चारुत्वप्रतीतिस्तर्हि काव्यस्यात्मा स्यात्' इति तदङ्गीकुर्म एव । नाम्नि खल्वयं विवाद इति ।  
— *Locana*, p. 105.



is like a man who sees heavenly wealth for one moment only, and the next moment it is gone."<sup>29</sup>

These passages from *Locana* incidentally provide us with Abhinavagupta's definition of beauty in the context of poetry, one of the fine arts : Beauty is that which gives rise to aesthetic respose. This definition could be made applicable to other fine arts as well.

Jagannātha defines beauty as follows :

*Ramaṇīyatā ca lokottarāhlādajanaka-jñāna-gocaratā ।*

Jagannatha's view about beauty may be stated in simple language as follows :

"Beauty (*ramaṇīyatā* or *saundarya*) produces non-worldly, extra-worldly (different from our everyday worldly experience) aesthetic delight. *Camatkāra* or *camatkṛti* is another name for this non-worldly (aesthetic) delight. This delight is directly experienced by the sensitive, sympathetic and responsive reader-spectator-*sahṛdaya*. So according to Jagannātha, "Beauty is what produces aesthetic delight (when the sensitive reader or spectator contemplates on it or mentally views it or gazes upon it.)"<sup>30</sup> This definition deserves comparison with the definition of Thomas Aquinas :

"Beauty is what pleases in the mere contemplation."<sup>31</sup>

The view of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta as to whether beauty is subjective or objective :

A perusal of relevant passages from *Dhvanyāloka* and *Locana*, it would seem, does not support either of the two views about beauty. These passages are collected here below for ready reference :

1. Ānandavardhana declares :

"Just as beauty in women, when looked at attentively, is an altogether different thing, is the very nectar to the eyes of the *sahṛdayas* even so is the suggested sense—an altogether different thing from the conventional/denoted sense and the figurative/meta-phorical sense."

29. चारुरूपं विश्रान्तिस्थानम्, तदभावे स व्यञ्जकत्वव्यापारो नैवोन्मीलति, प्रत्यावृत्य वाच्य एव विश्रान्तेः क्षणदृष्टनष्टदिव्यविभवप्राकृतपुरुषवत् । - *Locana*, p. 433.

30. (अ) रमणीयता च लोकोत्तराह्लादजनकज्ञानगोचरता । लोकोत्तरत्वं चाह्लादागतः चमत्कारत्वापरपर्यायः अनुभवसाक्षिको जातिविशेषः । - *Rasagaṅgādhara*, KM edn., p. 4.

(आ) सौन्दर्यं च चमत्कारधायकत्वम् । चमत्कृतिरानन्दविशेषः सहृदयहृदयप्रमाणकः । - *Ibid*, p. 157.

31. *The Theory of Beauty* by E. F. Carritt, University paper backs, Methuen : London, p. 6.



Abhinava expands this idea thus :

“Beauty is certainly/truly a different thing from (the beauty of the various/individual parts; it is but what is revealed through the arrangement or shape or form of these various/individual parts. Beauty is not merely the absence of any defect in the parts or their decoration with ornaments. For we find the *sahṛdayas* describing a certain woman as “This one is utterly devoid of beauty even though she be endowed with limbs that are free from defects like ‘being squint-eyed’ (or, being one-eyed) when looked at attentively and even if she be decorated with ornaments and, describing some other woman as. “This one is verily the moonlight oozing (or distilling) the nectar of loveliness even though she may not be completely free from some defect or another, and may not be decorated with ornaments.”<sup>32</sup>

Here we clearly find that beauty is spoken of as a quality of women; and it causes pleasure to the perceiver—*sahṛdaya*.

Although Abhinava when commenting on Ānandavardhana, defines beauty with reference to women, his definition can very well be applied to literary beauty as well.

2. Elsewhere Ānandavardhana asserts that an *alamkāra* (like *upamā*) is universally known as the source of beauty. All *alamkāras* truly become so if they are used as subservient to *rasa* etc., which is the very soul (or the essence) of *kāvya*. Abhinavagupta comments on this as follows : “*Upamā* embellishes the literal sense. However, this literal sense, when endowed with excellence by *upamā* (or any other *alamkāra*), serves to suggest (*rasādi*)-*dhvani*. So really speaking the *dhvani-ātmā* is *alamkārya*. The ornaments like bracelet, *keyūra*, etc., when put on one’s person embellish the sentient person by suggesting his particular mental condition—appropriate or inappropriate. For instance, a dead body when decorated with *alamkāras* does not shine as the soul has departed from the body. An ascetic if he puts on ornaments such as a bracelet of gold etc., becomes a laughing-stock, as in his case the mental condition of a lover is inappropriate. As far as the body is concerned the question of propriety or impropriety does not arise. It is, therefore, one’s self alone that is *alamkārya* as one proudly feels I am splendidly decorated.”<sup>33</sup>

Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta clearly point out that the figures like *upamā*, *rūpaka*, etc., must possess the characteristic of beauty (*cārutā*). If they are devoid of this element of beauty they have no place in poetry. Poetry attains beauty when it embodies suggested sense in the form of *rasa*; this *rasa* consists of pure pleasure, joy, or delight and it (alone) affords aesthetic repose or restful joy (*viśrāntidhāma*).<sup>34</sup>

32. See *Locana* pp. 49–50.

33. *Dhvanyāloka* II, p. 197 *Locana*, pp. 197–198.

34. *Dhvanyāloka* III, pp. 472–473.



3. The phrase '*gaṅgāyām ghoṣaḥ*' (A cowherd settlement on the Gaṅgā), is obviously, as it stands, absurd: *abhidhā* (the power of denotation) gives no sense, and we are obliged to find a transferred sense (by resorting to *lakṣaṇā*). *Lakṣaṇā* gives us the sense of a village on the bank of the Gaṅgā. Further, by such a phrase deliberately used in poetry there is brought to us a sense of the purity and coolness of the village. This sense is not given either by *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā* but by a new power of suggestion, *vyañjanā*, which is derived from the poet's purpose (*prayojana*) in using the phrase. But Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta insist that mere suggestion is not enough to make a true poem. What makes a true poem is beauty; and this beauty must be such as to afford the reader aesthetic repose (*viśrānti-sthāna*). Abhinavagupta when distinguishing *dhvani* (suggestion) from the secondary usage (*bhākta*) observes : "There is absolutely no beauty in such secondary usages : 'the boy is a lion' or 'the village on the river Gaṅgā'." In these and other similar examples "the boy is a fire", "the cots cry" there may be present slight touch of beauty. But these examples do not possess sufficient beauty-beauty sufficient enough to afford aesthetic repose to the *sahṛdaya*. In one word, Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta insist on the creation of beauty as vital to poetry. Abhinavagupta notes this essential characteristic in his *Locana* : "As for what has been said (by some critic) : 'Then the perception of beauty will be the soul of poetry', we actually accept this. The only dispute is about the name (*nāmni khalvayam vivādaḥ* !)"<sup>35</sup>

Now, *cārutvapraṭīti* (perception of beauty) presupposes existence of objective beauty due to a beautiful suggested sense and its perception or cognition by a *sahṛdaya*.

4. The erotic, being the source of the greatest pleasure, is the sweetest of all sentiments :

"The mental impression (*vāsanā, saṁskāra*) of love, in the case of lower animals, men and gods, is permanent and accompanies their soul in its migration from one birth to another. Hence there is none who does not feel interested in the matter of love. Even an ascetic, who has renounced all worldly things is moved by a poem, imbued with love, and appreciates and enjoys it. This is why the erotic sentiment is called the sweetest. For, a person, whether wise or otherwise, whether healthy or sick, longs for the essence of candied sugar, etc., as soon as it falls on his tongue."

In another context, Abhinavagupta amplifies the idea of an ascetic enjoying a love-poem by citing a striking example : "For it is not true that a man without passion must see things topsy turvy. If he hears the sounds of a lute he does not after all think that he has heard the raucous (harsh sounding) crowings of a crow." This statement implies

35. See f.n. 28 on page no. 9.



that the sounds of a lute are inherently beautiful and that they are also perceived as beautiful even by a passionless ascetic.”<sup>36</sup>

5. Following Bharata who brings in the analogy of *śāḍava* beverage and gourmet (fastidious eater) savouring tasty food, Abhinavagupta gives the analogy of a meat-dish and a sweet-dish, prepared by an unskilled cook, and a fastidious eater : “... There is no perception or cognition of *rasa* as in a special meat-dish prepared by an unskilled cook.” An objector might say : “Just as a sweet dish (*śikhariṇī*—a dish of curds and molasses mixed with spices) prepared by an unskilled cook on account of its inherent deliciousness tastes very well even so the said meat-dish might taste delicious.” Abhinavagupta replies that when tasting the said sweet-dish, the fastidious eaters do not, merely on the basis of the knowledge of the sweet-dish exclaim in wonder “oh! how delicious to taste is this sweet-dish !” They only say, “its ingredients curds, sugar and spices have not been properly mixed.”<sup>37</sup>

All the above passages speak of a *sahṛdaya* who perceives beauty that is a property or quality of things—thus attesting to the self-evident truth that it takes two, a subject and an object, to make beauty. So, according to these Sanskrit theorists, Beauty is by nature subjective-cum-objective.

In other words, perception of beauty is a bipolar phenomenon, being the result of the operation of a highly responsive, sensitive mind on an inherently beautiful thing. Sanskrit theorists, it would seem, support Alexander who wrote :

“Some there are, who believe beauty to be a character which belongs intrinsically to the beautiful object and is merely observed or discovered by us.”<sup>38</sup> As against this we have the statement by Lipps: “Aesthetic pleasure is an enjoyment of our own activity in an object.” The two views seem mutually exclusive. But they can be harmonised. “To the extent that the power to yield delight is the generic quality of objects of art, it seems to be an objective feature. But delight is an inward reality in the relisher (= the *sahṛdaya*). Beauty is objective when the beautiful object can evoke delight again and again. But the individuals who confront it should have the right sensibility.”<sup>39</sup> Disinterested relishing of the *rasa* which the poet has embodied in a poem is possible for a *sahṛdaya* since there is the basic identity of human nature between individuals—here the poet and the reader

36. न हि वीतरगो विपर्यस्तान् भावान् पश्यति । न ह्यस्य वीणाक्वणितं काकरटितकल्पं प्रतिभाति ।

— *Locana*, p. 488.

37. *Locana*, pp. 496–497.

38. Alexander : *Beauty and other Forms of Value*.

39. *Sanskrit Poetics : A Critical and Comparative Study* by Krishna Chaitanya, Publishing House, Bombay, 1985, p. 55.



of like heart with the poet. Admittedly, sensitivity or poetic sensibility varies widely between individuals but the reaction and experience of all true *sahṛdayas*, when they enjoy disinterestedly the aesthetic emotion, is almost identical and this proves indisputably the objective nature of beauty.

### The Nature of *rasa* :

Now, the greatest source of beauty in literature, is, according to Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the depiction or portrayal of emotional situation which gives a *sahṛdaya* aesthetic rapture of *rasa*. "The word '*rasa*' primarily means 'taste' such as sweetness; and by a metaphorical extension, it has been applied to aesthetic experience. The point of the metaphor is that, as in the case of a taste like sweetness, there is no knowing of *rasa* apart from directly experiencing it. *Rasa* experience is predominantly emotional. It naturally differs according to the specific kind of emotion portrayed—love, sorrow, fear, wonder and the like. *Rasa* is, however, in its intrinsic nature but one and its so called varieties are only different forms of it due to difference in their respective psychological determinants. In its fundamental character *rasa* signifies an emotion, experienced by itself transcending the subject-object relation. *Rasa*—experience consists in an ideal revival in the reader's mind of an emotion like the one depicted in the poem which lies latent in the *sahṛdaya*. Being a revival it necessarily goes back to his past experience. This past experience serves as the centre round which the reconstruction takes place. He imaginatively reconstructs in his mind the whole situation as it has been depicted by the poet and enjoys it. In this aesthetic experience the reader or spectator forgets himself altogether and experiences pure joy or delight."<sup>40</sup>

Abhinavagupta provides a philosophical foundation for this theory of *rasa*. "Reduced to its bare essentials the theory is as follows : Watching a play or reading a poem for the sensitive reader (*sahṛdaya*) entails a loss of the sense of present time and space. All worldly considerations for the time being cease. Since we are not indifferent (*taṭastha*) to what is taking place, our involvement must be of a purer variety than we normally experience. We are not directly and personally involved, so the usual medley of desires and anxieties dissolve. Our hearts respond sympathetically (*hṛdayasaṁvāda*) but not selfishly. Finally the response becomes total, all-engrossing, and we identify with the situation depicted (*tanmayībhavana*). The ego is transcended, and for the duration of the aesthetic experience, the normal waking "I" (*aham*) is suspended. Once this actually happens, we suddenly find that our responses are not like anything we have hitherto experienced, for now that all normal emotions are gone, now that the hard knot of "selfness" has been untied, we find ourselves in an unprecedented state of mental and

40. Based on *Art Experience*.



emotional calm. The purity of our emotion and the intensity of it take us to a higher level of pleasure than we could know before—we experience sheer undifferentiated bliss (*ānandaikaghana*).<sup>41</sup>

And this absorption results in the aesthetic rapture of *rasa*.

### About the content of *kāvya* :

Ānandavardhana says in the third *Uddyota* :

“In the province of *kāvya* where we perceive suggested sense, the notions of *satya* (truth) and *asatya* (falsehood) are meaningless. To examine *kāvya* through the well-known *pramāṇas* (means of valid knowledge) would simply lead to ridicule.”<sup>42</sup>

He means to say that things in *kāvya* have no place in the everyday world of space and time, and owing to this lack of ontological or physical status the question of reality or unreality does not apply to them. That, however, does not mean they are unreal. In fact, the distinction of existence or non-existence does not at all arise in their case.

Abhinavagupta elucidates this passage of Ānandavardhana by citing a dissimilar example (*vaidharmya-drṣṭānta*) :

“We are not to examine these statements in *kāvya* as to whether they are true and consider whether they command us to do something as the Vedic sentences enjoining *agniṣṭoma* sacrifice do. They simply directly contribute to giving aesthetic delight (and only indirectly to refining or influencing our character and culture of mind and heart). It is essentially of the nature of *alaukika camatkāra*.”<sup>43</sup>

It is evoked in a reader when a *vastu* or *alamkāra* or *rasādi*; is/are portrayed by the poet in his *kāvya*. The *rasādi-dhvani* is given the place of supremacy as it is the source of the highest delight next only to that of *Brahma*-realisation. Naturally, emotions are the central theme and content of *kāvya* according to both Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta, the two greatest aestheticians India has so far produced.

### About the method of *kāvya* :

Ānandavardhana regards “*śabdārthau*” (word and sense) as only the outer vesture of *kāvya* and *emotion* as its “*ātman*”. Now emotions are never conveyed by the mere naming of them. They can be conveyed only indirectly through an appropriate portrayal of their causes and effects. This indirect method of conveying *rasas* is called ‘*dhvani*’

41. *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*, Introduction (p. VII). by J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, Bhandarkar Oriental Res. Institute, Poona, 1969.

42. *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 455.

43. *Locana*, p. 455.



(suggestion, suggestiveness). This method is extended to two other spheres of theme of *kāvya*, viz. *vastu* (a fact, a bare idea) and *alamkāra* (figure of speech). Both *vastu-dhvani* and *alamkāra-dhvani* can be paraphrased but *rasādidhvani* can never lend itself to paraphrase. The beauty lent by suggested sense is the greatest *alamkāra* of poetic speech just like bashfulness of women.

Abhinavagupta too upholds this method of *dhvani* as propounded by Ānandavardhana. In the course of his exposition he often draws our attention to '*gopanasārasaundarya*', and in one passage he compares *dhvani* to a beautiful and noble lady's breasts partly covered and partly revealed.

"This simile on account of its sheer beauty and aptness became famous in later *alamkāra* literature. At one place he makes a perceptive remark : What charm is there if the sense to be conveyed is directly or openly conveyed by the power of denotation ?

Ānandavardhana boldly declares that *dhvani* (suggestion) is *kāvyaśya ātmā* (the soul, the very essence of poetry, creative literature). It may present itself in the form of *vastu* or *alamkāra* or *rasādi*. He is perfectly aware of the importance of *rasādhvani*. But it is Abhinavagupta who gives it the pride of place and asserts that the other two *dhvanis* are only its aspects, and that they are not really valuable in themselves but only in so far as they lead to *rasādi-dhvani*."<sup>44</sup>

When commenting on the word (*dhvaneḥ svarūpam*) '*atiramaṇīyam*' from Ānandavardhana's *Vṛtti* he rightly observes: "By this expression he points out the difference of *dhvani* from (and its superiority to) the *bhākta* (the secondary usage) : There is hardly any beauty in these examples of secondary usages : '*siṃho baṭuḥ*' (the boy is a lion), '*Gaṅgāyaṁ ghoṣaḥ*' (there is a settlement of cowherds on the river Gaṅgā)." Why these and such other examples lack beauty and why they do not deserve the title *kāvya* he explains in another passage.<sup>45</sup>

The Objector : Thus the sentence "the boy is a lion" might constitute as the soul if the form of suggestion is present in it.

The *Siddhāntin* : If so, you will have to call a jar 'living' for *ātman* which is all-pervasive is also present in it.

The Objector : If the soul is possessed of a body endowed with various organs etc., then only it is called 'living' and not any kind of body.

44. *Locana* p. 85.

45. *Locana* p. 37, P. 59.



The *Siddhāntin* : If the soul of *dhvani* (suggestion) is invested with a body consisting of words and meanings that are beautiful on account of the presence of *guṇas* (excellences) and *alamkāras* (figures of speech) appropriate to the particular (*rasa*-) *dhvani*, then we call those *śabda* and *artha* as *kāvya* (*śabdārthau kāvyam*).

In conclusion, *cārutva-pratīti* (perception of beauty) is the very soul or the essence of poetry (creative literature). This perception of beauty presupposes the existence of objective beauty due to a beautiful suggested sense and its perception by a sensitive reader or spectator. The subjective-cum-objective nature of beauty is suggested, when Abhinavagupta says in the *maṅgalaśloka* to his *Locana* :

*Sarasvatyās tattvaṁ kavi-saḥṛdayākhyam vijayate ।*

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46. I, especially acknowledge my deep debt of gratitude to the authors of the following works on which I have freely drawn :

J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan : *Śāntarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics And, Aesthetic Rapture* Vol. I : Text, Vol. II : Notes.

W. Basil Worsfold : *Jugment in Literature*, London 1917.



## BHARATA'S CONCEPT OF BHĀVA

Bharata in his *saṅgraha-kārikā* (*Nāṭyaśāstra*<sup>1</sup> VI.10) enumerates the main subjects of *Nāṭyaśāstra*, viz., *rasas*, *bhāvas*, etc. After dealing with *rasas* he takes up for treatment *bhāvas*. He mainly deals with eight *sthāyibhāvas*, thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* and eight *sāttvikabhāvas*, in all forty-nine *bhāvas*.<sup>2</sup>

Incidentally he defines *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* which are absolutely *jaḍa* or *acetana* that is insentient—devoid of consciousness.

*Bhāva* : At the outset of the chapter he informs us that *bhāvas* are so called as they suggest or manifest the *kāvyārtha* i.e. *rasa* connected with dramatic representation that is involuntary (*sattva*) and that which uses speech (*vāk*) and that which uses the body (*aṅga*) i.e., gestures and bodily movements and that which uses costume, (*āhārya*) not clearly mentioned but implied. In this connection he then cites two traditional verses :

1. A *bhāva* is so named as it brings to the consciousness of the spectators (or causes them to experience) the *kāvyārtha*, that is *rasa*, brought forth by the *vibhāvas* (determinants) and manifested through *anubhāvas* (consequents) and *sāttvikabhāvas* (involuntary states), and by dramatic representation that uses speech (*vāk*) and that which uses the body (*aṅga*.)

2. A *bhāva* is so called because it manifests the emotions or internal feelings of the poet through acting of involuntary states (e.g. tears, perspiration, etc.) and through dramatic representation of words (*vāk*), gestures, bodily movements and facial changes (lit. colour of the face – *mukharāga*).

Bharata derives the word *bhāva* “from the causative of *bhū*, to be, which may be intended in two different meanings, that is “to cause to be” (viz. bring about, create, etc.) and “to pervade”. According to the first meaning that which is brought about are the purposes of poetry, *kāvyārtha*, that is the *rasas*. .....According to the second meaning these are so called because they pervade the minds of spectators as any smell does.”<sup>3</sup>

1. *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata Muni with *Abhinavabhāratī* by Abhinavagupta, Vol. I, Fourth Edition, Oriental Institute, Vadodara, 1992.

2. तत्राष्टौ भावाः स्थायिनः । त्रयस्त्रिंशद् व्यभिचारिणः । अष्टौ सात्त्विका इति भेदाः । एवमेते काव्यरसाभिव्यक्तिहेतव एकोनपञ्चाशद्भावाः प्रत्यवगन्तव्याः ।

3. भू इति (प्यन्तः) करणे धातुः । तथा च भावितं वासितं कृतमित्यनर्थान्तरम् । लोकेऽपि च प्रसिद्धम् । अहो ह्यनेन गन्धेन रसेन वा सर्वमेव भावितमिति । तच्च व्याप्त्यर्थम् । – *Ibid*, p. 338.

वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् काव्यार्थान् भावयन्तीति भावा इति । – *Ibid*, p. 336.



As they cause the *rasas* relating to various kinds of dramatic representation (to pervade the minds of spectators) they are called *bhāvas* by those who produce a drama. (Ibid, VII.3)

"The word *vibhāva* has the meaning of distinct or clear knowledge. The words *vibhāva*, *kāraṇa*, *nimitta* and *hetu* are synonymous. As words, gestures and bodily movements and the dramatic representation of involuntary states (connected with the manifestation of *kāvyaārtha*, *rasas*) are clearly determined by this (*vibhāvyate anena*) it is called *vibhāva*. *Vibhāvita* is synonymous with *vijñata*." – (Ibid. p. 340)

*Anubhāva* : "*Anubhāva* is so called because the dramatic representation based on words (*vāk*) gestures and bodily movements (*aṅga*) and involuntary states (*sāttvikabhāva*) causes (the spectators) to experience (the corresponding emotion)." In this regard there is a verse :

"Since the *kāvyaārtha* (*rasa*) is made to be experienced by dramatic representation using speech (*vāk*) and gestures and bodily movements (*aṅga*), the term *anubhāva* (consequents) is therefore used. It is connected with the flourish of hand-gesture (*śākhā*) as well as the gestures of the major and minor limbs of the body." (Ibid, p. 345)

Now, in everyday life *vibhāva* is not called *vibhāva* but *kāraṇa* (cause). In the same way in everyday life *anubhāva* is not called *anubhāva* but *kārya* (effect). These designations, *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* which we do not use in everyday life, are indications of the *alaukika* nature of *rasa*.

In regard to *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* Bharata remarks :

The *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas* are well known [as *kāraṇa* and *kārya*]. They closely follow human nature. Hence their definitions are not given – not explained and this is for avoiding prolixity.

Incidentally, Bharata does not limit the number of *vibhāvas* – and *anubhāvas* unlike that of *sthāyi-vyabhicāri* – and *sāttvika-bhāvas* which are unalterably fixed as eight, thirty three and eight respectively.

*yo'rtho hrdayasaṁvādī.....NŚ VII. 7*

This verse, especially its first half, is variously interpreted :

(i) M. Ghosh thus translates the first half :

"The State proceeding from the thing which is congenial to the heart is the source of the sentiment".... (P. 120)

(ii) *Bharata-Nāṭya-Maṇjarī* translates it as :

"The emotional state pertaining to the art-content (*artha*) which evokes a hearty communion is the source of *rasa*;....." And adds a note :



'*Rasodbhavaḥ*' must be interpreted '*rasasya udbhavaḥ, utpattisthānam, kāraṇam vā*' and as going with *bhāvaḥ*, in keeping with Bharata's earlier pronouncement that *rasas* arise from *bhāvas*. – (p. 101)

(iii) The authors of *Śāntarasa*<sup>4</sup> translate it thus :

"The externalisation (*bhāva*) of that emotion (*artha*) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source (*udbhava*) of *rasa*. – (p. 78 fn. 4)

(iv) Abhinavagupta cites the verse in support of his definition of *sahṛdayas* :

"Those people who are capable of identifying with the subject matter, as the mirror of their hearts has been polished through constant repetition and study of poetry, and who sympathetically respond in their hearts – those (people) are what are known as sensitive readers."

(v) Keeping in mind the comments of the commentary *Bālapriyā*<sup>5</sup> the verse may be translated as follows :

Constant relishing (*bhāva* = *bhāvanā* – *nirantara-carvaṇā*) of the subject matter (viz., the *vibhāvas* etc.,) which makes an appeal to the heart is the source of *rasa* (*rasodbhava*). The body (of the *sahṛdaya*) is pervaded by it (i.e., the *rasa*) as drywood by fire. That is why they are external manifestations of the *sāttvikabhāvas* (involuntary states) like *romāñca* or *pulaka* (horripilation) or (goose-flesh), *sveda* (sweat) and the like.

Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy differs with the author of the *Bālapriyā* commentary and for that matter even with Abhinavagupta. According to him, the connoisseur's appreciative response to poetry was not called *rasa* by Bharata or his early interpreters. They rightly termed it only as *hṛdayasamvāda*. He cites Bharata's above verse and translates it in his own way, influenced, however by the *Locana-Kaumudī*<sup>6</sup> and finally observes :

"It appears to me that the metaphor here need not be taken literally to refer to body of the *sahṛdaya*, as it is usually done; but understood to refer to the body of a literary

4. *Śāntarasa* by J. L. Masson, M. V. Patwardhan, BORI, Poona, 1969, p. 78, f.n. 4.

5. योऽर्थ इति । यः हृदयसंवादी..... तद्विषयः सहृदयश्लाघ्यो विभावादिलक्षणोऽर्थः । तस्य भावः भावना निरन्तरचर्वणा । रसोद्भवः चर्वणाप्राणस्य रसस्याभिव्यक्तिहेतुः । शरीरमित्यादि । तेनार्थेन हृदयव्याप्तिपूर्वकम् । सहृदयशरीरमपि व्याप्यते । अत एव पुलकाद्याविर्भावः ।

— *Dhvanyāloka-Locana* with "*Bālapriyā*" commentary, Banaras, 1940, p. 39.

6. *New Bearings of Indian Literary Theory and Criticism* by Dr. K. Krishnamoorthy, B. J. Institute of Learning and Research, Ahmedabad-9, p. 48.



work as a whole. Bharata is not talking of the *sahṛdaya* at the commencement of his seventh chapter but of *bhāva* in drama. This context should not be ignored.<sup>7</sup>

A close look at the verse would reveal that its first half is concerned with the *rasa-niṣpatti* whereas the second half with its enjoyment by a *sahṛdaya*.

**Sthāyibhāva :** In the 'authentic' text of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*<sup>8</sup> we do not find the term *sthāyibhāva* defined. The following verse is generally accepted as the definition of *sthāyibhāva* :

बहूनां समवेतानां रूपं यस्य भवेद् बहु ।  
स मन्तव्यो रसः स्थायी शेषाः संचारिणो मताः ॥

Now, in the Baroda edition referred to above this verse and seven and a half verses succeeding it are presented in round brackets between the verses 119 and 120, and without numbering them, thus indicating that they are later interpolations or insertions in the Seventh chapter of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* called *Bhāvādhyāya*.

There is however a sort of internal evidence to believe that a few of them at least may be genuine. That apart, we have convincing evidence to declare that Abhinavagupta considered the above verse "*bahūnām samavetānām*" etc., to be a genuine part of Bharata's text. For he himself, when commenting on *Dhvanyāloka*, III.24 explicitly says :<sup>9</sup>

भावाध्यायसमाप्तावस्ति श्लोकः

बहूनां समवेतानां रूपं यस्य भवेद् बहु ।  
स मन्तव्यो रसस्थायी शेषाः सञ्चारिणो मताः ॥

तत्रोक्तक्रमेणाधिकारिकेतिवृत्तव्यापिका चित्तवृत्तिरवश्यमेव स्थायित्वेन भाति प्रासंगिकवृत्तान्तगामिनी तु व्यभिचारितयेति रस्यमानतासमये स्थायिव्यभिचारिभावस्य न कश्चिद् विरोध इति केचिद् व्याचक्षिरे ।..... (p. 386)

Translation: "At the end of Bharata's chapter on the *bhāvas* is this verse :

Of many [*rasas*] which are used in the same work the one whose form is [of] large [compass] should be considered the abiding (*sthāyin*) *rasa*; the others, the 'transient' (*sañcārin*) *rasas*.

According to what is stated in this verse, a state of mind (*cittavṛtti*) that extends over the basic plot must necessarily appear as "abiding", whereas that which accompanies only an incident in the plot will appear as "transient." Thus there is no contradiction in an abider – transient (= principal-subordinate) relation between them at the time when

7. *Ibid*, p. 26.

8. Vide f.n. 1 on page no. 18.

9. Vide the edition of *Dhvanyāloka* referred to in f.n. 5 on page no. 20.



they are relished in the form of *rasas*. This is how some people (In the term "some people" Abhinavagupta apparently includes himself) have explained the verse."

But others understand the verse differently..... According to them its literal interpretation is : "Of many *bhāvas* (emotional states) in their form of states of mind (*cittavṛtti*), that one whose form is found to be large is the *sthāyibhāva* (the abiding emotion) and it is a '*rasa*' because it is capable of being made into a *rasa*; the others are called, transient."

There is a third interpretation also : "Of many [*bhāvas*] which are used in the same work, the one whose form is [of a] large [compass] should be considered as the 'abiding' *bhāva* of [or in, or with] the *rasa*; the others as the 'transient' [*bhāvas*]." <sup>10</sup>

This passage from Abhinavagupta's *Locana* clearly shows that Abhinavagupta held that the present verse was a genuine part of Bharata's text of *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

Now, Bharata lists eight *sthāyibhāvas* (permanent, abiding or dominant emotions). They are the basic and vital element in the production of *rasa* (*rasa-niṣpatti*). They dominate all other transient emotions or mental states and persist throughout the drama amid their variations. According to Bharata, the *sthāyibhāva* stands to the other *bhāvas* in the position of a king to his subjects<sup>11</sup> or a master to his pupils.<sup>12</sup>

Some neo-moderns (*nava-navināḥ*) have taken exception to Abhinavagupta's describing these *sthāyibhāvas* as worldly (*laukika*) permanent emotions when Bharata has used the term strictly in its technical meaning (a dominant emotion which persists throughout the drama amid the variations of the transient feelings. The criticism of '*nava-navināḥ*' ignores Abhinavagupta's own view of aesthetic experience. For a clear exposition of his own view of *rasa* it was necessary for him to explain the worldly nature of the *sthāyibhāvas* like *rati*, *śoka*, etc. The names of permanent emotions in life and literature (particularly dramatic literature) are the same and not different as in the case of *hetu* or *kāraṇa*, *kārya* and *sahakāri* or *sahacāri* (*kāraṇa*) which are called *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabhicāribhāva* respectively in the field of the *rasa* theory. Possibly, this is responsible for the confusion of the neo-moderns.

In his *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* II.4 Abhinavagupta observes :

("When Bhaṭṭanāyaka) on his part says that extraordinary deeds of Rāma (such as building a bridge over the ocean, etc.) do not win sympathetic response from

10. *The Dhvanyāloka of Ānandavardhana with the Locana of Abhinavagupta*, translated by D. Ingalls, J. L. Masson and M. V. Patwardhan, (HOS-49), 1990, pp. 511-515.

11-12. यथा नराणां नृपतिः शिष्याणां च यथा गुरुः ।

एवं हि सर्वभवानां भावः स्थायी महानिह ॥ — *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VII. 8



everybody, he is being very rash indeed. For minds are characterised as possessing a great variety of latent impressions (*vāsanā*). As has been said : “*Vāsanās* are endless because desire is eternal” (*Yogasūtra* IV.10). Although separated by births (*jāti*), place (*deśa*) and time (*kāla*) nonetheless there is a correspondence between memory and *saṁskāras* (i.e., though several lives intervene, *vāsanās* still give rise to instinctive reactions to external situations.)” – (Ibid IV.9)<sup>13</sup>

Again, in *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. 1 p. 276 (4th edn. 1992) Abhinavagupta examines each one of the nine *sthāyibhāvas* and shows how every living being, right from his birth is endowed with these nine forms of consciousness (mental states.) of permanent nature. For example, in accordance with the maxim – ‘everyone seeks pleasure and avoids pain’, all beings are eager to taste or enjoy pleasure (*rati*). He concludes : “There exists no living being who is devoid of the *vāsanās* or *saṁskāras* (latent impressions of these nine mental states). All we can say is that in someone one of these mental states may predominate, in someone else it may not predominate to the same extent.”

From these passages it would seem that according to Abhinavagupta, *vāsanās* or *saṁskāras* are the same as *sthāyibhāvas*. Incidentally, it may be noted that in Kālidāsa's famous *subhāṣita*-like *arthāntaranyāsa* ‘*bhāvasthirāṇi janāntara-sauhrdāni, bhāvasthira* is the same as *sthāyibhāva*.

Now, when one watches the performance of a play in which, say, the *sthāyibhāva rati* predominates, one's corresponding *sthāyibhāva rati* lying latent is awakened or activated by the powerful impact of the *vibhāvas*, etc. After it is activated there takes place *hṛdayasṁvāda* (sympathetic response). This *hṛdayasṁvāda* represents the state just before *tādātmya* or *tanmayibhāva*. This *tādātmya* is made possible through the process of *sādhāraṇīkaraṇa* (universalisation, idealisation) which makes all events in a play impersonal and universal. When all the events, *vibhāvas*, etc., are made impersonal and universal *tādātmya* or *tanmayibhāva* or *tanmayibhavana* i. e. identification with the situation being portrayed takes place, and finally *rasa-carvaṇā*. In this process of *rasa-carvaṇa* we can easily see how basic is the concept of *sthāyibhāva* lying latent or dormant in the spectator's mind. Abhinavagupta very emphatically tells us that the spectators do not enjoy the *sthāyibhāva* or (*rasa*) present in the character (*anukārya*) or the actor (*anukartā*) but the *sthāyibhāva* activated in their own minds by the *vibhāvas*, etc.

**Vyabhicāribhāva :** (transient or transitory feelings) Bharata lists thirty-three *vyabhicāri-bhāvas*, *nirveda* (world-weariness), *glāni* (physical weariness) etc., and remarks that they are defined or explained by their name, that is they are significant (Ch. VI vv. 18–21.)

13. Vide *Śāntarasa* p. 74.



In the seventh chapter on *bhāvas* he describes them, one by one, along with directions as to how they should be represented or acted on the stage. He prefaces this description with an etymological explanation of the term *vyabhicārīṇaḥ*. 'VI' and 'abhi' are prefixes and the root is 'cara' meaning 'to move', 'to go'. Hence the term *vyabhicārīṇaḥ* means : "Those that move variously (vi) and favorably (abhi) in relation to the *rasas*." Incidentally, it may be noted that the *vyabhicāribhāvas* are also called or known as "*saṁcāribhāvas*" transient or evanescent feelings which serve to strengthen the prevailing *rasa* intensely or greatly. These *bhāvas*, which are opposite of *sthāyibhāvas*, do not form substratum of any *rasa*; still they act or serve as feeders to the prevailing or governing *rasa*. The name *vyabhicāribhāva* indicates that it may be in one context a part of one *sthāyibhāva*, in another context of another.

The number of *vyabhicāribhāvas* : When listing the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* Bharata clearly says : "These are the thirty-three *vyabhicārīṇaḥ*." It means that the number of *vyabhicāribhāvas* is fixed and that the list of *vyabhicāribhāvas* is exhaustive. Abhinavagupta remarks : "the number thirty-three is mentioned with a view to limiting their number on both sides that is, they are neither more nor less than [thirty three.]" He, however, while commenting on the verse giving the list of *sthāyibhāvas* says : "Some others say that Bharata has not given any fixed number for *sthāyins*. It means that these *sthāyins* too become *vyabhicārins*. This matter we will later discuss at length."

Here one such matter may be referred to. With reference to the *vyabhicāribhāvas* of *saṁbhoga-śṛṅgāra* Bharata says : the *vyabhicāribhāvas* of this *rasa* can be all of the thirty-three except laziness (*ālasya*), violence (*augrya*) and disgust (*jugupsā*). Now *jugupsā*, which is the *sthāyibhāva* of the *bībhatsa-rasa* is mentioned here as one of the *vyabhicāribhāvas* to be avoided when portraying the *saṁbhoga śṛṅgāra*. This statement of Bharata implies that the so-called *sthāyibhāvas* can or could come as *vyabhicāribhāvas* of some other *rasas*. As regards the eight *sāttvikabhāvas*, Bharata gives them, when defining individual *rasas* as *vyabhicāribhāvas*. These facts show that the categories of *bhāvas* as *sthāyins*, *vyabhicārins* and *sāttvikas* are not very strict or binding.

There is, however, no such suggestion from Bharata's text that a *vyabhicāribhāva* can become a *sthāyibhāva*. Abhinavagupta, however, in the context of the *sthāyibhāva* of *śānta* refers to *nirveda*, arisen from *tattvajñāna* (knowledge of the Truth or Reality) as its *sthāyibhāva*. This is why *nirveda* has been mentioned at the beginning of the *vyabhicāribhāvas*, even though it is an inauspicious word (with which to begin a list), precisely in order to show that it depends on, that is, partakes of both characters, that is, it is both a *vyabhicāribhāva* and a *sthāyibhāva*. Abhinavagupta, it may be noted,



observes at one place : A *sthāyin* can become a *vyabhicārin* but a *vyabhicārin* can never become a *sthāyin*.<sup>14</sup>

Again Bharata himself mentions quite a few new *vyabhicāribhāvas*, new in the sense that they are not given by Bharata in his list of thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas*. For example, under *hāsyā-rasa* he gives *tandrā* (drowsiness) and under *bībhatsa-rasa*, *udvega* (alarm or anxiety). It is possible however to argue, in defence of Bharata though, that these new *vyabhicāribhāvas* are only synonymous with some of the *vyabhicāribhāvas* listed by him.

On a scrutiny, we find that the eight *sthāyibhāvas* listed by Bharata not only correspond to but are actually identical with the worldly emotions (*laukika vāsanās* or *saṁskāras* or *saṁvittis* or *cittavṛttis*). But in the list of thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* we find that a large majority of them correspond to, as well as are identical with *laukika* transitory feelings. Only a few like *nidrā* (sleeping), *maraṇa* (death), *ālasya* (laziness) *vyādhi* (sickness), etc., are physical states.

Now a question arises : 'How is it that Bharata has included some insentient (*jada*, *acetana*) and external (*bāhya*) states in the list of *vyabhicāribhāvas* which are sentient (*cetana*) and internal (*āntara*) ?

No satisfactory answer is so far found to this baffling question. In Bharata's defence his admirers argue like this : Bharata's primary concern is the presentation of *bhāvas* from the world of drama through fourfold dramatic presentation of acting, and enable *sahṛdayas* to experience and enjoy aesthetic pleasure. He is least concerned in psychology and psychoanalysis. This is equally applicable to "*sāttvikabhāvas*" which are nothing but bodily-physical manifestations and yet are called (*sāttvika*) *bhāvas* !

The category of thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* is seen to be not a very strict one. Many of them are considered even by Bharata himself as *vibhāvas*. To cite one example : In defining *nidrā* (a *vyabhicāribhāva*) Bharata gives *śrama* (fatigue), *ālasya* (laziness), *cintā* (worry), which are listed as *vyabhicāribhāvas* as its *vibhāvas*. They are also considered as *anubhāvas*. For example, in defining *āvega* (panic) he gives *viṣāda* as an *anubhāva* and in defining *garva* (pride) he gives *asūyā* (envy), a *vyabhicāribhāva*, as its *anubhāva*.

14. *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I. Ch 6, p. 262.

(i) तत्त्वज्ञानजो निर्वेदोऽस्य स्थायी । एतदर्थमेवोभयधर्मोपजीवित्वख्यापनायामङ्गलभूतोऽप्यसौ पूर्वं निर्दिष्टो....  
स्थायिषु च सङ्ख्या नोक्त्यपरे । अत एव स्थायिन एते तु व्यभिचारिणोऽपि भवन्ति ।

(ii) स्थायिनो हि व्यभिचारिता भवति । न तु व्यभिचारिणां स्थायिता । - *Ibid*, p. 339.



Incidentally, it may be noted that Abhinavagupta did not accept the view that the *vyabhicāribhāvas* themselves would be attended by other *vyabhicāribhāvas*.<sup>15</sup>

**Sāttvikabhāvas** : Immediately after dealing with eight *sthāyibhāvas* and thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* Bharata goes on to consider *sāttvikabhāvas*. First he explains why they are called *sāttvika* : *sattva* is something which arises from the mind. It emerges from the concentrated mind.<sup>16</sup> The *sāttvikabhāva*, which is of the form of *romāñca* (horripilation or goose-flesh), tears (*āśru*) paleness or loss of colour (*vaivarṇya*), etc., and is in accordance with its appropriate feeling, cannot be enacted, by an absent-minded actor. *Sattva* is essential in drama as it is an imitation or reproduction or re-enactment of what happens in everyday life or of human nature.<sup>17</sup> To explain : Situations of happiness and misery that are to be reproduced on the stage should be properly presented on the strength of *sattva* so that they appear completely realistic. How can sorrow which needs for its expression weeping be enacted on the stage by anyone who is not himself unhappy ? (Who has no experience of unhappiness ?) and joy be enacted on the stage by anyone who is not happy ? This itself is the *sattva* in an actor : feigning to be in an unhappy or happy state, he has to shed tears or display goose-flesh.<sup>18</sup> And that is why these emotional or mental states are called *sāttvikabhāvas*.

These are the eight *sāttvikabhāvas* : 1. *stambha* (paralysis) 2. *sveda* (perspiration) 3. *romāñca* (horripilation or goose-flesh) 4. *svarabheda* (faltering voice) 5. *vepathu* (trembling) 6. *vaivarṇya* (paleness, loss of colour) 7. *āśru* (tears) and 8. *pralaya* (fainting).

A careful look at the above list of the eight *sāttvikabhāvas* would reveal that they are all external manifestations (*bāhya*) and physical attributes (*śarīradharma*) whereas *bhāvas* are mental states and internal (*āntara*). How is it then Bharata calls them *sāttvikabhāvas* ? Bharata nowhere directly answers this question. A discerning reader of Bharata's treatment of *bhāvas* would notice two significant things. One, immediately after dealing with the eight *sthāyibhāvas* (permanent emotions) and the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* (transitory feelings) and just before commencing the treatment of *anubhāvas* (consequents) Bharata treats of these eight *sāttvikabhāvas* and thereby suggests that they have dual character — they partake of both characters, i.e.,

15. अन्ये तु.... व्यभिचारिणामपि च व्यभिचारिणो भवन्ति । यथा निर्वेदस्य चिन्ता श्रमस्य निर्वेद इत्यादि निरूपयन्ति । तच्चासत् । — *Ibid*, p. 339.

16. इह हि सत्त्वं नाम मनःप्रभवम् । तच्च समाहितमनस्त्वादुच्यते । — *Ibid*, p. 373.

17. लोकस्वभावानुकरणात्वाच्च नाट्यस्य सत्त्वमीप्सितम् । — *Ibid*, p. 373.

18. एतदेवास्य सत्त्वं यद् दुःखितेन सुखितेन वाऽश्रुरेमाञ्चौ दर्शयितव्यौ.... — *Ibid*, p. 373.



they are both *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.<sup>19</sup> The *vyabhicāribhāvas* are invariably of the nature of 'bhāva' – mental states, feelings, whereas the *anubhāvas* are without any exception *jaḍa-acetana*, mere bodily external states or attributes. Two, when defining the individual *rasas* Bharata gives some of the *sāttvikas* as *vyabhicārins*. For example, while defining *karuṇa* he gives *stambha*, *vepathu*, *vaivarṇya*, *aśru* and *svarabheda* as some of its *vyabhicārins*. Again, while defining *bhayānaka* he gives *pulaka* (*romāñca*), *mukhavaivarṇya* and *svarabheda* as some of its *anubhāvas*, and *stambha*, *sveda*, *gadgada*, *romāñca*, *vepathu*, *svarabheda* and *vaivarṇya* as some of its *vyabhicāribhāvas*. Once again, while defining *adbhuta* he gives *romāñca*, *aśru*, *sveda* as some of its *anubhāvas*, and *stambha*, *aśru*, *sveda*, *gadgada*, *romāñca* and *pralaya* as some of its (*vyabhicāri*) *bhāvas*.

This treatment of *bhāvas* clearly indicates that the so-called *sāttvikabhāvas* partake of both characters, i.e. they are both *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.

Bharata's commentator Abhinavagupta, in the course of his commentary on NS VII-2 explains the term *sattva* as follows :

*Sattvaṃ cittaikāgryaṃ tajjanitaṃ ca kṛtakam bāṣpādi-prāptyavasthātmakam ca.....* (p. 340)

*Sattva* means 'concentration of the mind' and the state of feigned tears, etc. produced by it.'

In another context Abhinavagupta explains it thus :

*Sattva-samutthamiti sattvaṃ manas-samādhānam tajjanmakam iti.....* (Vol I.VI.71, P. 321)

*Sattva* means 'The equipoised state of the mind and what results from it.'

Again, he says :

*Sattva-samuttham prayatnakṛtam.....* (Ibid. p. 322)

*Sattva-samuttha* means 'brought about with great effort' i.e. 'feigned (with reference to persons endowed with *sattva*.)

In the 22nd chapter called *sattvābhinaya*, however Bharata uses *sattva* as meaning also the opposite of mind, namely the physical body and calls *bhāva*, *hāva*, *helā* etc., by the name *sāttvikābhinaya*. In the opening verse he declares '*nāṭyaṃ sattve pratiṣṭhitam*' – *nāṭya* (drama) rests or is founded on *sattva*'; and that

'*Sattvātirikto 'bhinayo jyeṣṭha ityabhidhīyate* 1' (Ch. XXII v. 2)

19. सात्त्विका व्यभिचारिवृत्तमभिनयवृत्तं चोपजीवन्तीति पृथगभिनयादिभ्यो गणिताः । – *Ibid*, p. 262.



'The acting in which *sattva* preponderates is called most excellent – the best.'

In the next verse (Ch. XXII-3) Bharata says : "Sattva is something invisible but serves as the basis of mental states through *romāṇca* (goose-flesh), tears perspiration and such other physiological signs displayed in accordance with the situations and sentiments."

Bharata and his great commentator Abhinavagupta<sup>20</sup> hold that compared with *vācika* and *āṅgika abhinaya* (Dramatic representation – acting – using speech and gestures and bodily movements) the role of *sāttvika abhinaya* in drama is of far greater importance : The *sāttvikabhāvas* and *sāttvika abhinaya* forcefully and effectively suggest emotions (psychic states) such as *rati* (love), *nirveda* (world-weariness), etc., and greatly facilitate the process of aesthetic experience on the part of *sahṛdayas* (sensitive spectators).

To conclude : Abhinavagupta rightly understands the word *bhāva* to mean special or particular states of mind-mental states (*citta-vṛtti-viśeṣa*). These mental states, depending on their propriety and context, take the form of *sthāyi* – (abiding) or *vyabhicāribhāvas* or *vibhāvas* or *anubhāvas*. But the *vibhāvas*, seasons, garlands or flowers, etc., and the *anubhāvas*, which are external and totally insentient (*ekānta-jada*) are not to be called by the name *bhāva* (mental state). Therefore the *sthāyi* – *vyabhicāri* and *sāttvika* – *bhāvas* alone are *bhāvas* (mental states). The definitions of *vibhāva* and *anubhāva* are only incidentally given in this *Bhāvādhyāya*.

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20. नाट्यं सत्त्वे प्रतिष्ठितम् । *Nāṭyaśāstra* III. 1.d.

अभिनयनं हि चित्तवृत्तिसाधारणतापत्तिप्राणसाक्षात्कारकल्पाध्यवसायसंपादनमिति, अत एवोक्तं सत्त्वे नाट्यं प्रतिष्ठितमिति । – *Ibid*, *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. III, Ch. XXII, p. 150.



## DUAL NATURE OF SĀTTVIKABHĀVAS

Of all the chapters in Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* the sixth and the seventh chapters, called *Rasādhyāya* and *Bhāvādhyāya* respectively, are perhaps the most significant as they deal with *rasa* (sentiment, aesthetic experience) and *bhāva* (emotion or feeling), which according to Bharata are the vital elements of a drama. The *Bhāvādhyāya* treats of eight *sthāyibhāvas* (permanent or dominant emotions) thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* (transitory feelings, accompanying emotions) and eight *sāttvikabhāvas* (involuntary states) which together make forty-nine *bhāvas*.

From Bharata's own treatment, it is, however, observed that the categories of *bhāvas* are not unalterably fixed. For example, Bharata declares : The accompanying transitory feelings of the sentiment of love (*śṛṅgāra*) are all *vyābhicārins* except laziness, violence and disgust (*jugupsā*). Now *jugupsā*, which is the *sthāyibhāva* (permanent emotion) of the sentiment of *bībhatsa* (the sentiment of horror or odium or disgust) is mentioned here as one of the *vyabhicārins* (transitory feelings) to be avoided when portraying the sentiment of *śṛṅgāra*. This statement of Bharata implies that the so called *sthāyibhāvas* can or could come as *vyabhicāribhāvas* of some other *rasas*.<sup>1</sup> Further, the very fact that Bharata defines all the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* and treats them almost as if they were *sthāyibhāvas* in the seventh *adhyāya* indicates that the distinction between the two categories of emotions is rather slender. As regards the *sāttvikabhāvas* Bharata gives them, when defining the individual *rasas*, as *vyabhicāribhāvas*.<sup>2</sup> This fact once again shows that the categories of *bhāvas* as *sthāyins*,

1. व्यभिचारिणश्चास्यालस्यौग्रजुगुप्सावर्ज्याः । – NS VI. p. 306

Cf. "The point is that normally *jugupsā* is the *sthāyibhāva* of *bībhatsa*. It is not given in the list of the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas*, but the very fact that Bharata says that it should not be used in love shows that he felt that it could be a *vyabhicāribhāva* as well as a *sthāyibhāva*. He, therefore, felt that under certain circumstances, ordinary *vyabhicāribhāvas* could become *sthāyibhāvas*, and *sthāyibhāvas* could become *vyabhicāribhāvas*."

– *Śāntarasa* (p. 124, f.n. 1)

2. For example (i) व्यभिचारिणश्चास्य (करुणस्य) निर्वेद.....स्तम्भ- वेपथुवैवर्ण्याश्रुस्वरभेदादयः ।  
– NS VI. p. 317

(ii) भावाश्चास्य (भयानकस्य).....स्तम्भस्वेदगद्गदरोमाञ्जवेपथुस्वरभेदवैवर्ण्यामरणादयः ।

– NS VI. p. 326



*vyabhicārins* and *sāttvikas* are not very strict. Here, we confine our discussion to the dual nature of the *sāttvikabhāvas* only.

While defining *karuṇa*, Bharata gives *āsrupāta*, *mukhaśoṣaṇa*, *smṛti-lopa* (which according to Abhinavagupta indicates *stambha* and *pralaya*) as some of its *anubhāvas*; and *stambha*, *vepathu*, *vaivarṇya*, *āśru*, *svarabheda* as some of its *vyabhicāribhāvas*.<sup>3</sup> Again, while defining *bhayānaka*, Bharata gives *pulaka*, *mukhavaivarṇya*, *svarabheda* as some of its *anubhāvas*; and *stambha*, *sveda*, *gadgada*, *romāñca*, *vepathu*, *svarabheda*, and *vaivarṇya* as some of its (*vyabhicāri*)*bhāvas*.<sup>4</sup> Once again, while defining *adbhuta* Bharata gives *romāñca*, *āśru*, *sveda* as some of its *anubhāvas*; and *stambha*, *āśru*, *sveda*, *gadgada*, *romāñca*, *pralaya* as some of its (*vyabhicāri*)*bhāvas*.<sup>5</sup> This treatment of the so-called *sāttvikabhāvas* unmistakably implies that according to Bharata, they partake of both characters (i.e., they are both *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*). Abhinavagupta, Bharata's commentator, makes explicit what Bharata implies when he speaks of *ābhyantara* (internal) and *bāhya* (external) *sāttvikabhāvas* : (i) "Loss or change of colour, tears and faltering voice – these *sāttvikas* are used here in the sense of internal feelings which have not manifested themselves externally. To explain : 'his throat is choked with tears but there are no tears in his eyes.' To show that tears, etc., depend on (i.e. partake character of) both *vyabhicāribhāva* and *abhineyatva* (= *abhinaya*), Bharata has described them between the (thirty-three) *vyabhicāribhāvas*, and the (fourfold) *abhinaya*. This we have already said before (A. Bh. p. 268) and will say again (in the seventh chapter ?)" (ii) "Even in the absence of internal *sāttvikas*, external perspiration, etc., are caused by swallowing poison or by fever, etc. In other words, perspiration, etc. are not invariably of the form or nature of mental states. The internal *sāttvikabhāvas*, when they are not in excess, are represented simply by using a fan, etc.; and if in excess, they manifest themselves as perspiration, etc., on one's person; and hence are described by Bharata as of the nature of *vyabhicārins*." (iii) "The words 'vāk', etc. are used in the sense of their functions i.e. *vācika abhinaya* etc. They produce *kāvyaārtha* which is connected with *vācika*, *āṅgika* and *sāttvika abhinaya* as *karuṇa*. The *vācika* is of the form of speech; the *āṅgika*

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3. तस्याश्रुपातपरिदेवनमुखशोषवैवर्ण्य.....स्मृतिलोपादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । व्यभिचारिणश्चास्य निर्वेद.....स्तम्भ-वेपथु-वैवर्ण्याश्रुस्वरभेदादयः । – NS VI. p. 317
  4. तस्य प्रवेपित.....पुलक-मुखवैवर्ण्य-स्वरभेदादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । भावाश्चास्य स्तम्भ-स्वेद-गद्गद-रोमाञ्च-वेपथु-स्वरभेद-वैवर्ण्य...मरणादयः । – NS VI. p. 326
  5. तस्य नयनविस्तार.....रोमाञ्चाश्रुस्वेद.....भ्रमणादिभिरनुभावैरभिनयः प्रयोक्तव्यः । भावाश्चास्य स्तम्भाश्रुस्वेदगद्गदरोमाञ्चावेग.....प्रलयादयः । – NS VI. p. 330



consists of gestures of hands, feet, etc.; and the *sāttvika* is of two kinds : internal and external.”<sup>6</sup>

The fact that Bharata mentions the *sāttvikabhāvas* separately immediately after the *vyabhicāribhāvas* and just before *catvāro 'bhinayāḥ* (fourfold dramatic representation) he ingeniously explains as follows : the *sāttvika* depends on (i.e. partake of) both characters, viz., *vyabhicāribhāva* and *abhinaya* (acting or dramatic representation). That is precisely why they are described or classed separately.<sup>7</sup> For ‘*abhinayas*’ means *anubhāvas* themselves.<sup>8</sup>

When commenting on the technical term *bhāva*, Abhinavagupta says : by the word *bhāva* particular mental states alone are meant.... The *vibhāvas* like seasons, garlands, etc., and the external manifestations of feelings like tears, etc. (*anubhāvas*), which are absolutely inanimate, cannot be designated or called by the term *bhāva* (mental state).<sup>9</sup> Citing this statement Raghavan observes : “They (tears, etc.) are *bāhya-anubhāvas*, physical manifestations and hence are *jaḍas*. Abhinavagupta says that the *sāttvikas* cannot be called *bhāvas* at all strictly, though we speak of *sāttvikabhāva*. The name *bhāva* primarily applies to mental states, the *sthāyins* and the *vyabhicārins*.”<sup>10</sup> This observation holds good as far as the *bāhya sāttvika-bhāvas* (like tears, etc.,) are concerned. Abhinavagupta, however, recognises *āntara* or *ābhyantara vaivarnya, aśru*,

6. (i) वैवर्ण्याश्रुस्वरभेदा अत्र बहिरुद्भिन्न [? बहिरनुद्भिन्न]स्वभावाश्रितवृत्त्यात्मानो गृह्यन्ते । तथा हि वक्तारो भवन्ति ‘अश्रुणा पूर्णोऽस्य कण्ठो न च नयनजलं दृष्टम्’ इति । एते ह्यश्रुप्रभृतयो व्यभिचारित्वाभिनेयत्वोपजीवनार्यैव मध्ये निर्दिष्टा इत्यवोचाम वक्ष्यामश्च । तेन न पौनरुक्त्यम् ।

— A. Bh. VI. p. 318

- (ii) भावा इति व्यभिचारिणः ।... (स्वेदादयो बाह्या आभ्यन्तरसात्त्विकाभावेऽपि) विषस्पर्शज्वरादिना भवन्ति । ततोऽनैकान्तिकाः । आन्तरा अनुद्रिक्ता व्यजनग्रहणादिभिरुद्रिक्ताः । (? ‘ग्रहणादिभिः, उद्रिक्ता’) बाह्यैः स्वेदादिभिर्यक्ता व्यभिचारिरूपाः पठिताः ।

— Kangle : *Rasabhāva-vicāra* (Marathi), p. 285

- (iii) वागङ्गेति । वागादयस्तत्कर्मसु वर्तन्ते । तेन वर्णनात्मना वाचिकेन संनिवेशवलनादी (? दि) नाङ्गिकेनान्तर्बहिरात्मना सात्त्विकेन करणभूतेनोपेतान् सम्बद्धान् । — A. Bh. VII. p. 343

7. व्यभिचारित्वाभिनेयत्वोपजीवका इति (तदनन्तरं) सात्त्विकाः । .....सात्त्विका व्यभिचारिवृत्तमभिनेयवृत्तं चोपजीवन्तीति पृथगभिनेयादिभ्यो गणिताः । — A. Bh. VI. p. 268

8. अभिनया अनुभावा एव । — A. Bh. VI. p. 290

9. भावशब्देन तावच्चित्तवृत्तिविशेषा एव विवक्षिताः । ...ये त्वेते ऋतुमाल्यादयो विभावा बाह्याश्च बाष्पप्रभृतयोऽनुभावा एकान्तजडस्वभावाः ते न भावशब्दव्यपदेश्याः । — A. Bh. VII. p. 342

10. Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa*, 1963 edn. (p. 448)



*svarabheda*, etc., also as *vyabhicāribhāvas*. Thus, it is very clear that as far as Bharata and Abhinavagupta are concerned, they admit *sāttvikabhāvas* to be both *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*. In other words, they hold that the *sāttvikabhāvas* have dual character. And immediately after two or three lines following the passage which Raghavan has cited, Abhinavagupta himself concludes :

तस्मात् स्थायि-व्यभिचारि-सात्त्विका एव भावाः ।

“Therefore *sthāyins*, *vyabhicārins* and *sāttvikas* alone deserve to be designated or called *bhāva*.”

Now, immediately after dealing with eight *sthāyibhāvas* and thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* Bharata goes on to consider *sāttvikabhāvas*. He starts off with the following objection : “Are the other mental states (*sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*) represented without *sattva* whence only these (to be described soon) are called *sāttvika* ?” Reply : *sattva* is something which arises from the mind. It emerges or results from the concentrated mind. The *sāttvikabhāva* which is of the form of *romāṇca* (horripilation or goose-flesh), tears (*āśru*) paleness or loss of colour (*vaivarṇya*), etc., and is in accordance with its appropriate feeling, cannot be acted out by an absent-minded actor. The *sattva* is essential in drama as it is an imitation or reproduction or representation or re-enacting of what happens in everyday life or of human nature. To explain : situations of happiness and misery that are to be enacted on the stage should be properly presented with the help or on the strength on *sattva* so that they appear completely realistic. How can sorrow which consists in weeping be acted out on the stage by anyone who is not himself unhappy (who has no experience of unhappiness) ? And how can happiness consisting in joy be acted out on the stage by any one who is not happy (by temperament) ? This itself is the *sattva* in an actor : feigning to be in an unhappy or in a happy state, he has to shed tears and display horripilation respectively. And that is why these states are called *sāttvikabhāvas*.<sup>11</sup>

These are the eight *sāttvikabhāvas* : 1. paralysis, 2. perspiration, 3. horripilation, 4. faltering voice, 5. trembling, 6. loss of colour or paleness, 7. tears and 8. fainting.

Abhinavagupta explains the term *sattva* as concentration of the mind (*cittaikāgryam*). According to one commentator (*īkākāra*) cited by Abhinavagupta, it means *manas-samādhānam*, the same as *cittaikāgryam*. In one context, he paraphrases *sattva*-

11. इह हि सत्त्वं नाम मनःप्रभवम् । तच्च समाहितमनस्त्वादुच्यते । मनसः समाधौ सत्त्वनिष्पत्तिर्भवति । तस्य च योऽसौ स्वभावो रोमाञ्चाश्रुवैवर्ण्यादिलक्षणो यथाभावोपगतः स न शक्योऽन्यमनसा कर्तुमिति । लोकस्वभावानुकरणत्वाच्च नाट्यस्य सत्त्वमीप्सितम् । .....एतदेवास्य सत्त्वं यत् दुःखितेन सुखितेन वाऽश्रुरोमाञ्चौ दर्शयितव्यौ इति कृत्वा सात्त्विका भावा इत्यभिव्याख्याताः । — NS VII. pp. 374-75



*samuttham* as *prayatnakṛtam*; in another context he explains it as what results from concentration of the mind (*manas-samādhānam*) and stresses the supreme importance of great effort (*prayatna*) for *sattva* (concentration of the mind) for *nāṭya* (drama) rests or is founded on *sattva*. “*Sattva* is something invisible but serves as the basis of mental states by means of horripilation, tears; and other *sāttvika* states displayed in accordance with the situations and sentiments.” Compared with *sāttvika abhinaya* the role of *vācika* and *āṅgika abhinayas* in drama is not so important, says Abhinavagupta.<sup>12</sup> It deserves our notice that the authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, who generally follow Abhinavagupta, explain the term *sattva* after Abhinavagupta, though the words and expressions differ : When the mind is attentive it is called *sattva*. For if the mind be inattentive, it is not possible for the actor to act out the *sāttvikabhāvas* like *svarabheda*, etc.”<sup>13</sup>

In continuation of this (Abhinavagupta's) discussion of the nature of *sattva*, Hemacandra's discussion of the *sāttvikas* deserves to be taken up. For, it is surely enough based, to the best of our belief,<sup>14</sup> on the missing portion of the *Abhinavabhāratī* (Ch. VII) dealing with the *sāttvikabhāvas*; the relevant portion from *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* as translated into English by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan is given at the end as an Appendix to facilitate ready reference. Here we confine ourselves to the main points of the discussion :

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12. सत्त्वं चित्तैकाग्रम् । — A. Bh. I p. 346  
 सत्त्वं मनस्समाधानम्.....टीकाकारः । — A. Bh. I p. 327  
 सत्त्वसमुत्थं प्रयत्नकृतम् । — A. Bh. I p. 328  
 सत्त्वं च मनस्समाधानजम् । — A. Bh. III p. 150  
 तस्माद् भूयसा प्रयत्नेन विना (न) सिद्ध्यतीति । .....सत्त्वस्य हि प्रयत्नाधिक्यमुपयोगीति वागङ्गयोरुपादानमलमेवेति  
 — अलमनेत (न) । — A. Bh. III p. 150  
 नाट्यं सत्त्वे प्रतिष्ठितम् । — NS XXII. 1. d  
 सत्त्वातिरिक्तोऽभिनयो ज्येष्ठ इत्यभिधीयते । — NS XXII. 2ab  
 अव्यक्तरूपं सत्त्वं हि विज्ञेयं भावसंश्रयम् ।  
 यथास्थानरसोपेतं रोमाञ्चास्त्रादिभिर्गुणैः ॥ — NS XXII. 3  
 सात्त्विकाभावे ह्यभिनयक्रियानामपि नोन्मीलति । अभिनयनं हि चित्तवृत्तिसाधारणतापत्तिप्राणसाक्षात्कार-  
 कल्पाध्यवसायसंपादनमिति । अत एवोक्तं सत्त्वे नाट्यं प्रतिष्ठितमिति । — A. Bh. III. p. 150
13. अवहितं मनः सत्त्वं तत्प्रयोजनं हेतुरस्येति सात्त्विकः ।  
 मनोऽनवधाने हि न शक्यन्त एव स्वरभेदादयो नेटेन दर्शयितुम् ॥ — ND, Baroda, 1959 edn., p. 169
14. I had given expression to this belief in a footnote to my paper on *Abhinavabhāratī* : Chapter VII Recovered ? first published in Journal, Oriental Institute, Baroda, Vol. No. XX, No. 3, March 1971. The various passages from *Abhinavabhāratī* (Ch. VI and VII) cited above have strengthened my belief almost into conviction.



*Sattva* means *prāṇātmakam vastu* (vital energy). It is so called because the mind dwells in it and because there is exuberance or predominance of *sattvaguṇa* in it and because it is characterised by intrinsic goodness. The *sāttvikabhāvas* arise from it. They are in the state of knowledge of *rati*, etc., which emerge from the *prāṇa-bhūmi*. (The idea is : the particular mental states like *rati*, etc., first appear as manifestations of consciousness. They then colour by superimposing their own nature—the *ābhyantara* (internal) *prāṇas*. In other words, flowing from their original mental state, they rest in the internal *prāṇas* without transforming themselves into external manifestations of feeling (*anubhāva*) like stupefaction (*stambha*), perspiration (*sveda*), etc.). They are distinct from bodily or physical tears, etc., which are external and inanimate (insentient or non-sentient) in their nature or form. They are produced by the same *vibhāvas* which produce *rati* etc.; to put it differently, the *vibhāvas* of the *sthāyins* like *rati*, etc., and of the *sāttvikabhāvas* like *stambha*, *sveda*, etc. are the same. They are beyond the range of aesthetic experience or relish. They are, however, suggested—their presence is conveyed—by their consequents, i.e. by their external manifestations. Although physical weakness (*glāni*) laziness (*ālasya*); fatigue (*śrama*), stupor (*mūrccā*), etc., are devoid of *ālambana-viṣaya*, still as they are caused by external factors, they are listed (or enumerated or counted) among *vyabhicārins*. The mental states like stupefaction (*stambha*), etc. are, on the contrary, not caused by external factors, and hence they are called *sāttvikas*.

The external *sāttvikas* stupefaction (*stambha*), etc., are bodily or physical attributes (*śarīra-dharma*) and therefore are called *anubhāvas*. They first suggest their corresponding internal, *sāttvikabhāvas* but ultimately (really speaking or in reality) they suggest the mental states or emotions like love, world-weariness, etc.

These *sāttvika-bhāvas* occur in connection with each one of the sentiments (*rasas*). They do not enjoy even a slight trace of independence (or of occasional predominance) — not even like the *vyabhicārins* on the analogy of a king's servant enagaged in his own marriage ceremony who is followed by the king (at the time of the marriage procession). (That is, in relation to his own servant, the king occupies, for the time being, a position subordinate to that of his own servant.)

Dhananjaya, who closely follows *Nāṭyaśāstra*, pointedly refers to the dual nature of the *sāttvikabhāvas* :

पृथग्भावा भवन्त्येऽनुभावत्वेऽपि सात्त्विकाः ॥ — DR IV.4(b)

सत्त्वादेव समुत्पत्तेस्तच्च तद्भावभावनम् । — DR IV.5(a)

i.e., the *sāttvikas*, although they are of the nature of *anubhāvas*, are *bhāvas* other than *sthāyins* (permanent emotions) and *vyabhicārins* (transitory feelings). For, they arise from *sattva* and it (*sattva*) means "making the spectator's mind or heart realize the joys or sorrows of the character portrayed." It is the actor, who plays the role



of Rāma, etc. who, by the strength of his fourfold dramatic representation, makes the spectator apprehend clearly or experience *almost directly* the joys or sorrows the character (*Rāma*) seems to have gone through. In the words of Keith : “The consequents are the external manifestations of feeling, by which the actors exhibit to the audience the minds and hearts of the persons of the drama..... A special class is later made of those consequents, which are the involuntary product of sympathetic realization of the feeling of the person portrayed, and hence are called *sāttvika*, as arising from a heart which is ready to appreciate the sorrows or joys of another (*sattva*).”<sup>15</sup> Raghavan explains *sattva* as follows : It is the making of our own hearts take the shape of what is presented in the poem or drama. This is *sattva*. This is how even *rājasa* and *tāmasa bhāvas* like anger and sorrow came to be *sāttvika*. The Sāṅkhya term *sattva* is used in this context with a specialised meaning imported (injected) into it and equated with *sattva* well known in dramaturgy as meaning “*tanmayībhavana*.”<sup>16</sup> At another place he observes : “Surely *sattva* means *manas* and as all *bhāvas* are mental moods, they are all *sāttvikas*. *Sāttvika* also means, from the point of view of the actor.....those *bhāvas* in the acting of which the actor had to enter into the mind and show. Though such acting is common to all *bhāvas*, it is true most of the *sāttvikas*, for a tear has to be shown by an actual tear and horripilation by horripilation.”<sup>17</sup> Viśvanātha defines *sattva* thus :

*Sattva* “is a certain inward disposition which spontaneously reveals the repose of one’s soul *where it does not interfere to modify the indication*” and *sāttvikas* as “Those changes in a human being are called ? involuntary or *honest* and *spontaneous*, which arise from *sattva*.” These *sāttvikas* differ from the *anubhāvas* (consequents) in general only in their taking rise in *sattva*—just in the same way as the bull differs from the cattle (*go-baḷivarda-nyāyena*); in other words, the *sāttvikas* are a special class of the *anubhāvas* in general. Śāradātanaya deals with the *sāttvikabhāvas* in his *Bhāvaprakāśana*.<sup>18</sup> Kumārasvāmin in his *Ratnāṇa* commentary on *Pratāparudrīya* takes note of his view along with those of others.

Kumārasvāmin’s *Ratnāṇa* commentary is remarkable for its resume of a variety of interpretations of *sattva*, the source of the eight *sāttvika-bhāvas*. He specifically

15. *The Sanskrit Drama* by A. B. Keith, Oxford University Press, 1964 edn., p. 315.

16. *Bhoja’s Śṛṅgāra-Prakāśa*, Madras, 1963 edn., p. 484.

17. *Ibid*, p. 441.

18. “सत्त्वं नाम स्वात्मविश्रामप्रकाशकारी कश्चनान्तरो धर्मः ।

विकारः सत्त्वसम्भूताः सात्त्विकाः परिकीर्तिताः ।

सत्त्वमात्रोद्भवत्वात् भिन्ना अप्यनुभावतः ।

‘गोबलीवर्दन्यायेन’ इति शेषः ॥ — *Sāhityadarpaṇa* III.134–35.



mentions *Bhāvaprakāśa*, Ācārya Hemacandra, and *Rasanirūpaṇa* of Naraharisūri in the course of his exposition of the technical term *sattva* and the *sāttvikabhāvas*. He is indebted to *Daśarūpakāvaloka* also for his explanation of *sattva* and the dual nature of *sāttvikabhāvas*. As already observed above, Hemacandra is almost certainly indebted to Abhinavagupta for his treatment of the *sāttvikabhāvas*. So Kumārasvāmin may be said to be indebted to Abhinavagupta through Hemacandra.

Abhinavagupta, Hemacandra and Kumārasvāmin unambiguously state that the mental states such as love, world-weariness, etc. become transformed into (internal) *sāttvikabhāvas*, *stambha*, etc., owing to sympathetic realization; and that they are indicated by the *external*, insentient, physical and bodily consequents such as *stambha*, etc.; and that ultimately—in reality—just the mental states such as love, world-weariness, etc., are suggested by the external manifestations.

Kumārasvāmin records four different views regarding *sāttvikabhāvas* held by “some” (*kecit*, *Anye*). The first view stated by him is identical with Ācārya Hemacandra’s (or rather Abhinavagupta’s) view (cf. *Kāvyaṇuśāsana*, pp. 144–45). According to the second view, *sattva* is a particular kind of strength or energy (*bala*) which is of the nature of making the spectators or audience realize vividly, without the aid of other *bhāvas* (the *vyabhicārins*, transitory feelings) the particular *rasa*; and *sāttvikabhāvas* are those external manifestations of feelings which arise from that *sattva*. According to the third view, *sāttvikabhāvas* are stupefaction, etc., themselves, which though similar to *anubhāvas* (consequents like sidelong glances, etc.) are called *sāttvikabhāva* on the analogy of words like *pañkaja*, etc. These words although etymologically mean ‘anything produced in mud’, by convention mean only ‘a lotus’. The *sāttvikabhāvas* are the outcome of *sattva*, the manifestations of *sattva* but because of the predominance of the *annamayakośa* they convey external manifestations such as stupefaction, etc., through *yoga-ruḍhi* (etymology delimited by convention). According to the fourth view, the term *sāttvikabhāvas* is used to denote only the external manifestations of feelings like stupefaction, etc., because of its wellknown usage in the *alamkāra-śāstra* (poetics) just as in the Vaiśeṣika system of philosophy the word *padārtha* is used to indicate the three categories out of seven, viz., *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma* (substance, quality and action respectively). Out of these conflicting views, Kumārasvāmin has no special preference for anyone.

According to *Rasataranṅinī*, ‘*sattva*’ means living body; and the *sāttvikas* are its attributes i.e. the *sāttvikas* are physical effects—stupefaction, etc. are physical effects



and are called *sāttvikabhāvas*. The *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, being internal, are (of course) not physical effects.<sup>19</sup>

*Rasa-ratna-pradīpikā* (p. 10) says : Although these *sāttvikas*, in accordance with their possibility (*yathā-sambhava*) occur in one and all *rasas*, still disregarding their nature as *vyabhicārins* they are enumerated separately as *sāttvikabhāvas* since they originate in *sattva* alone. And that *sattva* means the extreme readiness of the actor's/spectator's heart to appreciate the sorrows (or joys) of another (the original character); and it arises from a (concentrated) mind.<sup>20</sup>

Prabhākara says in his *Rasapradīpa* (p. 18) : "The *sāttvikas* are counted or included among *anubhāvas* as they are the effects of *rati* (love), etc. They are described separately as they are produced from *sattva*, their invariable cause. It is defined as follows : In poetics, the mind, when it is not affected or contaminated or influenced by *rajas* and *tamas* (the other two constituent elements of *prakṛti*) is called *sattva*. The *sāttvikabhāvas* are so called as they are able to produce or evoke *rasa* through their connection with it (*sattva*)".<sup>21</sup>

The explanation of *sattva* as *jīvaccharīra* given in *Rasatarāṅgiṇī* though novel is not in conformity with Bharata, who very clearly and without any ambiguity whatsoever explains it with reference not to 'living body' but to concentration of the mind, i.e., what results from such a concentration. (*NS. Ch. VII*, pp. 374-75).

Dr. J. L. Masson and Prof. M. V. Patwardhan observe in their Notes (*Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. II, p. 63) : "Note Abhinava, p. 268 : *sāttvikā vyabhicārivṛttam*

19. ....अत्रेदं प्रतिभाति सत्त्वशब्दस्य प्राणिवाचकत्वात् । अत्र सत्त्वं जीवच्छरीरं तस्य धर्माः सात्त्विकाः । तथा च शारीर भावाः स्तम्भादयः सात्त्विका भावा इत्यभिधीयन्ते । स्थायिनो व्यभिचारिणश्च भावा अन्तरतया न शरीरधर्मा..... । - *Rasatarāṅgiṇī*, Section IV (*Sāttvikabhāvanirūpaṇa*)

20. यद्यपि एते यथासंभवं सर्वेषु रसेषु व्यभिचरन्ति तथापि व्यभिचारित्वमनादृत्य सत्त्वमात्रसम्भवा भवन्ति इति सात्त्विका इति भिन्नतया गणिताः । तच्च सत्त्वं परगत[—सुख—]दुःखादिभावनायाम् अत्यन्तानुकूलान्तःकरणत्वं मनःप्रभावः (? मनःप्रभवम्) । तेन सत्त्वेन कृताः सात्त्विकाः ।

- *Rasaratnadīpikā*, Section III (*Vibhāvānubhāva-sāttvika-lakṣaṇa*)

21. अनुभावलक्षणमाह धनिकः...सात्त्विकास्त्वेतदन्तर्गता एव ।

तेषामपि रत्यादिकार्यत्वात् । भिन्नतया प्रतिपादनं तु नियत-कारण-सत्त्व-जनितत्वात् । तल्लक्षणं तु — रजस्तमोभ्यामस्पृष्टं मनः सत्त्वमिहोच्यते ।

निवृत्तयेऽस्य तद्योगात् प्रभवन्तीति सात्त्विकाः ॥ इति ।

अस्य रसस्येति प्रकृतपरामर्शः । - *Rasapradīpa*, Section II (*Rasaviveka*)



*abhinayavṛttam copajīvanīti pṛthagabhinayādibhyo gaṇitāḥ*. Abhinava's point seems to be that Bharata mentions them separately from the *vyabhicāribhāvas* because they have a dual character : they are transitory (*vyabhicāri*) and they depend on acting. But in so far as the *vyabhicāribhāvas* belong to the actor, they are also dependent on *abhinaya*. Abhinava's explanation is thus not very convincing. Perhaps, Bharata has mentioned the *sāttvikabhāvas* separately because they are harder to feign. It is easy to imitate delight, but more difficult to make one's hair stand on end (*romāñca*) either in fear or in pleasure." It is rather difficult to agree with the authors when they say "Abhinava's explanation is thus not very convincing." As Abhinava observes elsewhere (*A. Bh. Ch. VI*, p. 290) '*abhinayā anubhāvā eva*', the *sāttvikas* have a dual nature : they are transitory feelings, and at the same time external manifestations of feeling. That is why a special class is made of the eight *sāttvikas*, stupefaction, perspiration, horripitation, etc., "which are the involuntary product of sympathetic realisation of the feeling of the person portrayed, and hence are called *sāttvika*, as arising from a heart which is ready to appreciate the sorrows or joys of another (*sattva*)".<sup>22</sup> This nature helps us to distinguish very clearly these eight *sāttvika-bhāvas* from the usual thirty-three transitory feelings and the other external manifestations of feeling. That the *sāttvikas* are harder to feign, as they involve or demand complete concentration of the mind on the part of the actor/spectator, is very true and acceptable to one and all.

The explanation given by *Bhāratiya Nāṭyaśāstra* (in Marathi) as to why the *anubhāvas*, *stambha*, *sveda*, etc., are called *sāttvikas* may briefly be stated as follows : "In everyday life, we find that in appropriate circumstances and situations, the *sthāyins*, *rati* (love) etc., are awakened quite naturally; and their corresponding physical effects become manifest to discerning people. But, an actor has to produce with great effort these artificial mental states by means of sympathetic realisation of the feelings of joys and sorrows in others. To distinguish these artificial mental states from the natural mental states of love, etc., they are given different names on the basis of the particularly prominent *anubhāvas* manifested on their awakening. The eight *sthāyins*, *rati*, *hāsa*, *śoka*, *krodha*, *utsāha*, *bhaya*, *jugupsā* and *vismaya* may thus have been given the *sāttvika* names : 1. *pralaya*, 2. *svarabhaṅga*, 3. *āsru*, 4. *vepathu*, 5. *sveda*, 6. *vaivarnya*, 7. *romāñca* and 8. *stambha*. But later on there was utter confusion between these names of artificial *sthāyins* and the *anubhāvas* bearing these very names. Consequently, a doubt might have arisen whether they are *anubhāvas* or *bhāvas*.



This explanation is ingenious no doubt but not convincing. If the names of the eight *sāttvikas* were standing in the same order as we find in the case of the eight *sthāyins* with reference to the eight *rasas*, the explanation offered by *Bhāratiya Nāṭya-śāstra* would have gained support from Bharata.

Abhinavagupta's theory of internal and external *sāttvikabhāvas* involving the Sāṅkhya and the Vedānta concepts of *sattva* (*rajas* and *tamas*), and the *Kośas* respectively is certainly novel and interesting. However, it does not seem to have found favour with later thinkers except Ācārya Hemacandra, Naraharisūri<sup>23</sup> and Kumārasvāmin. May be, they found it unconvincing or unsatisfactory or regarded it as unimportant.<sup>24</sup>

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23. एवं प्राचामालङ्कारिकाणामनेकधा पारिप्लवं वर्तते । .....

विशेषान्तराणि नरहरिसूरिविरचिते रसनिरूपणे द्रष्टव्यानि ।

— *Pratāparudrīya-Ratnāṇa* (Madras, 1914 edn., p. 160)

24. (i) For translation of Hemacandra's passages by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan, vide Appendix at the end.

(ii) The translation of the passages from Kumārasvāmin's *Ratnāṇa* too is by Prof. M. V. Patwardhan.



## HEMACANDRA ON SĀTTVIKABHĀVAS

Of all the chapters of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* the sixth *Rasādhyāya* and the seventh *Bhāvādhyāya* are the key chapters. For, they deal with the most important elements of *rasa* and *bhāva* (aesthetic or imaginative experience, and feelings or emotions) in drama. Bharata himself explicitly states 'without *rasa* no (dramatic) matter can arise'.<sup>1</sup> *Rasas* and *bhāvas* being intimately connected, the *bhāvas* too are equally important. There is clear evidence that verses on *rasa* and *bhāva* existed even prior to the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.<sup>2</sup> Chapters on *rasa* and *bhāva* frequently use technical terms like *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, *vybhicāribhāva*, *sthāyibhāva* and *sāttvika-bhāva* in the course of the exposition of the theories of *rasa* and *bhāva*. Abhinavagupta in his commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* emphatically states that "in the everyday world there are no such things as *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and the like. They are merely causes and effects." In other words they belong exclusively to the realm of art.<sup>3</sup>

Now, the sole intention behind the invention of this terminology is obviously to emphasize the point that the world of drama is different from the real world. And as Abhinavagupta observes in his commentary, in the theatre we live neither in the time nor in the space of the characters portrayed in the drama nor of the actors. Nothing "really happens" or "is affected" in a drama or on the stage as it happens in the real world; when this is not carefully understood something like the following happens :

A well-known actress and an actor were to enact in a film a scene of an attempted rape. That the scene should appear as *akṛtrima* (natural) as possible, the actress asked the villain to do his best and that she would resist his attempt with all her might. Later she told her friend that if the filming had gone on a couple of minutes longer she would have died of suffocation !

1. न हि रसादृते कश्चिदर्थः प्रवर्तते । — NS VI v. 31-v. 32

2. For instance, Bharata introduces the two verses VI. 32-33 with the words : अत्रानुवंश्यौ श्लोकौ भवतः ॥ The word *ānuvaṁśya* means "traditional", "handed down as basic and authoritative". Read also P. V. Kane : *The History of Sanskrit Poetics*, Bombay, 1951 edn., pp. 16-17.

3. (i) न हि लोके विभावानुभावादयः केचन भवन्ति । हेतुकार्यावस्थामात्रत्वाल्लोके तेषाम् । — A. Bh. Vol. I, p. 292

(ii) लोके विभावानुभावाभिनयादिव्यवहारभावात् । — A. Bh. Vol. I on NS VI-71

(iii) लोके हि न कश्चिद् विभावादिव्यवहार इति भावः । — A. Bh. Vol. I on NS VI. 36



In another film in a particular scene the actress was to be slapped. She asked the actor to give her a slap with all force so that it should appear 'natural'. When the actor actually slapped her, her ear-drum was damaged and her eye too !

These things belong to real life and not to the world of drama. What the sensitive spectators expect of the actors and actresses is their supreme skill in acting and make the scenes *appear* real although they are fake. Their art lies in concealing art.

Once an actor played the role of a villain so very well that one person from the audience rose in his seat, took out his 'Chappal' and threw it at that actor. The actor however, smilingly took it as a tribute to his power of acting. The poor fellow who however threw in his anger the 'chappal' at the actor does not deserve to be called an ideal spectator. He failed to make the right distinction between reality and illusion. The poet, gifted with marvellous creative imagination — *pratibhā*, and permeated with latent *saṃskāras* (impressions) of worldly love depicts the *vibhāvas*, etc., through his play and the actor, trained and talented, presents the *anubhāvas* in such a way as to bring the enjoyment of love to the level of an imaginative experience of love.<sup>4</sup> The terms 1. *vibhāva*, 2. *anubhāva*, 3. *vyabhicāribhāva* correspond to *kāraṇa*, *kārya*, *sahakāri kāraṇa* of our everyday life. The technical term *sthāyibhāva* (the permanent emotion running all through the play from the beginning to the end) corresponds to the permanent emotions which are inborn with human beings, Bharata's categories of *sthāyibhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *sāttvikabhāvas*, are not unalterably fixed. This is quite clear from a perusal of the text.<sup>5</sup> The technical term *sāttvikabhāva*, however, is somewhat confounding and calls for a detailed exposition.

A careful look at Bharata's treatment of *karuṇa*, *vīra* and *adbhuta* would show that Bharata gives some of the *sāttvikabhāvas* as *anubhāvas* and some others as *vyabhicārins*. This treatment implies that according to Bharata they partake of both characters — they are both *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.

Abhinavagupta, Bharata's commentator, makes explicit *bāhya* (external) what Bharata implies when he speaks of *ābhyantara* (internal) and *sāttvikabhāvas*. The internal *sāttvikabhāvas* are sometimes not in excess (*anudrikta*); they are represented by using a fan etc., and if in excess they manifest themselves as perspiration etc., on one's person and hence are described by Bharata as of the nature of *vyabhicārins*.

4. कविर्हि लौकिकरतिवासनानुद्धिस्तथा विभावादीनाहरति नाट्यं चानुभावान् (नट्यानुभावान् ?) यथा रत्यास्वादः शृङ्गारे भवति । 'आस्वादयितुरपि प्राक्क्षयां रत्यवगम उपयोगी, इत्युक्तं प्राक् । — A.Bh. Vol. I (on *NS*) p. 302)

5. Bharata defines the thirty-three *vyabhicāribhāvas* treating them almost as if they were *sthāyibhāvas*, and some of the *sthāyibhāvas* are given as *vyabhicāribhāvas* of other *rasas*. The *sāttvikabhāvas*, when the individual *rasas* are defined, are given as *vyabhicāribhāvas*.



Further, Abhinavagupta draws our attention to the fact that Bharata mentions the *sāttvikābhāvas* as a separate class immediately after the *vyābhicāribhāvas* and just before the '*catvāro*' *bhinayāḥ*' (the fourfold dramatic representation). *Abhinayas* mean *anubhāvas* themselves. This fact leads to the reasonable conclusion that Bharata regards that the *sāttvikabhāvas* partake of the dual nature – they are *vyābhicārins* as well as *anubhāvas*.

Further on, Abhinavagupta states that *vibhāvas* like seasons, garlands, etc., and *anubhāvas*, external manifestations of feelings like tears, etc., are exclusively of bodily or physical nature, and external and they can never be designated as *bhāvas*-mental states, (*cittavṛttiviśeṣa*) and finally establishes :

*Tasmāt sthāyi-vyābhicāri-sāttvikā eva bhāvāḥ ।*

(A.Bh. Vol. I, p. 433)

(Therefore, the *sthāyi*, *vyābhicāri* and *sāttvikas* alone are called *bhāva*-mental states).

Now, about the word *sāttvika* : Bharata after dealing with the *sthāyibhāvas* and *vyābhicāribhāvas* treats of the *sāttvikas*. He raises the objection : "Are the other mental states (*sthāyibhāvas* and *vyābhicāribhāvas*) represented without *sattva* whence only these eight (*stambha*, *sveda*, etc.) are called *sāttvika* ?" and himself replies : *sattva* is something which arises from the mind. It emerges from the concentrated mind. It is essential in drama. Situations of happiness and misery need to be properly presented on the stage with the help of *sattva* so that they appear completely realistic to the spectators. This itself is the *sattva* in an actor; feigning to be in an unhappy or in a happy state he has to shed tears or display horripilation. And that is why these states (*stambha*, *sveda*, etc.) are called *sāttvikabhāvas*."<sup>6</sup>

Abhinavagupta explains the term *sattva* as concentration of the mind (*cittaikāgryam*). The authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* who generally follow Abhinavagupta echo him when they say : "When the mind is attentive it is called *sattva*....For if the mind be inattentive it is not possible for the actor to act out the *sāttvikabhāvas* like *svarabheda* (faltering voice), etc."<sup>7</sup>

In continuation of Abhinavagupta's discussion of the nature of *sattva* Hemacandra's discussion of the *sāttvikabhāvas* deserves to be taken up. In a footnote to my paper

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6. इह हि सत्त्वं नाम मनःप्रभवम् । तच्च समाहितमनस्त्वादुत्पद्यते । मनसः समाधौ सत्त्वनिष्पत्तिर्भवति । .....एतदेवास्य सत्त्वं यद् दुःखितेन सुखितेन वाश्रुतेमाञ्चौ दर्शयितव्यौ इति कृत्वा सात्त्विका भावा इत्यभि-  
व्याख्याताः । – NS, VII, pp. 374–75
  7. अवहितं मनः सत्त्वं तत्प्रयोजनं हेतुरस्येति सात्त्विकः । मनोऽनवधाने हि न शक्यन्त एव स्वरभेदादयो  
नटेन दर्शयितुम् । – ND, Baroda, 1959 edn., p. 169



“Abhinavabhāratī, Ch. VII Recovered ?” I wrote “The discussion of this topic (*sattva* and *sāttvikabhāvas*) in the *KĀŚ* (pp. 144–147) is possibly based on the portion in the *A. Bh.* on the *Bhāvādhyāya* (now lost). This guess is hazarded on the strength of a few significant phrases common to the *A. Bh.* and the *KĀŚ*.<sup>8</sup> The language, the style, the mode of presentation and the fact that Hemacandra freely adopts the whole section on *rasa* and passages after passages from *Abhinavabhāratī* on *Daśarūpaka-vidhāna* lead a careful student to believe that it is more likely than not that the whole discussion is taken over from the *A. Bh.* (on Ch. VII) now lost. The theoretical discussion in *Alaṃkāracūḍāmaṇi* may briefly be presented in the words of the late Professor M. V. Patwardhan as follows :

The word *sattva* means vital force (or energy) because of the etymology, viz. : the mind is lodged in it, and because vital force consists in an excess of *sattva-guṇa* and because of its inherent goodness (*sattva* = *sādhutva*). The *sāttvikabhāvas* have their origin in *sattva* (in the vital force) and hence they are known by the name *sāttvika*.<sup>9</sup> The *sāttvikabhāvas* are associated with the emotions such as *rati* (love) etc., which arise from *prāṇabhūmi*—the bedrock (*bhūmi*) of the vital force. They are distinct from the physical effects such as tears, etc., which are extraneous (to the vital force) and which are non-sentient (? bodily, of physical nature) in their nature or form (*jaḍarūpa*). They are produced only by the *vibhāvas* associated as causes with the emotions or psychic states such as *rati* (love), etc. and are beyond the pale of aesthetic experience, and their presence (i.e. the presence of the internal *sāttvikabhāvas*) is intimated or suggested by their consequents. To explain : The psychic states, when they enter into the predominantly earth-allied element in the vital force give rise to *stambha* (the blocking of sensation, when they enter i.e. affect) the predominantly water-allied element in the vital force give rise to tears. But as *tejas* (heat) is intimately allied to the vital force either intensely (acutely) or in a feeble manner (mildly) and it gives rise to perspiration and paleness of the body (? face) it is spoken of in that way. Perspiration due to the infusion (of *tejas*) into the water-dominated element of the vital force, for example, is thus illustrated in the following stanza, cited in *Viveka* (p. 146) :

“When in the course of gambling (with dice) for amusement (or diversion) her embrace was first won (as a wager) by her dear consort, and then thereafter, the charming (delightful) offering of the lower lip (for being kissed) was won by her dear consort

8. Vide my book *Studies In Sanskrit Sāhitya-Śāstra*, B. L. Institute of Indology, Patan (North Gujarat), p. 77

9. सीदत्यस्मिन्मन इति व्युत्पत्तेः सत्त्वगुणोत्कर्षात् साधुत्वाच्च प्राणात्मकं वस्तु सत्त्वम्, तत्र भवाः सात्त्विकाः । भवा इति वर्तते ।

— *Kāvyānuśāsana*, Śrī Mahāvīra Jaina Vidyālaya Bombay, 1964 edn., p. 144.



as a wager, he again inquired of his beloved about the (next) wager to be put forward by her, she silently stretched out (extended) her *perspiring* hand in order to throw (cast) the dice (*sāra-visāraṇāya* = *akṣa-utkṣepaṇāya*), while her cheeks began to throb (quiver) because of the outburst of passion accumulated in her (mind) but held in check with a suppressed (inchoate) smile (*sāntarhāsa*). But (physical) paleness or loss of colour due to the infusion of *tejas* into the water-dominated element of the vital force in a feeble manner is thus illustrated in the following stanza, cited in *Viveka* (p. 146) :

“As that princess (Indumati) seeking to choose a consort for herself (from among the assembled kings) (simply) passed by the various kings successively (without making her choice of any one of them) each of them became *pale* (lost colour) just as when a flame (torch) passing successively in front of the mansions on the principal street in a city, each mansion became *pale* (and plunged in gloom).” When *ākāśa* (space) affects (*anugraha*), there arises *pralaya* (fainting). But when *vāyu* (air) affects the vital force either slowly or swiftly or in a manner midway between the two, it becomes transformed in a triple way viz., horripilation, tremor or trembling and faltering voice. Faltering voice due to *vāyu* (air) affecting the vital force swiftly is thus illustrated in the following stanza in *Viveka* (p. 146).

“When Kṛṣṇa left for Dvārakā, Rādhā, embracing the tender branch (*latā*) of the Vaṅjula tree (Aśoka tree), bent down because of his jumping down from it (in the river Yamunā flowing near it) sang with such deep longing, her song turning into a loud wail and her throat so choked with profuse tears that the ducks swimming in the water began to cry plaintively (in sympathy).” Such is the view of those who are conversant with Bharata (i.e. with the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata).<sup>10</sup>

The final position is this : The external *sāttvikabhāvas* such as stupefaction, etc., are physical attributes and they operate as *anubhāvas* suggesting the (corresponding) internal *sāttvikabhāvas* and in reality they (ultimately) suggest emotions, psychic states such as love, world-weariness, etc.<sup>11</sup>

.....These *sāttvikabhāvas* occur in connection with each one of the *rasas* and they do not possess even a slight trace of independence (autonomy) not even like the *vyabhicāribhāvas* on the analogy of a king's servant engaged in his own marriage ceremony who is followed by the king ( at the time of the marriage procession, i.e. in relation to his own servant the king occupies, for the time being, a position

10. *KĀŚ*, pp. 144-146.

11. बाह्यास्तु स्तम्भादयः शरीरधर्मा अनुभावाः । ते चान्तरालिकान् सात्त्विकान् भावान् गमयन्तः परमार्थतो रतिनिर्वेदादिगमका इति स्थितम् । - *Ibid*, p. 147



subordinate to that of his own servant.).<sup>12</sup> The whole discussion may briefly be summarised as follows :

The basic eight feelings are first felt by mind and later the mind allows or disallows them to be manifested physically through perspiration, or goose flesh, or tears or pale complexion, etc. The fact to be noted is that all feelings are basically internal. They originate in human consciousness. They are in fact its vital part, hence termed as *sattvika*.

Thus the whole section dealing with the theoretical knowledge about the *sāttvikabhāvas* and providing appropriate illustrations drawn from literature is remarkable for its originality and novelty. In the field of Poetics it has been preserved for us by Hemcandra and Hemcandra alone. There is a solitary reference by Kumārasvāmin, the author of *Ratnāpaṇa*, a commentary on *Pratāparudrīya* to the final position – the concluding lines (f.n. 11)–which he introduces with the words : *uktaṃ ca ācārya-Hemcandreṇa*. Kumārasvāmin, it would seem, thinks that the whole section on *sāttvikabhāvas* is of Hemacandra himself.

In conclusion, we should be grateful to Hemacandra who by his preference for eclectic writing has preserved for us the gold—the precious and best portions and passages from his illustrious predecessors and is of immense help in improving the corrupt readings from the texts of his source-books : *Abhinavabhāratī*, *Dhvanyālokalocana*, *Vakrokti-jīvita*, *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, etc., and contributes to knowledge.

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12. एते च सात्त्विकाः प्रतिसं संभवन्तीति राजानुगतविवाहप्रवृत्तभृत्यन्यायेनापि व्यभिचारिवन्न स्वातन्त्र्यगन्धमपि भजन्ते... – *Ibid*, p. 147.



## RASA : LAUKIKA

There are two schools of Sanskrit literary thinkers regarding the nature of *rasa* : whether it is *laukika* (of everyday life, worldly, normal, as in actuality) or *alaukika* (different from everyday life, extra-worldly, supra-normal). Here we present the view of those Sanskrit theorists who advocate that *rasa* is *laukika* in its nature. Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra*, the oldest known Indian work on dramatics (and aesthetics), nowhere states that all *rasas* are pleasurable or that like pleasurable permanent or dominant emotions (*sthāyins*) even sorrowful *sthāyins* when represented on the stage give pleasure and pleasure alone. But a few statements in the opening chapter, called *Nāṭyotpatti* would tempt one to draw an inference that he held the view that the *rasas* are pleasurable : He refers to *nāṭya* as *krīḍanīyaka* (a play-thing, a form of entertainment) and as *dhṛti-krīḍā-sukhādi-kṛt*—which gives comfort (*dhṛti*), pleasure (*krīḍā*) and joy (*sukha*), etc. He further declares : this *nāṭya* (drama) will give restful joy to all those who are distressed, or are completely exhausted on account of hard work, or are overpowered with grief or have mortified themselves by observing various religious *vratas* (vows, rites, practices).<sup>1</sup> Abhinavagupta in his commentary on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* reproduces the views of Lollaṭa, Śaṅkuka, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka, and the Sāṅkhyas and criticises them. He himself makes a categorical statement that all the *sthāyins* when presented on the stage are pleasurable and that all *rasas* too are pleasurable.<sup>2</sup> Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha, Jagannātha and many others accept Abhinavagupta's exposition as the last word. But some other thinkers (*ālamkārikas*) like Nāṭyadarpaṇakāra classify the eight *rasas* into two groups; one pleasurable and the other non-pleasurable and hold the view that a sorrowful experience remains sorrowful whether in actuality or in its aesthetic representation; the pleasure the spectators derive is simply due to the skill of the actor and the creative imagination of the poet or dramatist. Still some others, the moderns of the 17th century-*Navīnas* hold the view that there are only four (or with the reluctantly admitted *śānta* five) *rasas* as they are pleasurable and reject the non-pleasurable four *rasas* the status of *rasa*. The view of Abhinavagupta that all the eight (or nine) *rasas* are pleasurable and that even sorrowful situations in actuality acquire pleasurable quality through the aesthetic treatment they undergo

1. NS I.11 (cd); NS I.114.

2. तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधानाः स्वसंविच्चर्वणरूपस्यैकधनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात् । .....इत्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् । — A. Bh. I, p. 282.



in a work of art, would certainly appeal to a large majority of *sahridayas*—responsive, sensitive critics.

In the course of his discussion of the *sthāyin* of the *śāntarasa* Abhinavagupta clearly distinguishes between a *sthāyin* and its corresponding *rasa*. One is *siddha* (already present, an accomplished thing) the other is *sādhya* (to be effected, to be brought about). One is *laukika*, the other is *alaukika*; one is *sādhāraṇa* (common, ordinary), the other is *asādhāraṇa* (unique, uncommon).<sup>3</sup>

Although there is no such clear distinction to be found in Bharata's text and although there is no prominent mention in it of the identity between the *sthāyins* of our everyday life and their corresponding *rasas* we do come across a few indications in Bharata's writing which lead one to infer that he believed that it is merely the *sthāyibhāva* of the world that is called *rasa* when imitated or represented on the stage; and that some *rasas* are pleasurable and some others sorrowful.

(ii) Bharata defines true (or ideal) spectators thus : "True spectators at a drama are those who, when the character is depressed, become themselves depressed, when the character is delighted or pleased, they themselves become delighted or pleased, when the character is in sorrow, they are themselves in sorrow."<sup>4</sup>

Again Bharata says :

"When the character is angry the spectator becomes angry, when the character is terrified or seized with fear he (the spectator) himself is terrified or is seized with fear—such a person is to be known as the ideal spectator."<sup>5</sup>

From these definitions it would seem, say the *laukikavādins*, that pleasurable permanent emotions create delight in the hearts of spectators whereas painful ones create sorrow – cause pain – in the hearts of spectators, and we might infer that Bharata held the view that some *rasas* are pleasurable and others painful. It would be fair, however, to Bharata to understand these definitions to mean that Bharata expects of the actor the ability to represent any feeling convincingly and effectively and carry away the spectator and of the spectator to have in him the ability to participate fully in the feeling. The immediate response to the various dramatic situations may be

3. शमशान्तयोः पर्यायत्वं तु हासहास्याभ्यां व्याख्यातम् । सिद्धसाध्यते यद् (तथा लौकिका) लौकिकत्वेन (? सिद्धसाध्यतया लौकिकालौकिकतया) साधारणासाधारणतया च वैलक्षण्यं शमशान्तयोरपि सुलभमेव ।

– A. Bh. I. p. 335.

4. दैन्ये दीनत्वमायान्ति ते नाट्ये प्रेक्षकाः स्मृताः ।

ये तुष्टौ तुष्टिमायान्ति शोके शोकं व्रजन्ति च ॥ – NS XXVII. 42.

5. क्रुद्धः क्रोधे भये भीतः स श्रेष्ठः प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः । – NS XXVII. 62ab.



pleasurable or painful; but the total ultimate impact on the spectator is bound to be pleasurable.

(ii) On p. 299 Bharata declares :

"Now we proceed to explain the different *rasas* with their *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* and bring the *sthāyibhāvas* to the state of *rasa*."<sup>6</sup>

And on p. 379 he informs us :

".....*sthāyīeva tu raso bhavet*" :

The *sthāyibhāva* (permanent emotion) itself becomes *rasa*.<sup>7</sup>

After defining the *sthāyibhāvas* Bharata observes :

"Thus these permanent emotions, which attain the title *rasas* should be known."<sup>8</sup>

When defining *rasas*, Bharata speaks of *śṛṅgāra* and *karuṇa* as '*rati-sthāyibhāva-prabhava*', and '*śoka-sthāyibhāva-prabhava*' and of the remaining six *rasas* as '*sthāyibhāvātmaka*' (NS VI pp. 300-330) it would seem that Bharata treats the permanent emotions of our everyday life and the *rasas* on the same level.

Lollaṭa, an early commentator of Bharata's *rasa-sūtra* explains that the *sthāyin* itself, when strengthened, intensified or fully developed becomes *rasa*.<sup>9</sup> This means that Lollaṭa held the view that *rasa* is *sukha-duḥkhātmaka*.

Abhinavagupta, after giving Lollaṭa's interpretation observes that the ancient thinkers like Daṇḍin subscribed to the same view and quotes the definitions of the erotic and the furious *rasas* in support of his observation. According to Śaṅkuka, the next commentator, the *sthāyin* itself, when imitated, is called *rasa*. But we cannot conclude on this count that he held the view that *rasa* is *sukha-duḥkhātmaka*. For, there is one passage in *Abhinavabhāratī* which leads us to draw the inference that all the *rasas* are, according to him, pleasurable. The passage may be rendered as follows :

6. इदानीमनुभावविभावव्यभिचारिसंयुक्तानां लक्षणनिदर्शनान्यभिव्याख्यास्यामः । स्थायिभावांश्च रसत्वमुपनेष्यामः ।  
- NS VI, p. 299.

7. स्थाय्येव तु रसो भवेत् । - NS VII, p. 377.

8. एवमेते स्थायिनो भावा रससंज्ञाः प्रत्यवगन्तव्याः । - NS VII, p. 355.

9. तेन स्थाय्येव विभावानुभावादिभिरुपचितो रसः । स्थायी त्वनुपचितः । - A. Bh. VI, p. 272.

10. ये तु रत्याद्यनुकरणरूपं रसमाहुः अथ चोदयन्ति शोकः कथं सुखहेतुरिति । परिहरन्ति च अस्ति कोऽपि नाट्यगतानां विशेष इति । तत्र चोद्यं तावदसत् । शोको हि प्रतीयमानः किं स्वात्मनि प्रत्येतुर्दुःखं वितनोतीति नियमः शत्रुदुःखे प्रहर्षात् । अन्यत्र च मध्यस्थत्वात् । उत्तरं तु भावानां वस्तुस्वभावमात्रेणेति न किञ्चिदत्र तत्त्वम् । - A. Bh. VI, p. 291.



There are some (like Śaṅkuka) who say that the *sthāyin rati* (love), etc., when imitated, become *rasa-s* and then raise the question : 'How can sorrow (then) be the source of pleasure ?, and they themselves answer it by saying that things portrayed in drama acquire a peculiar or special property—come to possess some sort of speciality. But their question itself is wrong. Abhinavagupta further asks : "Is there any rule that the perception of sorrow in others invariably produces sorrow in the heart of spectators ?" For, when one's enemy is in sorrow, one feels happy, whereas in other cases (say of a *taṭastha*, who is neither one's friend nor enemy) one remains indifferent. And therefore, the answer of Śaṅkuka that it is in the very nature of emotions (*bhāvas*) to give pleasure (when depicted in drama and imitated on the stage) is no answer at all.<sup>10</sup> This indirect reference (to Śaṅkuka) makes it abundantly clear that he held the view that all *rasas* are pleasurable.

After criticising Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta briefly deals with the Sāṃkhya view about *rasa* : The worldly objects, capable of producing pleasure and pain are external, but the *sthāyins* awakened by the external objects are internal and of the nature of either pleasure or pain. Thus according to the Sāṃkhya view, *rasa* is of dual nature – of amphibian nature – of pleasure or pain.<sup>11</sup>

None of the thinkers preceding Abhinavagupta however, felt the need to give a reasoned exposition of this dual nature of *rasa*. But a few post-Abhinavagupta thinkers who did not subscribe to his theory that all *rasas* are pleasurable (*ānandarūpa*) and extra-worldly or aesthetic (*alaukika*), were bold enough to assert that the *rasa* is *sukha-duḥkhātmaka* in its nature and that it is only worldly. It is Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the joint authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, Siddhicandraṇi, the author of *Kāvyaprakāśakhaṇḍana*, a commentary on Mammaṭa's *Kāvyaprakāśa*, and Rudrabhaṭṭa, the author of *Rasakalikā* who defy Abhinavagupta's authority. It is Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra who vigorously and eloquently advocate this view of *rasa* and attempt to give cogent arguments in its favour. They declare in a *kārikā*<sup>12</sup> "*sukha-duḥkhātmako rasaḥ*" and set forth in the *Vivaraṇa* arguments in support of it : To say that all *rasas* are pleasurable is against experience : *karuṇa*, *raudra*, *bībhatsa* and *bhayānaka*—these four *rasas* cause indescribable pain to the *sahṛdayas*, sensitive and responsive spectators. They simply shudder when they witness plays depicting these *rasas*. If these *rasas* were pleasurable they would not shudder. The *camatkāra* (peculiar delight), experienced by the spectators at the

11. साङ्ख्यदृशा सुख-दुःख-स्वभावो रसः । — A. Bh. VI, p. 276.

12. *Nāṭyadarpaṇa*, III. 7.



end of the performance of tragic scenes is, however, simply due to the creative imagination—genius (*pratibhā*, *śakti*) of the poet and the high skill of the actors. The thinkers (like Abhinavagupta) who hold that these *rasa*-s also are pleasurable are perhaps deceived-misled by this *camatkāra*. It is through excessive passion or desire to experience this *camatkāra* that people go to the theatre to witness plays portraying these *rasas* also.<sup>13</sup> Poets present themes keeping in mind the pleasurable and painful nature of the original story of Rāma, etc. These four painful *rasas* resemble the pungent or hot taste that adds to the sweetness of a beverage. For they heighten the pleasure yielded by pleasurable *rasas*. Tragic events such as the abduction of *Sītā*, *Duśśāsana* dragging Draupadī by her hair and attempting to disrobe her, Hariścandra's serving a *cāṇḍāla* as a slave, the death of Rohitāśva, Lakṣmaṇa's being hit by a *śakti*, a kind of missile, Aghoraghaṇṭa's attempt to kill Mālātī (in *Mālātī-Mādhava*), when represented on the stage can never cause delight in the hearts of the *sahṛdayas*. If through imitation by actors the unpleasant or painful feelings are said to become pleasant, it is obvious that the actor's art of acting is very deficient it represents things falsely-in their perverted form.<sup>14</sup>

Rudrabhaṭṭa's *Rasakalikā* agrees with the view of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* that some *rasas* are pleasurable and some others painful (*duḥkharūpa*). It attributes our interest in witnessing plays depicting them to our mental absorption in the acting going on in front of us. "So the *rasa* of *karuṇa* is of a peculiar kind and is particularly due, not to the nature of the emotion itself, but to our contemplation of the art with which an actor presents it."<sup>15</sup>

Siddhicandra, a contemporary of Jagannātha, first explains the experience of *paramānanda*, the supreme joy of *rasa* according to the doctrine of the Vedantins. His use of terms like '*ratyādyavacchinnam* (*caitanyam*), *bhagnāvaraṇam* (*caitanyam*)'<sup>16</sup>,

13. अनेनैव च सर्वाङ्गाह्लादकेन कवि-नट-शक्ति-जन्मना चमत्कारेण विप्रलब्धा परमानन्दरूपतां दुःखात्मकेष्वपि करुणादिषु सुमेधसः प्रतिजानते । एतदास्वादलौल्येन प्रेक्षका अपि एतेषु प्रवर्तन्ते ।

— ND III. 7 *Vivaraṇa*, p. 141.

14. तथानुकार्यगताश्च करुणादयः परिदेवितानु (? दि)कार्यत्वात् तावद् दुःखात्मका एव । यदि चानुकरणे सुखात्मानः स्युर्न सम्यगनुकरणं स्यात् विपरीतत्वेन भासनादिति । — ND III.7, *Vivaraṇa*, p. 142.

15. Read f.n. to p. 484, Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāra Prakāśa*, by Dr. Raghavan, 1963 edn.

16. *Kāvya prakāśa khaṇḍana* of Siddhicandraṇi ed. by Prof. R. C. Parikh, (Bhāratiya Vidyā Bhavan publication), p. 16.



strongly reminds us of Jagannātha's explanation of *rasa* as *ratyādyavacchinnā bhagnāvaraṇā cideva rasaḥ* in his *Rasagaṅgādhara*.<sup>17</sup> As compared with it, a peculiar pleasure which arises on watching a dramatic performance or hearing the recitation of poetry is similar to the pleasure of anointing one's body with sandal-paste or of pressing the breasts of a young beautiful woman and is itself *rasa*—this is the view of the modern (*navīnāḥ*) who belong to the 17th century.<sup>18</sup> In other words, the *Navīnas* (possibly, the author himself) regard the aesthetic pleasure as on a par with ordinary pleasures of the senses — as only *laukika* (worldly). As a corollary to this view they hold that there are only four *rasas*; — the erotic, the heroic, the comic and the marvellous; and reject the claim of the pathetic, the furious, the terrifying and the disgusting to the title of *rasas*.<sup>19</sup> “The pathos (*karuṇa*) and others, arising from sorrow (*śoka*) etc., although are revealed with *cit* (or *caitanya*) — consciousness consisting of delight, they cannot be called *rasa* since the *sthāyi-amśa* (part) is opposed to the state of *rasa*.” Again, if you argue that they, being revealed by *alaukika vibhāvas* etc., deserve to be called *rasa* like the pleasurable bites inflicted in the course of love game, our reply is ‘No’. For following this line of argument you will have to call mental distress caused by hunger, thirst, etc., as new or different *rasas*. The bites in the course of sexual enjoyment remove the pain caused by overpowering passion and give a sense of relief as when a burden is taken off one's shoulders. But to say that sorrow (*śoka*) etc., like love (*rati*) etc., consists of (leads to) light, knowledge and joy is simply a madman's prattle.<sup>20</sup> Further, in ‘Aja-Vilāpa’ (Aja's Lament) etc., because of *varṇanīya-tanmayibhavana* ‘identifying one's self with the event or situation portrayed’, how could there arise the aesthetic joy similar to *Brahmānanda*? In the disgusting (*bībhatsa*) *rasa* which describes vividly flesh, pus, etc., the reader or spectator does not vomit or spit is itself a matter of surprise, how could it produce *rasa* consisting of supreme joy? It may be granted that the *śānta* somehow deserves the title *rasa* with reference to persons who have given up completely all *vāsanās* (various instincts) but certainly not with reference to sensualists as it (the *śānta*) involves abstention from all pleasures of the senses. The heroic and the furious do not differ as their *vibhāvas* bear resemblance. Regarding *dānavīra*, etc., the poet's chief intention is to describe the supreme generosity, greatness, etc., of the hero. The poet describes ‘The Lament of Aja’, for pointing out

17. Nirnaya Sagar edn., 1939, p. 27.

18. तदपेक्षया कामिनीकुचकलशस्पर्शचन्दनानुलेपनादिनेव नाट्यदर्शनकाव्यश्रवणाभ्यां सुखविशेषो जायते । स एव तु रस इति नवीनाः ।

19. नवीनास्तु शृङ्गार-वीर-हास्याद्भुतसंज्ञाश्चत्वार एव रसाः । करुणादीनां यथा न रसत्वं तथा वक्ष्यते ।

— Ibid p. 16.

20. Ibid p. 22.



the profound love of Aja towards Indumatī his beloved queen. So too the *śānta* is described to demonstrate the intense sense of world-weariness of *mumukṣus* (persons desirous of liberation). So too the terrifying in order to ill-surtate the tenderness of heart of the heroes concerned. In fact (to tell the truth), poets depict these various situations to demonstrate the richness of their *pratibhā* (creative imagination) in the same way as they write *padma-bandha* (artificial composition in which the words are arranged in the form of a lotus flower), etc.<sup>21</sup>

This point of view that "*rasa* is *laukika* – is made up of pleasure and pain and that it in no way differs from other pleasures of the senses", however, did not find able advocates among the *ālamkārikas* and was thrown into background, if not completely eclipsed by the writings of Abhinavagupta, Mammaṭa, Hemacandra, Viśvanātha and Jagannātha.

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21. वस्तुतस्तु कविभिः स्वशक्तिप्रदर्शनार्थमेव पद्यबन्धादिनिर्माणवत् तत्र तत्र प्रवर्त्यत इति । – *Ibid*, p. 22.



## RASA-ALAUKIKA<sup>1</sup>

Some of the Sanskrit Ālamkārikas, notably Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* and *Siddhicandragaṇi*, the author of *Kāvyaaprakāśakhaṇḍana*, unequivocally take the position that the *rasa-praṭīti* or *rasānubhava*, the aesthetic or imaginative experience, is entirely *laukika*, that is, worldly or continuous with and like other experiences in everyday life. Abhinavagupta, who is the greatest authority in Sanskrit Aesthetics and his very able followers like Maṃmaṭa, the author of *Kāvyaaprakāśa*, a standard work on Sanskrit poetics and aesthetics, Viśvanātha, the author of the well-known *Sāhitya-Darpaṇa* and Pandit Jagannātha, the author of the celebrated *Rasagaṅgādhara*, take the very opposite position that the aesthetic experience is something that is *alaukika*, non-worldly, extra-worldly, transcendental and beyond our framework of time and space and that it only takes place in the realm of literature and never in real life.

Here we confine ourselves to giving a clear exposition of this concept of *alaukikatva* according to Abhinavagupta in the light of his observations in his two well-known commentaries—*Abhinavabhāratī* on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Locana* on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*, and examining if it corresponds with the Western or, to be more specific, the Kantian concept of the autonomy of the art (aesthetic) experience.

Abhinavagupta never tires of stating over and over again that *rasa* is *alaukika*. Some of the relevant passages from the two commentaries are almost identical, word for word; some others closely correspond with each other and only a few make a new point. The major passages in which Abhinavagupta dwells on *alaukikatva* are presented here :

(i) *Locana*, p. 79 : When a man hears the words : "A son is born to you" joy is produced (through the power of denotation—*abhidhā*). But the suggested sense (*rasa* and the like) is not produced the way joy is produced in the above case. Nor does it come about through the secondary usage (*lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, *bhakti*). But it arises in a sensitive man (*sahṛdaya* — a man who is sensitive to literature) through his

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1. The total range of meanings conveyed by the word '*alaukika*' cannot be expressed through any one English expression. Different expressions such as *sui generis*, autonomous, extra-worldly, non-worldly, other-worldly, supra-normal, transcendental, etc., have been used by critics in different contexts for the term *alaukika*.



knowledge of *vibhāvas* and *anubhāvas*, because of his *hṛdaya-saṁvāda* (sympathetic response) and his *tanmayībhāva* (identification). It is *vilakṣaṇa* (different) from ordinary awareness of happiness etc. and it is not an objective thing (like a jar, etc.).<sup>2</sup>

(ii) *Locana*, pp. 50–52 : The *pratīyamānārtha* (suggested sense) is of two kinds (i) *laukika* (ordinary) : bare ideas (*vastu*) and images (or *alamkāras*) may be suggested, but they are at the same time *vācya* (expressible) also; and (ii) *kāvya-vyāpāraika-gocara* (= *vyāñjanā-gocara* or *alaukika*) what can only be suggested; no emotion is, in its essence, directly describable. It is not communicable like a fact (or idea) and image (or *alamkāra*). (The use of words like 'love' and 'sorrow' may convey to a person, an idea of the corresponding emotion but it will be only an idea and not a *felt* emotion). *Rasa*, according to Abhinavagupta, is never even in a dream *sva-śabda-vācya*—conveyed by the mere naming of the emotion (to be suggested).<sup>3</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our attention to the fact that *rasa* does not arise either through *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā* (*bhakti, guṇavṛtti*). It comes about through *vyāñjanā* the power of suggestion, peculiar to poetry (i.e., creative literature).

(iii) *Locana*, p. 160 : "In literature, however, the *vibhāvas* etc. conveyed (by convention and context) immediately tend towards the production of aesthetic relish (and are not ends in themselves) and so convention etc. do not play any role in the actual aesthetic relish itself. Nor is this (knowledge of the suggested sense) like the apprehension of religious (injunctions) such as : 'I have been enjoined to do such and such. I am now engaged in doing such and such. I have accomplished such and such.' Because in these cases some action is involved, and so these are of worldly nature."

2. न चायं रसादिरर्थः 'पुत्रस्ते जातः' इत्यतो यथा हर्षो जायते तथा । नापि लक्षणया । अपि तु सहृदयस्य हृदयसंवादबलाद् विभावानुभावप्रतीतौ तन्मयीभावेनास्वाद्यमान एव रस्यमानतैकप्राणः सिद्धस्वभावसुखादिविलक्षणः परिस्फुरति ।

The last compound we dissolve in a way quite different from the way both the commentators (The authors of *Bālapriyā* and *Kaumudī*, p. 147) and Professors Masson and Patwardhan (*Aesthetic Raputre*, Vol. I, p. 27 and Vol. II, p. 37, f. n. 233) do it. We dissolve the compound as '*siddha-svabhāva-vilakṣaṇaḥ*', and '*sukhādivilakṣaṇaḥ*.' This way the compound expression agrees with Abhinavagupta's description of *rasa* in *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284 : '*na tu siddha-svabhāvaḥ tātkālika eva*', and *smṛtyanumāna-laukika-saṁvedana-vilakṣaṇa eva*.'

3. तत्र प्रतीयमानस्य तावद् द्वौ भेदौ — लौकिकः काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरश्चेति । लौकिको यः स्वशब्दवाच्यतां कदाचिदधिरोते स.....वस्तुशब्देनोच्यते । .....यस्तु स्वप्नेऽपि न स्वशब्दवाच्यो न लौकिकव्यवहारपतितः किं तु शब्द-समर्थमाणहृदयसंवादसुन्दरविभावानुभावसमुचितप्राग्विनिविष्टत्यादिवासनानुगसुकुमारस्वसंविदानन्दचर्वणाव्यापार-रसनीयरूपो रसः, स काव्यव्यापारैकगोचरो रसध्वनिरिति.....। — *Locana*, pp. 50–52.



“In literature (however) the aesthetic relish (of the suggested sense) through the *vibhāvas* etc. is like the appearance of magic flower; it is essentially a thing of the present moment which does not depend on the past or the future time.”<sup>4</sup>

In this passage Abhinavagupta points out that this aesthetic rapture is *unique*. It is different from the ordinary worldly joy (and also from the bliss of *brahmāsvāda* experienced by a *yogin*, as explained in the passage (ix) below).

(iv) *A. Bh. I., p. 36* : In this marvellous passage Abhinavagupta identifies some of the distinctive features of *rasa* and the *rasika* : As it is a very long passage we shall refer only to the most striking features mentioned in it : For the sensitive spectator practical interests or affairs are of no consequence when he goes to the theatre. He feels : he would listen to and see something marvellous which is beyond his everyday experience (*lokottara*), something worthy of his attention, something whose essence is from the beginning to the end, sheer delight. He would share this experience with the rest of the spectators. Engrossed in the aesthetic enjoyment of appropriate music, both vocal and instrumental, a man completely forgets himself (and also his worldly preoccupations, the narrow interests of his routine life and his worries) and he is aware then of nothing beyond the object or the situation portrayed by the poet. His heart becomes like a spotless mirror. It facilitates *hṛdaya-samvāda* (sympathetic response) and *tanmayībhāva* (identification). What he sees is divorced from space and time. His apprehension (of *rasa*) does not fall within the ordinarily recognised categories of knowledge : right knowledge, false knowledge, doubt, probability or fancied identification, and the like. He is so engrossed in what he sees and is so carried away by an overpowering sense of wonder that he identifies himself with the principal character and sees the whole world as the latter saw it.<sup>5</sup>

(v) *Locana, p. 442* : In everyday life we hear such sentences as : “Take the cow to the field for grazing” or “Bring the cow home as it is evening.” On hearing these

4. इह तु विभावाद्येव प्रतिपाद्यमानं चर्वणाविषयतोन्मुखमिति समयाद्युपयोगाभावः । न च नियुक्तोऽहमत्र करवाणि कृतार्थोऽहमिति शास्त्रीयप्रतीतिसदृशमदः । तत्रोत्तरकर्तव्योन्मुखेन लौकिकत्वात् । इह तु विभावादिचर्वणादभुतपुष्पवत् तत्कालसारैवोदिता न तु पूर्वापरकालानुबन्धिनीति लौकिकास्वादाद् योगिविषयाच्चान्य एवायं रसास्वादः ।
5. नाट्ये तु पारमार्थिकं किञ्चिदद्य मे कृत्यं भविष्यतीत्येवंभूताभिसंधिसंस्काराभावात् सर्वपरिषत्साधारण-प्रमोदसारपर्यन्तसमादरणीयलोकोत्तरदर्शनश्रवणयोगी भविष्यामीत्यभिसंधिसंस्कारादुचितगीतातोद्यचर्वणा-विस्मृतसांसारिकभावतया विमलमुकुरकल्पीभूतनिजहृदयः सूच्याद्यभिनयावलोकनोद्भिन्नप्रमोदशोकादितन्मयीभावः पाठ्याकर्णनपात्रान्तरप्रवेशवशात् समुत्पन्ने देशकालविशेषावेशानालिङ्गिते सम्यङ्-मिथ्या-संशय-संभावनादिज्ञानविज्ञायत्वपरामर्शानास्पदे...स्वात्मद्वारेण विश्वं तथा पश्यन्..... ।



sentences the concerned boy actually carries out what he has been told to do. In literature, however, there is no such activity demanded of the spectator. There is absolutely no suggestion of anything that he is expected to do. His attitude (towards the actor playing the part of, say, a villain like Rāvaṇa or the actress playing the role of the heroine Sītā) is one of appreciation alone and his sole aim is to find restful joy.<sup>6</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta pointedly refers to some of the important steps in the aesthetic experience, the attitude of a true spectator, the generalized nature of what he sees on the stage, the extraordinary or non-worldly nature of the cognition of *rasa*, absence of any (physical) activity on the part of the spectator, and presence in him of a contemplative attitude.

(vi) *Locana*, p. 158 : *Rasa* is nothing but aesthetic enjoyment and this enjoyment consists (almost) exclusively in a kind of knowledge or consciousness. If it were possible to convey *rasa* through words (and their conventional meanings) alone we would have been possibly forced to admit that *rasa* is, like the denoted sense, *laukika*. But we do find that *rasa* is capable of being suggested by alliteration, gentle or harsh, which is devoid of any denoted sense. But in everyday life we never come across a thing which could possibly be suggested by *anuprāsa*. This is therefore, an additional proof for the doctrine of the *alaukikatva* of *rasa*.<sup>7</sup>

(vii) *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284 : In another passage Abhinavagupta says : *Rasa* is completely different from the permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc., and it cannot be maintained, as Śāṅkuka did, that *rasa* is the apprehension of the permanent emotion of somebody else and that it is so called because it is an object of relish. For if it were so why should the permanent emotion of real life be not called *rasa* ? For if a non-existing (unreal) permanent emotion (in the actor) be capable of being the object of aesthetic relish, a real permanent emotion has all the more reason for being so capable. Therefore the apprehension of the permanent emotion of another person should be called only inference and not *rasa*. For what aesthetic relish is involved in this

6. काव्यवाक्येभ्यो हि न नयनानयनाद्युपयोगिनी प्रतीतिरभ्यर्थ्यते, अपि तु प्रतीतिविश्रान्तिकारिणी, सा चाभिप्रायनिष्ठैव नाभिप्रेतवस्तुपर्यवसाना । — *Locana*, p. 442.

7. ज्ञानविशेषस्यैव चर्वणात्मत्वात् । इत्यलं बहुना । अतश्च रसोऽयमलौकिकः । येन ललितपुरुषानुप्रास-स्यार्थाभिधानानुपयोगिनोऽपि रसं प्रति व्यञ्जकत्वम् । — *Locana*, p. 158

वाचकशब्दैकगम्यत्वे हि रसस्य वाच्यार्थवल्लौकिकत्वं कथञ्चिच्छब्दशङ्क्यमनुप्रासादिनापि वाचकत्वशून्येन व्यङ्ग्यत्वमस्त्येव । न चानुप्रासव्यङ्ग्यं वस्तु लोके दृष्टचरमतोऽपि रसस्यालौकिकत्वं सिद्धमित्यर्थः ।

— *Bālāpriyā*, p. 158



kind of inference<sup>8</sup> ? *Rasa* is not an objective thing in the real world as it is coterminous with the process of aesthetic relish and ceases to exist the moment the process of its relish is over;<sup>9</sup> .....unless one is actually experiencing it, *rasa* does not exist. Its essence consists exclusively in aesthetic enjoyment. It is the permanent emotion (*artha*) brought to the state of aesthetic relish which is a form of knowledge free from worldly obstacles—worries, narrow personal interests, etc., by the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* which attain a unity in the mind of the spectator (or reader).<sup>10</sup>

(vii) *A. Bh. I.*, pp. 284–285 : The *vibhāvas* etc. are *alaukika* and are so called on account of their peculiar functions of *vibhāvanā* (awakening to life the latent permanent emotion) etc.<sup>11</sup> They are not the causes of the production of *rasa* (*niṣpatti-hetus* = *kāraka-hetus*) for if it were so, there would arise the contingency of its (*rasa*'s) existence even in the absence of the knowledge of the *vibhāvas* etc. Nor are they the causes of cognition (*Jñapti-hetus*) of *rasa* as *rasa* is not an objective thing (like a *ghaṭa*, *paṭa*—a jar, cloth, etc.) in our everyday life. Then what are the *vibhāvas* etc. ? The *vibhāvas*, etc. are *alaukika*; they make it possible for the *rasika* to relish *rasa*. If the opponent asks; “Is there anything in the whole world like this ?” Abhinavagupta replies : The fact that there is nothing in the whole world like this only serves to strengthen our position that *rasa* is *alaukika*.<sup>12</sup>

8. स्थायिविलक्षण एव रसः । न तु यथा शङ्कुादिभिरभ्यधीयत—स्थाय्येव विभावादिप्रत्याय्यो रस्यमानत्वाद् रस उच्यत इति । एवं हि लौकिकोऽपि किं न रसः । असतोऽपि हि यत्र रसनीयता स्यात् तत्र वस्तुसतः कथं न भविष्यति । तेन स्थायिप्रतीतिरनुमितिरूपा प्राप्या (? वाच्या) न रसः । .....तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता । — *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284.
9. न तु सिद्धस्वभावः तात्कालिक एव न तु चर्वणातिरिक्तकालावलम्बी.....रसः । — *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284.
10. अत एवालौकिकविभावादिनामधेयव्यपदेश्यैः.....सामाजिकधियि सम्यग् योगं संबन्धमैकाग्रं वाऽऽसादित-वद्भिरलौकिकनिर्विघ्नसंवेदनात्मकचर्वणागोचरतां नीतोऽर्थश्चर्व्यमाणतैकसारः.....रसः । — *A. Bh. I.*, p. 284.
11. तैरेवोद्यानकटाक्षधृत्यादिभिलौकिकीं कारणत्वादिभुवमतिक्रान्तैर्विभावना.....मात्रप्राणैः अत एवालौकिकविभावादिव्यपदेशभाग्भिः..... ॥ — *A. Bh. I.* p. 284
12. अत एव विभावादयो न निष्पत्तिहेतवो रसस्य । तद्विधापगमेऽपि रससंभवप्रसङ्गात् । नापि ज्ञप्तिहेतवः येन प्रमाणमध्ये पतेयुः । सिद्धस्य कस्यचित् प्रमेयभूतस्य रसस्याभावात् । किं तर्ह्येतद्धि विभावादय इति । अलौकिक एवायं चर्वणोपयोगी विभावादिव्यवहारः । क्वान्यत्रेत्थं दृष्टमिति चेद् भूषणमेतदस्माकमलौकिकत्वसिद्धौ । — *A. Bh. I.* p. 285

Cf also :

न हि लोके विभावानुभावादयः केचन भवन्ति । हेतुकार्यावस्थामात्रत्वालोके तेषाम् । अथ त एव रसनोपयोगित्वे विभावादिरूपतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते । — *A. Bh. I.* p. 292  
लोके हि न कश्चिद् विभावादिव्यवहार इति भावः । — *A. Bh. I.* p. 293  
लोके विभावानुभावाभिनयादिव्यवहारभावात् । — *A. Bh. I.* p. 327



In these passages Abhinavagupta draws our pointed attention to two distinctive features of *rasa* : One, *rasa* which consists exclusively in aesthetic relish or pleasure is *alaukika* as it is radically different in kind from the permanent emotions (four of which are primarily pleasurable and four, primarily painful).<sup>13</sup> And, two, : The *vibhāvas* etc. are *alaukika*. They correspond to the *kāraṇas* etc. in everyday life but as they make the relish of *rasa* possible they exist only in the context of *rasa*. In everyday life we do not have such terms as *vibhāva*, etc. They belong only to art, not to the real life. The ancients whom Bharata also follows invented an entirely new terminology to impress on our minds the basic distinction between the real life and the realm of literature, the real world and the world of drama.

(ix) *A. Bh. I. pp. 284-285* : The aesthetic enjoyment of *rasa* consists in a completely extraordinary sense of wonder or mystic delight (*camatkāra*) and is totally different (*vilakṣaṇa eva*) from memory or recollection (*smṛti*), inference and worldly feelings of happiness, etc.<sup>14</sup> The empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, etc. do not operate in the case of this non-worldly or extra-worldly (*alaukika*) *rasa-carvaṇā*. This aesthetic enjoyment or relish or *rasa* is brought about solely by the combination of the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are extra-worldly (*alaukika*).<sup>15</sup> It is different from the perception of the permanent emotions of *rati* (love) etc., aroused by the empirical means of valid knowledge such as direct perception, inference, *āgama*, *upamāna*, etc.<sup>16</sup> It is also different from the perception without active participation of the thoughts of others on the part of imperfect *yogins*;<sup>17</sup> further, it is also different from the ecstatic experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self and in which all desire for worldly objects is absent.<sup>18</sup> For these three forms of perception are vitiated by one kind of defect or another. To explain, : (i) The perception of the worldly permanent emotions like love etc. gives rise to practical desires such as possessing the object of love etc.; (ii) The perception

13. तथा हि — रतिहासोत्साहविस्मयानां सुखस्वभावत्वम् ।.....क्रोध-भय-शोक-जुगुप्सानां तु दुःखरूपता ।

— *A. Bh. I. p. 43*

14. तथा हि लौकिकचित्तवृत्त्यनुमाने का रसता । तेनालौकिकचमत्कारात्मा रसास्वादः स्मृत्यनुमानलौकिक[स्व] संवेदनविलक्षण एव । — *A. Bh. I. p. 284*

15. ....न चात्र लौकिकप्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणव्यापारः । किन्त्वलौकिकविभावादिसंयोगबलोपनतैवेयं चर्वणा ।

— *Ibid, p. 285*

16. सा च प्रत्यक्षानुमानागमोपमानादिलौकिक-प्रमाण-जनित-रत्याद्यवबोधतः.....विशिष्यते । — *Ibid, p. 285*

17. तथा योगिप्रत्यक्षजनिततटस्थपरसंवित्तिज्ञानात्.....विशिष्यते । — *Ibid, I. p. 285*

18. सकलवैषयिकोपरागशून्यशुद्धपरयोगितस्वात्मानन्दैकधनानुभवाच्च विशिष्यते । — *Ibid, p. 285*



of an imperfect *yogin* lacks vividness and (iii) The perception of perfect *yogin* is simply overpowered by the *Ātman* (Self, or Brahman, the Ultimate Reality); and therefore all these three perceptions are devoid of beauty.<sup>19</sup> In aesthetic experience, on the contrary, there is no possibility of there arising any obstacle or defect : because of the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in one's person, one is not overpowered by *Ātman*, or *Brahman*, (the object of *samādhi*); because of one's active participation and the absence of sensations of pleasure etc. as inhering exclusively in other persons, there is no lack of vividness; and because of one's being overpowered by one's own *vāsanā*, say, love etc., awakened by the corresponding *vibhāvas*, etc., which are generalised there is no possibility of any obstacle confronting you.<sup>20</sup>

In this passage Abhinavagupta asserts that empirical means of valid knowledge do not at all operate in the case of *rasanā* (and consequently that of *rasa*) and contrasts the aesthetic pleasure or relish or experience with a number of other experiences. These other experiences are : (i) ordinary perception or cognition or apprehension of love, etc. produced by empirical means of valid knowledge; (ii) telepathy (the knowledge of other people's minds) of an imperfect *yogin* and (iii) the ecstatic experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated (compact) bliss of his Self. He is all the while driving at the *alaukika* nature of *rasa*.

(x) *A. Bh. I. p. 285* : *Rasa* consists exclusively in aesthetic relish and it is not of the nature of the object of cognition. The very life or existence of *rasa* entirely depends on this aesthetic relish. (*Rasa* ceases to exist after its enjoyment.) (The aesthetic relish is not the result of any means of valid cognition nor of any means of production. But *rasa* itself is not unprovable for it is verified by one's own heart—from one's own experience of it. Aesthetic relish or experience consists exclusively in knowledge. However this knowledge is totally different from all other empirical or mundane kinds of knowledge.<sup>21</sup>

In this passage Abhinavagupta makes it clear that aesthetic experience, which consists exclusively in knowledge, is *in a class by itself*, not comparable to any other

19. एतेषां यथायोगमर्जनादिविघ्नान्तरेदयात् तादस्थहेतुकास्फुटत्वेन विषयावेशवैवश्येन च सौन्दर्यविरहात् ।

— *Ibid*, p. 285

20. अत्र तु स्वात्मैकगतत्वनियमासम्भवात् विषयावेशवैवश्यम्, स्वात्मानुप्रवेशात् परगतत्वनियमाभावात् तादस्थ्यास्फुटत्वम्, तद्विभावादिसाधारण्यवशसंप्रबुद्धोचितनिजरत्यादिवासनावेशाच्च न विघ्नान्तरदीनां संभवः ।

— Hemacandra's *Kāvyañuśāsana*, MJV edn., pp. 102–103

21. रस्यैकप्राणो ह्यसौ न प्रमेयादिस्वभावः । .....सा च रसना न प्रमाणव्यापारो न कारकव्यापारः । स्वयं तु नाप्रामाणिकः । स्वसंवेदनसिद्धत्वात् । रसना च बोधरूपैव । किन्तु बोधान्तरेभ्यो लौकिकेभ्यो विलक्षणैव ।



kind of knowledge, unique, *sui generis*. Further, he asserts that the proof of *rasa* is "*sva-samvedana-siddhatvam*" – because *rasa* is felt, therefore it exists.

(xi) *Locana* : pp 86, 92–93, 155 : In the "*Krauñca*-episode", narrated at the beginning of Vālmīki's *Rāmāyaṇa*, the sage's poetic utterance is not to be viewed as the expression of his own sorrow. "It is hardly natural for one that is tormented by grief to play the poet,.....(It is not the emotional situation as it actually was (*laukika*) that is represented in it.) It is the situation as it is in the poet's vision or as it has been transfigured by his sensitive nature and imaginative power (*alaukika*)."<sup>22</sup>

The word "*pratibhā*" means "creative imagination" capable of creating ever newer and newer things. A form of this *pratibhā* is capable of creating beautiful poetry. It is when the poet is filled with *rasa*—(is fully under the spell of *rasa*) that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry—like a liquid, say water, which overflows a vase if it be already full.<sup>23</sup>

The purport of this passage is : A poet does not depict "the emotional situation as it actually exists and as he witnesses it. That would by no means constitute art. *He idealises the situation*. Absorption in such an idealised situation helps transcending worries, tensions of ordinary life and attaining a unique form of experience. *That is why rasa is called alaukika.*"

(xii) *A. Bh. I. p. 282* : All these *rasas* consist essentially in delight, for the essence of undifferentiated or compact *prakāśa* (light) consisting in the aesthetic rapture of one's own consciousness is (transcendental) delight. In everyday life also women when they are totally absorbed in the relish or rumination of their consciousness plunged in profound sorrow find rest or repose in their own heart. For happiness consists in complete rest or repose without any kind of obstacle. Pain, on the contrary, is nothing but lack or absence of complete rest or repose. It is precisely for this reason that the

22. मा निषाद प्रतिष्ठां त्वमगमः शाश्वतीः समाः ।

यत् क्रौञ्चमिथुनादेकमवधीः काममोहितम् ॥ इति ॥

न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम् । .....न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति । — *Locana*, p. 86

Cf :

एवं हि लोकगतचित्तवृत्त्यनुमानमात्रमिति का रसता । यस्त्वलौकिकचमत्कारत्मा रसास्वादः काव्यगत-  
विभावादिचर्वणाप्राणो नासौ स्मरणानुमानादिसाम्येन खिलीकारपात्रीकर्तव्यः । — *Ibid*, p. 155

23. 'प्रतिभा' अपूर्ववस्तुनिर्माणक्षमा प्रज्ञा । तस्या विशेषो रसावेशवैशद्यसौन्दर्य काव्यनिर्माणक्षमत्वम् ।

— *Ibid*, pp. 92–93

यावत् पूर्णो न चैतेन तावन्नैव वमत्यमुम् । — *Ibid*, p. 87



Sāṅkhyas who explain sorrow as property of *rajas* declare that restlessness is the very essence of sorrow. All the *rasas* thus consist essentially in (mystic) delight.<sup>24</sup>

(xii) *A. Bh. I. pp 291–292* : In this passage, which is apparently aimed at criticising Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta says : People (like Śaṅkuka) argue that *rasa* consists in the imitation of (permanent emotions such as) love etc. They themselves raise the objection : “How can sorrow be the cause of pleasure ?” And they answer their own objection by saying that it is the very nature of the emotions that when portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure. In refuting this position Abhinavagupta writes :

“But in the first place, the objection they raise is itself false. For it is not a rule that when one perceives sorrow in somebody else, one will necessarily feel sorrow in oneself. For instance, when one finds one’s enemy in sorrow one is *delighted*. In other cases (i.e. those of persons who are neither one’s friends nor foes) one remains indifferent. Now as regards the answer they gave to their own objection (that it is the very nature of the emotions that when they are portrayed in a drama they give rise to pleasure), it is no answer at all. In our opinion, in aesthetic experience it is one’s own consciousness which consists of uniform bliss that is enjoyed. How can there be any suspicion of sorrow ? The various permanent emotions like love, sorrow, etc. only serve to lend variety to the enjoyment of this bliss. Acting (*abhinaya*) etc. serve to awaken to life these permanent emotions.”<sup>25</sup>

24. तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधानाः । स्वसंविच्चर्वणरूपस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात् । तथा हि — एकघनशोकसंविच्चर्वणेऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिस्तथायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात् । अविश्रान्तिरूपतैव दुःखम् । तत एव कापिलैर्दुःखस्य चाञ्चल्यमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोवृत्तितां वदद्भिरित्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् ।

Read in this connection the following passage from *Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. I. pp. 31–32 : .....“The compassion of a poem is different from the compassion found in the ordinary world. The explanation is that sensitive readers (*rasika*) become more and more deeply attracted towards this aesthetic experience of grief whereas they tend to shun the real experience. For if (*karuṇa*) were to consist exclusively in sorrow the way worldly *karuṇa* does, then nobody would feel like going (to plays in which *karuṇa-rasa* was present) and thus large (and important) works as the *Rāmāyaṇa* etc. which consist exclusively in *karuṇarasa*, would fall into oblivion.....Therefore, *karuṇa*, like the other *rasas* consists in joy.” Also, cf : *Dhanika’s Avaloka* on *Daśarūpaka* (Adyar edn. 1969, p. 221) and *Sāhitya-Darpaṇa* III. 4–8.

25. ये तु रत्याद्यनुकरणरूपं रसमाहुः, अथ चोदयन्ति शोकः कथं सुखहेतुरिति । परिहरन्ति च अस्ति कोऽपि नाट्यगतानां विशेष इति । तत्र चोद्यं तावदसत् । शोको हि प्रतीयमानः किं स्वात्मनि प्रत्येतुर्दुःखं वितनोतीति नियमः । शत्रुदुःखे प्रहर्षात् । अन्यत्र च मध्यस्थत्वात् । उत्तरं तु भावानां वस्तुस्वभावमात्रेण (मात्रता) इति न किञ्चिदत्र तत्त्वम् । अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दघनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः । — *A. Bh. I. pp. 291–292*



In these passages Abhinavagupta dwells upon his favourite theme that all *rasas* are essentially pleasurable. Even the painful emotions of anger, fear, sorrow and disgust (*krodha*, *bhaya*, *śoka* and *jugupsā*) of our real life, when poetised or represented on the stage, are contemplated in their idealised form, completely divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, (and from all reference to time and space); and when they are thus contemplated they yield pure joy.

(xiv) *Locana* : p. 40, p. 399, p. 455 : Abhinavagupta states that *vyutpatti* (instruction in regard to the four well-known *puruṣārthas*—ends of human life, or as the term has been sometimes interpreted, — moral instruction, intellectual refinement) and *prīti* (pleasure, joy, delight) constitute the goal of literature. If *vyutpatti* is half of the goal of literature, *prīti* is the other half. But he does not fail to state that moral instruction and delight are not really different from one another but are two aspects of the same thing; for they both have the same cause—both are aroused by poetry—both are the result of one and the same aesthetic experience.<sup>26</sup>

(xv) *A. Bh. I.*, p. 3 : Drama is indeed different from every worldly thing (*laukika-padārtha-vyatiriktam*); it is altogether different from (*vilakṣaṇam*) imitation (*anukāra*), reflection (*pratibimba*), picture (*ālekhyā*), similitude (*sādṛśya*), superimposition (*āropa*), identity, poetical fancy, dream, tricks, magic, and the like. It is fit to be cognised by

26. (i) तत्र कवेस्तावत्कीर्त्यापि प्रीतिरेव संपाद्या । यदाह — 'कीर्तिं स्वर्गफलमाहुः' (काव्यालङ्कारसूत्रवृत्ति १-१-५) इत्यादि । श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्ति-प्रीती यद्यपि स्तः, यथोक्तम् — धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।  
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥ इति ॥  
तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । अन्यथा प्रभुसंमितेभ्यो वेदादिभ्यो मित्रसंमितेभ्यश्चेति-  
हासादिभ्यो व्युत्पत्तिहेतुभ्यः कोऽस्य काव्यरूपस्य व्युत्पत्तिहेतोर्जायासंमितत्वलक्षणो विशेष इति  
प्राधान्येनानन्द एवोक्तः । चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् ।

— *Locana*, pp. 40-41.

- (ii) .....रसास्वादवैवश्यमेव स्वरसभाविन्यां व्युत्पत्तौ प्रयोजकमिति प्रीतिरेव व्युत्पत्तेः प्रयोजिका । प्रीत्यात्मा च रसस्तदेव नाट्यं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यस्मदुपाध्यायः । न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तौ भिन्नरूपे एव । द्वयो-  
रप्येकविषयत्वात् ।  
— *Locana*, p. 336.
- (iii) न हि तेषां (काव्य) वाक्यानामग्निष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् सत्यार्थप्रतिपादनद्वारेण प्रवर्तकत्वाय प्रामाण्यमन्विष्यते,  
प्रीतिमात्रपर्यवसायित्वात् । प्रीतिरेव चालौकिकचमत्काररूपाया व्युत्पत्त्यङ्गत्वात् । — *Locana*, p. 455

Note : Abhinavagupta quotes the view of an earlier writer :

सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादिफलम् ।

— *A. Bh. I.* p. 289

"The sole purpose of drama is joy and that it never creates sorrow."

From the passages cited above it would seem that Abhinavagupta would agree with this view.



one's own perception which is of the nature of aesthetic relish; and this cognition is altogether different (*bhinna-vṛttānta*) from the well-known kinds of knowledge; right perception, error, doubt, lack of determinate knowledge, and lack of identity. It is truly of the nature of *rasa* (aesthetic experience).<sup>27</sup>

(xvi) *A. Bh. I., p. 35* : Abhinavagupta explains the above passage with examples while commenting on Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* I.107, p. 35 : To explain : Here, that is in drama, (literally, in the *Nāṭyaveda*) those who are seen (on the stage—playing the roles of the gods and the demons) are not the real gods and the demons. With regard to them there arises neither the cognition of identity nor of similitude, as in the case of twins; nor of error (mistaken knowledge), as in the case of a mother-of-pearl for silver, nor of super-imposition, as when one says : “This man from the country called *Bālhika* (part of modern Punjab) is a bull”; nor of a poetical fancy, as when one says “Her face is like the moon”; nor of a copy, as in the case of a picture or a clay-model etc.; nor of an imitation, as in the case of a disciple who cleverly imitates his teacher when reproducing his explanation; nor of a sudden creation, as in magic (*indrajāla*); nor of an appearance by employing *māyā* (tricks), as in the case of a sleight of hand, etc. In all these cases, as there is no *sādhārāṇīkaraṇa* and the spectator is quite indifferent he cannot have the aesthetic pleasure or experience.<sup>28</sup>

In these passages Abhinavagupta demonstrates how drama (or, for that matter creative literature) is unique, different from the various ordinary worldly things and how it lies beyond the ken of the various recognised modes or means of cognition, and is therefore *alaukika*, completely outside both time and space. He means to say Drama or “Literature occupies a time and a space that exist to the side of the world we know, it is a dimension apart, a different order of reality.”<sup>29</sup> “The aesthetic perception which is not dependent on the concepts of reality and unreality, cannot be

27. तत्र नाट्यं नाम लौकिकपदार्थव्यतिरिक्तं तदनुकाशप्रतिबिम्बालेख्यसादृश्यारोपाध्यवसायोत्प्रेक्षास्वप्नमायेन्द्र-जालादिविलक्षणं तद्-ग्राहकस्य सम्यग्ज्ञानभ्रान्तिसंशयानवधारणानध्यवसायविज्ञानभित्रवृत्तान्तास्वादनरूप-संवेदनसंवेद्यं वस्तु रस-स्वभावमिति वक्ष्यामः । — *A. Bh. I. p. 3*

28. तथाहि—तेषु न तत्त्वेन धीः । न सादृश्येन यमलकवत् । न भ्रान्तत्वेन रूप्यस्मृतिपूर्वकशुक्तिरूप्यवत् । नारोपेण सम्यग्ज्ञानबाधानन्तरमिथ्याज्ञानरूपम् । न तदध्यवसायेन गौर्वाहीकवत् । नोत्प्रेक्ष्यमाणत्वेन चन्द्रमुखवत् । न तत्प्रतिकृतित्वेन चित्रपुस्तवत् । न तदनुकारेण गुरु-शिष्य-व्याख्याहेवाकवत् । न तात्कालिकनिर्माणेन्द्रजालवत् । न युक्तिविरचिततदाभासतया हस्तलाघवादिमायावत् । सर्वेष्वेतेषु पक्षेष्वसाधारणतया द्रष्टुरीदासीन्ये रसास्वादायोगात् । — *A. Bh. I. p. 35*

29. *Aesthetic Rapture*, Vol. I. p. 32 and Vol. II. f.n. 271.



spoken of as a real experience (that is, the direct experience, perception of something real). Abhinavagupta says it is like a real experience. In other terms, the aesthetic experience is *like* a direct perception *sui generis*, free of every relation with practical reality, etc."<sup>30</sup>

Abhinavagupta's *alaukikatva* of *rasa* doctrine may briefly be stated as follows :

Objects in the world of poetry or drama have no place in the everyday world of our space and time. Owing to this lack of ontological status the question of reality or unreality does not apply to them. This, however, does not mean that they are unreal. They are drawn from life but are *idealised*. They, however, do not become false or illusory through *idealisation*. A reader or spectator who mistakes them for real objects or views them as unreal or false is no true spectator—*sahṛdaya*. The objects, depicted in poetry or drama, assume *a unique character which the spectator can describe as neither real nor unreal*. To take a logical view of the things portrayed in poetry or drama or to adopt a strictly philosophic approach to literature would only invite ridicule (as Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta say).<sup>31</sup>

The things of our real life the poet transforms by the magic touch of his divine *pratibhā*—creative imagination. That the aesthetic sense is not universal is a well known fact. The poet, therefore, needs a *sahṛdaya* (one endowed with a similar sensitivity—a sensitive spectator or fully responsive reader) to appreciate the things of beauty and joy he has created by his *pratibhā*.

In our real life everything is consciously or unconsciously related to the individual perceiver (*pramātr*) or to his friend, or to his enemy (*para*) or to someone in no way connected with him (*taṭastha*). But the poet's creations are not so related; they are wholly impersonal. They have no reference to anybody in particular. Being altogether

30. R. Gnoli : *The Aesthetic Experience According To Abhinavagupta*, pp, 57–58, f.n. 1

31. काव्यविषये च व्यङ्ग्यप्रतीतिनां सत्यासत्यनिरूपणस्याप्रयोजकत्वमेवेति तत्र प्रमाणान्तरव्यापारपरीक्षोपहासायैव संपद्यते । — *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 455

न हि तेषां वाक्यानामनिष्टोमादिवाक्यवत् सत्यार्थप्रतिपादनद्वारेण प्रवर्तकत्वाय प्रामाण्यमन्विष्यते, प्रीतिमात्रपर्यवसायित्वात् । प्रीतेरेव चालौकिकचमत्काररूपाया व्युत्पत्त्यङ्गत्वात् । .....नायं सहृदयः केवलं शुष्कतर्कोपक्रमकर्कशहृदयः प्रतीतिं परमर्षु नालमित्येष उपहासः । — *Locana*, p. 455  
and, जैमिनीयसूत्रे ह्येवं योज्यते न काव्येऽपीत्यलम् । — *Locana*, p. 173

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divorced from reference to personal interests, one's own or those of others, aesthetic experience is free from all the limitations of ordinary pleasure, arising out of narrow attachment, such as envy, desire or aversion; and the *sahṛdaya* becomes almost unconscious of his private self. He rises above the duality of pain and pleasure, love and hatred and enjoys through disinterested contemplation absolutely pure joy or delight. With the outer vesture of all practical interests and infatuation removed he experiences pure delight, *ānanda*, bliss of his Self with this qualification that it is coloured by a particular *vāsanā* say of love, sorrow, etc., awakened to life for the time being by the particular *vibhāvas*, etc.<sup>32</sup>. He experiences or enjoys a unique kind of delight that has no parallel in our everyday life. It is therefore called *alaukika*. The aesthetic perception is an inward-oriented apprehension. The *sahṛdaya* is completely absorbed in the aesthetic object to the exclusion of everything else—in other words, his mind is completely free from all obstacles, worries, tensions, preoccupations, prejudices etc., and he tastes his own consciousness which is but pure bliss and bliss alone. It is only coloured by some *vāsanā* or the other, aroused by the particular *vibhāvas* and that is why it is said to be akin to the enjoyment of *Brahman*—the Ultimate Reality (*Brahmāsvādasavidha*).

These important passages from Abhinavagupta's two works on literary and aesthetic criticism throw sufficient light on *alaukikatva*, a key term for him. It would be evident to a careful student of these passages that Abhinavagupta uses the term *alaukika* with different shades of meaning. In one or two places he uses the term *alaukika* to distinguish the process whereby *rasa* is achieved from other worldly or mundane (*laukika*) processes. It is achieved by the power of suggestion which is peculiar to poetry (or creative literature) and not by the commonly known processes of *abhidhā* (power of denotation) and *lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, or *bhakti* (secondary usage). Occasionally he uses this term '*alaukikā*' to point out that the mundane or worldly or earthly things of our everyday life are completely transformed by the magic touch of the activity of a poet's *pratibhā* (creative imagination, genius). He, however, frequently uses this term to mean "what is different or distinct from worldly things", "non-ordinary", "non-worldly", "what is not found in everyday life", "what exists only in the realm of

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— *A. Bh.* I. p. 339 (as restored by me)



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These important passages from Abhinavagupta's two works on literary and aesthetic criticism throw sufficient light on *alaukikatva*, a key term for him. It would be evident to a careful student of these passages that Abhinavagupta uses the term *alaukika* with different shades of meaning. In one or two places he uses the term *alaukika* to distinguish the process whereby *rasa* is achieved from other worldly or mundane (*laukika*) processes. It is achieved by the power of suggestion which is peculiar to poetry (or creative literature) and not by the commonly known processes of *abhidhā* (power of denotation) and *lakṣaṇā*, *guṇavṛtti*, or *bhakti* (secondary usage). Occasionally he uses this term '*alaukikā*' to point out that the mundane or worldly or earthly things of our everyday life are completely transformed by the magic touch of the activity of a poet's *pratibhā* (creative imagination, genius). He, however, frequently uses this term to mean "what is different or distinct from worldly things", "non-ordinary", "non-worldly", "what is not found in everyday life", "what exists only in the realm of

32. (i) अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दघनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः । — *A. Bh.* I. p. 292

(ii) तत्र सर्वरसानां शान्तप्राय एवास्वादो विषयेभ्यो विपरिवृत्त्यान्तर्मुखतालाभात् । केवलं वासान्तरोपहित इत्यस्य सर्वप्रकृतित्वाभिधानाय पूर्वमभिधानम् ।

— *A. Bh.* I. p. 339 (as restored by me)



literature (or any other fine art)". He also uses the term to convey the sense of "what is unique", "in a class by itself", *sui generis*, transcendental or autonomous. He lays great emphasis on this aspect of *rasa* when he, over and over again, remarks that experience of *rasa* is something that is *alaukika*, not really of this world, and beyond our concepts of time and space or divorced from time and space and that it approximates the experience of the perfect *yogin* in which he experiences the undifferentiated bliss of his Self or that it is akin to the enjoyment or relish of *Brahman*—the Ultimate Reality.

Before comparing Abhinavagupta's position that *rasa* is *alaukika* with Kant's position that art experience is autonomous, let us briefly state in the words of Prof. R. B. Patankar, the author of *Saundarya-Mīmāṃsā*, a unique work on Aesthetics in Marathi, the autonomist position of Kant :—

"Two positions have been taken regarding the relation between (i) art experience and (ii) other experiences in life. *The first position* is that (a) there is a continuity between the two types, (i) and (ii), of experiences (b) and that art experience is valuable because it promotes goals of these other experiences (e.g., art experience is valuable because it gives us an insight into reality, it makes us morally better). *The second position* is that art experience is radically different from other varieties of experiences, the difference is one of kind, not one of degree. Art experience is *sui generis*, autonomous, self-contained; art experience is valuable because it is art experience, and for no other reason.

If one wants to maintain the autonomist position, as Kant wants to, one has to show that art experience is different from (i) cognitive experience (ii) practical experience, including moral experience; (iii) experience of sensory pleasure, entertainment, etc. If the autonomy of art experience is to be proved, it will have to be shown (a) that the art object does not have the ontological status that objects in the real world have, and (b) that art experience is not mediated by any concepts. Sanskrit aestheticians like Śaṅkuka, Abhinavagupta have pointed out that the art object does not have the ontological status that things in the real world have. But no Sanskrit aesthetician has thought it necessary to say that art experience is not mediated by concepts.....Śaṅkuka has deontologised the art object. But no Sanskritist deconceptualised art experience."

If we examine the concept of Abhinavagupta, that *rasa* is *alaukika*, by applying the above-mentioned criteria we will have to admit that Abhinavagupta is not autonomist. It is true that according to Abhinavagupta the empirical means of valid cognition such as direct perception, inference, etc. simply do not operate in regard to *rasa*. He explicitly states that no kind of intellectual thinking bears any parallel



to the experience of *rasa*. Further, it is also true that according to him sheer delight is ultimately the sole aim or goal of poetry (or creative literature). Śaṅkuka, and following his lead, Abhinavagupta have deontologised the art-object. But they have not taken the second step—they have not deconceptualised art or aesthetic experience. So they cannot be called autonomist in the Kantian sense.

But leaving aside this restricted Kantian meaning of the term 'autonomist' and accepting the words 'autonomy' and 'autonomist' in their wider sense we can certainly say that Abhinavagupta and Ānandavardhana, whom Abhinavagupta follows, are both full-fledged autonomists :

In his *Dhvanyāloka* Ānandavardhana observes : "In the province of poetry (creative literature) obviously standards of truth and falsity have no relevance. Any attempt to find out or discover whether a poem (or any literary composition) is true or false by employing means of valid cognition leads to ridicule alone." Abhinavagupta comments on it : "Such a person will be ridiculed as follows : He is not sensitive to literature. He is not able or competent to appreciate aesthetic experience for his mind has become (truly) hard by his indulging in dry logic."<sup>33</sup>

In the same work at another place Ānandavardhana dwells upon the autonomy of a poet : "In the boundless world of poetry, the poet is the sole creator. As it pleases him to create a new world of his own, this real world is transformed. If the poet is pervaded by *rasa* then the whole world in his poem will be infused with *rasa*. But if he be devoid of emotion then the world too will become dry as dust.

A great or good poet, by virtue of his autonomy, at his sweet will causes even insentient objects to behave as if they were animate and animate objects to behave as if they were inanimate."<sup>34</sup>

Mammatā, a staunch follower of Ānandavardhana and Abhinavagupta endorses this view of poet's autonomy, and consequently, that of the aesthetic experience in the opening verse of his *Kāvyaprakāśa* :

33. Vide footnote (29) *supra*.

34. अपारे काव्यसंसारे कविरैकः प्रजापतिः ।

यथास्मै रोचते विश्वं तथेदं परिवर्तते ॥

शृङ्गारी चेत् कविः काव्ये जातं रसमयं जगत् ।

स एव वीतरागश्चेत्तस्मिन् सर्वमेव तत् ॥

भावानचेतनानपि चेतनवच्चेतनानचेतनवत् ।

व्यवहारयति यथेष्टं सुकविः काव्ये स्वतन्त्रतया ॥ — *Dhvanyāloka*, p. 498.



“Supreme is the poet's speech which unfolds an altogether new creation, which is free from the laws of *niyati* (Destiny or nature), which consists of delight and delight alone, which is completely independent of anything else and which is charming on account of nine *rasas*.”

So keeping in view the ancient tradition about the *alalukika* nature of poetic creation and Abhinavagupta's constant emphasis on the *alaukika* nature of *rasa* throughout his writings we are perfectly justified in describing Abhinavagupta as a champion of *alaukikatāvāda*, an autonomist in the popular and wider sense of that word. To call Abhinavagupta an autonomist in the restricted sense in which Kant uses the term, would be a highly misleading and inexcusable error.

Finally, it would be better to coin a new appropriate term (other than autonomy) in English to express Abhinavagupta's concept of *alaukikatva* and a new suitable term (other than *alaukikatva*) in modern Indian languages like Marathi, Gujarati, Hindi etc. to express Kant's concept of autonomy. If this suggestion is followed a lot of confusion in the minds of scholars reading books on Abhinavagupta and his *alaukikatva* in English and modern Indian languages would be avoided.

Although Bhaṭṭa Tauta criticises Śaṅkuka's analogy of '*citra-turaga-praṭīti*' and although it is traditionally believed that the view of the *guru* is also the view of his *śiṣya*, Abhinavagupta's own statements indisputably prove that he is one with Śaṅkuka in accepting *alaukika* or the unique mode of perception involved in aesthetic experience—*citra-turaga-praṭīti*.

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## RASA AND ITS PLEASURABLE NATURE

Bharata nowhere in his *Nāṭyaśāstra* makes any explicit statement that the *rasa* by its very nature is pleasurable. There are, however a few clear indications in the text of *Nāṭyaśāstra* of its pleasurable nature. The Indian tradition of the origin of the drama as preserved in the *Nāṭyaśāstra* says : *Nāṭya*, the completely new form of literature was created as a *krīḍanīyaka* (lit. a play-thing, pastime, recreation) to give pleasure to the eyes and ears alike (*drśyam śravyaṇca*).<sup>1</sup> It was meant to give courage, provide pastime, pleasure, friendly or salutary advice, etc.<sup>2</sup> It was also intended to give relief or aesthetic repose to persons afflicted with grief, exhausted with work, or overpowered with sorrow or distressed through weakness caused by different religious practices including fasts (*tapasvinām*).<sup>3</sup>

Dhanañjaya, who in his famous work, *Daśarūpaka*, gives an abstract of Bharata's *Nāṭyaśāstra* explicitly states that the *rūpakas* (the ten types of drama) overflow with joy or delight.<sup>4</sup>

Dhanika, his brother and commentator comments in his *Avaloka* : Aesthetic enjoyment consisting of supreme joy that is inwardly experienced or felt is the real purpose of the ten forms of drama, and not merely knowledge of the three goals of human life, etc. as is the case in the *Mahābhārata* (Itihāsa).<sup>5</sup>

Some modern scholars, however, cite Bharata's definition and description of ideal spectator :

“An ideal spectator at a dramatic performance is one who, when (the character) is pleased becomes himself pleased, when (the character) is angry becomes himself

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1. क्रीडनीयकमिच्छामो दृश्यं श्रव्यं च यद्भवेत् । — *NS* I.11(b)

2. हितोपदेशजननं धृति-क्रीडा-सुखादिकृत् । — *Ibid*, I.113(b)

3. दुःखार्तानां श्रमार्तानां शोकार्तानां तपस्विनाम् ।

विश्रान्तिजननं काले (पा.भे. लोके) नाट्यमेतद्भविष्यति ॥ — *Ibid* I.115

4. आनन्दनिष्पन्दिषु रूपकेषु.....स्वादु (पा.भे. स्वाद) परङ्मुखाय ॥ — *DR* I.6

5. अत्र केचित्.....त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिं काव्यफलत्वेनेच्छन्ति ।

तन्निगृह्य स्वसंवेद्य-परमानन्द-रूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपाणां फलम्, न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिमात्रम्.....! — *Avaloka* on *DR*, 1.6



angry, when (the character) is frightened or terrified becomes himself frightened or terrified.”<sup>6</sup>

Also, “Ideal spectators at a dramatic performance are those who, when (the characters) are depressed become themselves depressed, when (the characters) are pleased become themselves pleased, when (the characters) are in sorrow, are themselves in sorrow.”<sup>7</sup> And, they interpret it that it was Bharata's view that some *rasas* are pleasurable and some others painful.

It should be noted that Bharata does not speak here about the nature of *rasa* – whether it is pleasurable or painful or whether it is both—but of the essential quality of sympathy that a spectator or reader must have. Unless gifted with sympathy he cannot respond to the scenes and situations presented on the stage or in the poem and cannot establish what has aptly been called by Abhinavagupta the *hṛdaya-saṁvāda*. It is then followed, in Abhinavagupta's language; by the two successive stages of *tanmayībhāva* or *tanmayībhavana* (identifying oneself with the scene or situation retaining a certain distance) and *rasāsvāda* or *rasa-carvaṇā* (aesthetic enjoyment).

To explain *rasāsvāda* (aesthetic enjoyment or experience) Dhanañjaya gives the following analogy :

“When children play with clay-elephants, etc., the source of their joy is their own *utsāha* (dynamic energy). The same is true of spectators watching (the heroic deeds of) Arjuna and other (*Mahābhārata*) heroes on the stage” .....This aesthetic experience or enjoyment is a manifestation of that joy or bliss which is innate as the true nature of the self (*ātman*) because of the identification of the spectators with *kāvyaārtha* (the characters, scenes and situations presented in the drama).”<sup>8</sup>

6. यस्तुष्टो (? यस्तुष्टौ) तुष्टिमायाति शोके शोकमुपैति च ।  
कुद्धः क्रोधे भये भीतः स श्रेष्ठः प्रेक्षकः स्मृतः ॥ – NS XXVII 61(b) – 62(a)
7. दैन्ये दीनत्वमायान्ति ते नाट्ये प्रेक्षकाः स्मृता ।  
ये तुष्टौ तुष्टिमायान्ति शोके शोकं व्रजन्ति च ॥ – NS XXVII 42
8. क्रीडतां मृण्मयैर्यद्वद् बालानां द्विरदादिभिः ।  
स्वोत्साहः स्वदते तद्वच्छ्रेतृणामर्जुनादिभिः ॥  
स्वादः काव्यार्थसंभेदादात्मानन्दसमुद्भवः । – DR IV.41(b)–42(a), IV.43(a)



Dhanika discusses this problem at some length : "It is quite proper to say that the sentiments of the erotic, the heroic, the comic, etc., which consist essentially in joy arise from *ātmānanda* (the joy which is innate as the true nature of the self). But in the sentiment of pathos (*karuṇa*) and such other sentiments (that of anger, of fear, and of disgust,) how can joy arise ? For when *sahṛdayas* (sensitive readers or spectators) listen to a poem full of pathos, they experience sorrow, shed tears, etc. If this sentiment of pathos were essentially to consist in joy, this would surely not happen." This objection is answered as follows : "What you say is true. But the aesthetic joy in the sentiment of pathos and similar other sentiments is such that it is both pleasurable and painful. For example, in the act of *Kuṭṭamita* (affected repulse of a lover's caresses, as for instance, when he holds or catches her by her hair, presses her breasts or kisses her and inflicts passionately love-bites) at the time of *sambhoga* (sexual enjoyment) women experience both pleasure and pain. (In other words, love-bites tooth-marks and nail-marks although physically painful give pleasure to women.) The aesthetic experience of grief or sorrow in poetry, in *kāvya* (creative literature) is different from the grief or sorrow as directly experienced by people in the actual life. To explain : *Sahṛdayas* turn more and more to experience this aesthetic grief or sorrow. If it were only painful like the grief or sorrow in the real world (actual life) then nobody would ever think of going to witness plays or reading poems full of the sentiment of pathos. (For it is an axiom that every being strives to secure happiness and shun misery or pain.) Consequently, then such great and celebrated works as the *Rāmāyaṇa*, etc., which predominantly depict the sentiment of pathos would have fallen into oblivion and lost. The shedding of tears etc., by the spectators (or readers) on listening to the description of a sad or tragic incident or event (in a work of art), like the shedding of tears, etc. through sorrow over the death or loss of one's beloved person in actual life, is not at variance (with the view mentioned above). Therefore, *karuṇa-rasa* (the sentiment of pathos), like the other *rasas* of *śṛṅgāra* (the sentiment of love) etc., is certainly pleasurable."

But of all the Sanskrit *ālaṃkārikas*, it is Abhinavagupta who repeatedly speaks of the pleasurable nature of *rasa*. Before setting forth his view in detail it is necessary to notice two other theories mentioned and refuted by him. After refuting Śāṅkuka's view that *rasa* is the reproduction (*anukaraṇa*) of mental states he briefly refers to the Sāṃkhya theory of *Rasa*. According to the Sāṃkhyas, *rasa* is made of pleasure and pain and is nothing but a combination of various elements (the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc.), possessing the power of producing pleasure and pain and that these elements are only external (*bāhya*), i.e., they are not psychic or mental states (*citta-vṛttis*). According to this theory, there is no difference between *rasas* and *sthāyi-bhāvas*



(permanent mental states). The advocates of this theory are naturally forced to give a metaphorical interpretation of all the passages in which Bharata distinguishes *rasas* from *citta-vṛttis*. The very fact that the Sāṃkhyas have to resort to a forced interpretation of Bharata's passages shows that their theory is unsound.<sup>9</sup>

Towards the end of his comment on *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VI.33 Abhinavagupta attacks Śaṅkuka and his followers who hold the view that *rasa* is the reproduction of permanent mental states like *rati* (love), etc. : "Some people argue that *rasa* is the reproduction or imitation of permanent mental states like love (*rati*) etc., and they thus go on to ask the question : 'How can sorrow be the cause of joy ?' They answer their own question by saying that sorrow (and similar other painful mental states) when portrayed in drama acquire a peculiar or special property (whereby they become a source of pleasure). But to start with, the very question they ask is false. For, is there an invariable rule that when one perceives sorrow in somebody else it necessarily produces sorrow in oneself ? It is observed in actual life that when one sees one's enemy in sorrow, one experiences extreme joy. In other cases (i.e., in the cases of persons who are neither one's friends nor foes) one remains totally indifferent. Now, regarding the answer they give to their own question, viz., it is the very nature of the mental states or emotions that when they are depicted in drama, they attain a peculiar or special property – they come to possess speciality and produce joy is no answer at all (lit., there is no substance in it)."<sup>10</sup> In our opinion, (says Abhinavagupta) (in aesthetic experience) what is enjoyed is one's own consciousness which consists of a compact mass of bliss. How can there be any question of sorrow ? Different emotions like love, sorrow, etc., only serve the purpose of lending variety to the enjoyment of this consciousness consisting of bliss. Acting, etc., helps or serves to awaken it (i.e. the *saṃvedana*, consciousness)."<sup>11</sup>

Abhinavagupta is firmly of the view that all the (eight or nine) *rasas* are pleasurable (*ānandarūpa*). When commenting on *Nāṭyaśāstra* (I.119, p. 43) he declares : The four permanent (or dominant) mental states of love (*rati*), laughter (*hāsa*), dynamic energy

9. सुख-दुःख-जनन-शक्ति-युक्ता विषयसामग्री बाह्यैव साङ्ख्यदृशा सुख-दुःख-स्वभावो रसः ।...स्थायिनस्तु तत्सामग्रीजन्या आन्तराः सुखदुःखस्वभावा इति ।.... – A. Bh. I, p. 276
10. ये तु रत्याद्यनुकरणरूपं रसमाहुः अथ चोदयन्ति शोकः कथं सुखहेतुरिति । परिहरन्ति च अस्ति कोऽपि नाट्यगतानां विशेष इति । तत्र चोद्यं तावदसत् । शोको हि प्रतीयमानः किं स्वात्मनि प्रत्येतुर्दुःखं वितनोतीति नियमः । शत्रुदुःखे प्रहर्षात् । अन्यत्र च मध्यस्थत्वात् । उत्तरं तु "भावानां वस्तुस्वभावमात्रेण" इति न किञ्चिदत्र तत्त्वम् । – A. Bh. I. p. 291
11. अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दधनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः । – A. Bh. I. p. 292



(*utsāha*) and wonder (*vismaya*) are primarily pleasurable (*sukha-svabhāva*). But the other four permanent (or dominant) mental states of anger (*krodha*), fear (*bhaya*), sorrow (*śoka*) and disgust (*jugupsā*) are primarily painful. These permanent mental states, however, do not exclusively consist in happiness or misery, joy or sorrow, but are pierced through an element of sorrow and joy respectively.<sup>12</sup>

In the course of his discussion of the sixth obstacle to the realization of *rasa*, viz., the lack of some predominant factor (*apradhānatā*), he observes : “All these permanent mental states (when portrayed in a drama) are predominantly pleasurable. For, the essence of compact light (*prakāśa*) consisting in the aesthetic relish of one’s own consciousness is transcendental delight. To explain : In actual life also women when they are completely absorbed in the rumination of their consciousness characterised or circumscribed by profound sorrow find full rest or repose in their own heart. For happiness consists in complete rest or full repose without any obstacle. Pain, on the contrary, is nothing but absence of complete rest or full repose. It is for this reason alone that the Sāṃkhyas who explain pain or sorrow as a property of *rajas* declare that restlessness is the very essence of pain or sorrow. All the *rasas* thus consist essentially in transcendental delight.<sup>13</sup> But some of them, on account of the *vibhāvas*, etc., by which they are coloured are affected by a certain touch of bitterness.<sup>14</sup>

When explaining Bharata’s comparison of *rasa* (sentiment) with *anna* (food) and of the aesthetic process with tasting, Abhinavagupta elucidates the phrase *harṣādīmś-cādhigacchanti* with reference to (i) gourmets to mean that they attain pleasure (and *ādi* includes) satisfaction, nourishment, strength and good health and with reference to (ii) sensitive spectators to mean that they attain pleasure, (and the word *ādi* includes) proficiency in the four goals of human life, viz., *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*, and the fine arts. He then quotes the view of earlier writers (*anye tu*) : “Others however think that the word *ādi* etc., in the above phrase includes sorrow and the like. But this inclusion (*saṃgraha*) is not proper. For drama produces pleasure and pleasure (alone) (*‘harṣaikaphalaṃ nāṭyam’*) in the sensitive spectators and not sorrow, etc.,

12. तथा हि-रतिहासोत्साहविस्मयानां सुखस्वभावत्वम् ।...

क्रोध-भय-शोक-जुगुप्सानां तु दुःखस्वरूपता । — A. Bh. I.119, p. 43

13. तत्र सर्वेऽमी सुखप्रधानाः । स्वसंविच्चर्वणरूपस्यैकघनस्य प्रकाशस्यानन्दसारत्वात् । तथा हि एकघनशोकसंविच्चर्वणेऽपि लोके स्त्रीलोकस्य हृदयविश्रान्तिरन्तरायशून्यविश्रान्तिशरीरत्वात् (सुखस्य) । अविश्रान्तिरूपतैव दुःखम् । तत एव कापिलैर्दुःखस्य चाञ्चल्यमेव प्राणत्वेनोक्तं रजोवृत्तितां वदद्भिरित्यानन्दरूपता सर्वरसानाम् । — A. Bh. I. p. 282

14. किन्तूपरञ्जकविषयवशात् केषामपि कटुकिम्ना स्पर्शोऽस्ति.....। — A. Bh. I. p. 282



(other similar painful feelings). Thinking that there is no good or valid reason to believe that drama produces sorrow and that they would be required to refute the view that sorrow is the purpose of drama these writers read : *harṣāṃścādhiḡacchanti* (i.e. they attain pleasures).<sup>15</sup>

Abhinavagupta does not record either his approval or disapproval of this view. But this view does not, it would seem, differ from Abhinavagupta's own view often expressed in his two commentaries – *Abhinavabhāratī* and *Dhvanyālokalocana*. He, for instance, remarks in his *Locana* : “Although knowledge (instruction in the four ends of human life and the fine arts) and pleasure for the reader are both present, pleasure is the chief purpose of *kāvya* (poetry, creative literature)..... Even of instruction in the four ends of human life, joy or delight (*ānanda*) is the final and chief purpose or result or reward.”<sup>16</sup> Again, “*rasa* has for its essence pleasure and *rasa* alone is drama. ....This is what our respected teacher says. Nor are pleasure and moral instruction really different from one another, for they both have the same cause (*ekaviṣayatvāt*).”<sup>17</sup>

Viśvanātha discusses this problem of *karuṇa* etc. being pleasurable in his *Sāhitya-darpaṇa* (Chapter III.4–8) :

He declares that *rasa* is made of pleasure or joy and that it is *brahmāsvāda-sahodara* (akin to the enjoyment of Brahman, characterised by *sat*, *cit* and *ānanda*).

*Objection* : “Then since *karuṇa*, etc. (i.e. *bībhatsa*, *bhayānaka* and *raudra*) arise out of sorrow, etc., they cannot be called *rasas* at all.”

*Answer* : In *karuṇa*, etc. supreme aesthetic joy is produced. And in this matter the experience of the sensitive spectators and readers is the sole proof. Moreover, if they were to produce sorrow, nobody would be attracted towards (the works depicting) these *karuṇa* and such other *rasas*. No sensible person exerts himself to experience sorrow; and since all (sensible and sensitive people) are seen to be drawn towards *karuṇa*, etc., it is evident that *karuṇa* and such other *rasas* consist of (aesthetic) joy. If *karuṇa-rasa* were the cause or source of sorrow, such great works as *Rāmāyaṇa* would cause sorrow. And how then, someone may ask, can joy arise from what causes

15. अन्ये त्वादिशब्देन शोकादीनामत्र संग्रहः । स च न युक्तः । सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादि-फलम् । तथात्वे निमित्ताभावात् तत्परिहारप्रसङ्गाच्चेति मन्यमाना हर्षाश्चाधिगच्छन्तीति पठन्ति ।

– A. Bh. I. p. 289

16. श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीतिर्यद्यपि स्तः.....तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । .....चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् । – *Locana* on I.1 pp. 40–4

17. प्रीत्यात्मा च रसस्तदेव नाट्यं नाट्यमेव वेद इत्यस्मदुपाध्यायः । न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्ती भिन्नरूपे एव द्वयोरप्येकविषयत्वात् । – *Locana* p. 336



sorrow ? To this Viśvanātha replies as follows : Granted that wordly joys and sorrows arise from worldly causes of joys and sorrows. But when these very causes etc., are depicted in *kāvya* (creative literature) they lose their character as causes, etc., and turn into *vibhāvas* etc., which no longer remain *laukika* (worldly) and are called *alaukika* (non-worldly). They like love-bites, etc., in sexual union, produce pleasure and pleasure alone, and therefore, our above thesis is unexceptionable.

But if the thesis (poetic or dramatic representation of sorrows and suffering produces only joy) be correct, how is it that the shedding of tears, (etc., are produced while) witnessing or hearing sad events in the life of Hariścandra, etc. in the *Mahābhārata* and the like ? To this it is replied as follows : The shedding of tears etc., are held to come from the mind (or heart) being melted.

Jagannātha in the course of his exposition of the nature of *rasa* as elucidated by various *ālaṃkārikas* (literary thinkers) sets forth *for the first time* the views of the *Navyas* (Moderns) and *Pare* (other literary thinkers). It may not be wrong to suggest that Jagannātha himself held the view ascribed to the *Navyas*. The *navyas* account for joy produced by *karuṇa* and such other *rasas* as follows :

“The sensitive spectator (*sahṛdaya*) identifies himself with a hero, say, Duṣyanta; and enjoys the dramatic performance, say, *Abhijñānaśākuntala*. In this connection it may be asked : *rati* (love) of Śakuntalā for Duṣyanta, let us grant for the sake of argument, produces peculiar joy in the spectators as in the case of Duṣyanta. But how can *śoka* (sorrow), the permanent emotion of the sentiment of pathos, which is well-known to be the cause of unhappiness produce joy in the spectator ? On the contrary, it would be only proper to hold that it (*śoka*) produces unhappiness in the spectator as in the case of the hero. Some might argue : “That real sorrow produces unhappiness is an accepted truth. But the sorrow produced by reading a poem portraying *karuṇa rasa* or while witnessing a tragic scene or event, being unreal cannot produce a distressing effect. While the hero of a poem or a play experiences grief, the *sahṛdaya* does not.” But this argument is not correct. This argument, if accepted, would force us all to accept the position that the rope mistaken for a serpent does not produce fear or trembling. Again, it would not be reasonable to say that *rati* (love) etc., which is imaginatively felt by the spectator produces joy in him.” In reply to this it is said : “What you say is true. But if it be the experience of the *sahṛdayas* (lit. if it be verified by the heart of the *sahṛdayas* that pure joy alone is produced from poetic or dramatic works replete with *karuṇa-rasa* just like from the poetic or dramatic works in which the erotic sentiment predominates, then it will have to be admitted that extraordinary power or better, function of suggestion *lokottara-kāvya-vyāpāra*) itself is the cause



of preventing sorrow or grief just as it is the cause of producing joy. For a cause is inferred from the effect. On the other hand, if sorrow/grief is proved to effect from a poem or a play depicting *karuṇa-rasa* as joy from an erotic poem or play then it is not necessary to infer the cause, viz., the preventing of sorrow or grief and then, both joy and sorrow will follow their own cause respectively." It may be asked : "If a poem full of pathos were to produce sorrow why should a poet strive himself to compose such a poem and a sensitive reader, to listen to it ? For it being the cause of an undesirable or unwelcome thing (viz., sorrow) it would be only proper for him to refrain from it." In reply it is said : "As there is in a play full of pathos welcome joy in a larger degree and unwelcome unhappiness in a lesser degree, a poet's activity of composing and a spectator's activity of witnessing it stands to reason, just like a person's activity of applying sandal paste to one's body."

Now, according to the literary thinkers or critics who maintain that every poetic work yields pure joy, there is absolutely no hindrance to the poet's or reader's or spectator's activity in regard to writing a poem, or listening to it or witnessing a play respectively. Even the flow of tears or shedding of tears when reading a poem full of pathos is only natural as it takes place while experiencing that pure joy; and this flow of tears does not (at all) arise on account of grief. Therefore the flow or shedding of tears from the eyes of the devotees of (Viṣṇu, Śiva or any other) deity on hearing his description is only proper. There is not even the slightest touch of sorrow or grief in listening to such descriptions of deities (And yet they shed tears; therefore it is quite evident that these tears are of pure joy and not of sorrow). It may be asked : "If the sensitive spectator or reader who has completely identified himself with sorrow-stricken Daśaratha, etc., experiences in relishing the sentiment of pathos etc., joy, then in a dream or in *sannipāta* (a dangerous fever – a combined derangement of the three humours of the body causing fever which is of a dangerous kind) by such identification also he ought to experience sorrow in this case (viz., relishing the sentiment of pathos, etc.)." To this it is said in reply : "That even matters like sorrow, etc., which are in themselves distasteful (unwelcome), produce extraordinary or transcendental joy is due to the glorious power of the extraordinary poetic function, called *vyañjanā* (the power of suggestion). The sweet aesthetic relish arising out of this extraordinary poetic

18. तेभ्यः सुरते दन्तघातादिभ्य इव सुखमेव जायते । — *SD Vṛtti* on III. 7

Cf. किन्तु तादृश एवासावानन्दः सुखदुःखात्मको यथा प्रहरणताडनादिषु संभोगावस्थायां कुट्टमिते स्त्रीणाम् ।

— *Avaloka* IV.44-45

And, संभोगसमये स्त्रीणामधरदंशनादौ कृत्रिमदुःखानुभावसीत्कारवदन्नाप्युपपत्तेः । सुखेऽपि दुःखवदुपचारः कुट्टमितमिति तल्लक्षणात् । — *Ratnāṇa*, p. 209



function (of *vyañjanā*) is altogether different from the experience of joy produced by any other means of cognition (like perception, inference, analogy, scriptures, etc.).”<sup>19</sup>

This discussion reveals that conflicting views are held by Sanskrit literary thinkers regarding *rasa* and its pleasurable nature : (i) Some are of the view that *rasas*, one and all, without any exception, are pleasurable. They define and describe *rasa* as a manifestation of the joy or delight or the bliss of the self (*ātmānanda*) or one’s own consciousness circumscribed by or coloured with a particular permanent emotion with its veil of ignorance uncovered or rent asunder.

Consequently, in this enjoyment of one’s own consciousness which is a mass of bliss or of one’s own mental state with the preponderance of the element of *sattva* and with the light and bliss of self reflected in it there can be absolutely no question of any unhappiness, pain, grief or sorrow. These literary critics are known as ‘*kevalāhlādavādins*’. (ii) Some other literary critics are of the view that some *rasas* like the erotic (*śṛṅgāra*) etc., are pleasurable but some others like the pathetic (*karuṇa*) are painful as in our actual everyday life. These literary critics are known as *sukhaduḥkhātmacavādins*. (iii) The modern (*navya*) literary critic, Siddhicandragani is alone in holding the view that there are only four *rasas*, *śṛṅgāra*, etc., as they are pleasurable, and the rest of the so-called (eight or nine) *rasas* do not deserve to be called *rasas*.

Of the four well-known commentators of Bharata’s *rasasūtra*, Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka and Abhinavagupta are undoubtedly of the view that all *rasas* are pleasurable. Regarding Lollaṭa we do not get any definite indication in his exposition of the *rasasūtra* as presented by Abhinavagupta in his *Abhinavabhāratī* (I. p. 272). But in his *Locana* commentary on *Dhvanyāloka* (II. pp. 184–85) we have a clue in this regard. An objection is raised by Śaṅkuka against Lollaṭa’s *Puṣṭivāda* or *Utpattivāda* : “.....Therefore there is no *rasa* in the character being portrayed.....If one were to say that it exists in the spectator how could there be *camatkāra* (mysterious or mystic delight, thrill of joy) ? On the contrary, in *karuṇa-rasa*, etc., the spectator would experience only sorrow or grief or pain.” This passage may be taken as an indication to draw the inference that Lollaṭa was also of the view that all *rasas* are pleasurable. We are fortunate enough to come across a passage which has been cited by Abhinavagupta only to criticise Śaṅkuka. Śaṅkuka unambiguously states : “*śoka* (and other similar permanent mental states) when portrayed in *kāvya* (a poem) and *nāṭya* (a play) come to possess a peculiar charm or beauty whereby they become pleasurable; and that it is the very nature of these *bhāvas* (permanent mental states) to become pleasurable when depicted in drama (creative literature).”<sup>20</sup>

19. *Rasagaṅgādhara*, Kāvya-mālā edn., Bombay, 1939, (pp. 30–32)

20. Vide the passage cited in f.n. no. 10 *supra*.



Incidentally, it may be noted that Mammaṭa has paraphrased, when summarising Śaṅkuka's interpretations of the *rasasūtra*, the phrase '*vastu-svabhāva-mātreṇa*' and the sentence '*asti ko'pi nāṭya-gatānām bhāvānām viśeṣaḥ*' as '*vastu-saundaryabalād rasanīyatvenānyānumīyamāna-vilakṣaṇaḥ.....(ratyādir bhāvaḥ.....)*'<sup>21</sup>

Although Abhinavagupta criticises Śaṅkuka for this view of his, elsewhere he himself declares : ".....the states of mind appropriate to love (*kāma*) etc., and denoted by such words as *rati* (sexual love) etc., are made capable of being enjoyed or relished through the suggestive poetic activity or function (*kavi-vyāpāra*) and the fourfold suggestive *abhinaya* (acting or dramatic representation).<sup>22</sup> Abhinavagupta very clearly says : "States of mind, conveyed through the extraordinary process of verbal representation, etc., render themselves worthy or capable of relish or enjoyment, although they are in our actual day-to-day life unworthy or incapable of being relished or enjoyed."<sup>23</sup>

Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra who hold the view that *rasas* are "*sukhadulṅkhātma*" account for the mysterious delight (*camatkāra*) arising from repugnant *karuṇa* and such other *rasas* by referring to *kavi-naṭa-śakti-kauśala* : "That mysterious delight is seen to result from these (repugnant and) painful *rasas* is due to the poet's creative imagination and the actors' skill or proficiency in acting or the dramatic representation (due to the excellence of the art of the dramatist and of the actors)."<sup>24</sup> As these authors have made free use of *Abhinavabhārati* in writing *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* probably they have been influenced by the two passages from *Abhinavabhārati* cited in foot-notes (no. 22 and no. 23).

Viśvanātha who, as a rule, follows Abhinavagupta depends on him for this point too : "In the actual world the rule holds that from worldly causes of joy, sorrow, etc., worldly joy, sorrow, etc., respectively are produced. But in the world of poetry and drama, which is *alaukika* (transcendental, non-worldly) joy alone is produced from the *vibhāvas*, etc., which are *alaukika*.

21. संयोगात् गम्यगमकभावरूपात् अनुमीयमानोऽपि वस्तुसौन्दर्यबलाद्रसनीयत्वेनान्यानुमीयमानविलक्षणः स्थायित्वेन संभाव्यमानो रत्यादिभावस्तत्रासन्नपि सामाजिकानां वासनया चर्व्यमाणो रसः.....

— KP. (Jhalakikar's edn.) p. 90

22. ....कामादिषु समुचिताश्चित्तवृत्तयो रत्यादिशब्दवाच्याः कविनटव्यापारेणास्वादयोग्यता-प्रापणद्वारेण.....सामाजिकान् प्रति रसत्वं शृङ्गारदितया नीयन्ते । — A. Bh. I. p. 333

23. चित्तवृत्तय एवालौकिकाः वाचिकाद्यभिनय — (? एवालौकिकवाचिकाद्यभिनय)प्रक्रियारूढतया स्वात्मानं लौकिकदशायामनास्वाद्य—[मप्यास्वाद्यं] कुर्वन्तीत्यतस्ता एव भावाः ।

— A. Bh. I. p. 344 (text restored by me)

24. करुण-रौद्र-बीभत्स-भयानकाश्चत्वारो दुःखात्मानः ।... यत् पुनरेभिरपि चमत्कारो दृश्यते, स रसास्वादविरमे सति यथावस्थितवस्तुप्रदर्शकेन कवि-नट-शक्ति-कौशलेन । — ND p. 141



Jagannātha too who also is a follower of Abhinavagupta asserts that the power of suggestion (*vyañjanā*) plays a unique role in creative literature. Such is the power of the *lokottara* (i.e. *alaukika*) poetic function of *vyañjanā* that even things like sorrow, although unwelcome in themselves when portrayed in creative literature produce extraordinary joy or delight. The sweet relish arising from this *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* is altogether different from the joyful experience produced by any other *pramāṇa* (proof, like perception, inference, etc.).<sup>25</sup>

It is indeed extraordinary that none of the post-Abhinavagupta *ālamkārikas* (literary critics) noticed the glaring contradiction between the two following statements made by Abhinavagupta in his *Locana*. In the course of his exposition of the relish or enjoyment (*bhoga*) of *rasa* Bhaṭṭa Nāyaka observes that it approximates the relish or enjoyment of the Highest Brahman – Abhinavagupta commenting on this statement says : “We admit with him that aesthetic enjoyment (*rasāsvāda*) is similar to the relish or enjoyment of bliss of the Highest Brahman.”<sup>26</sup> But commenting on his own verse “*yā vyāpāravatī rasān rasayitum.....*” he says :

“The happiness which results from the knowledge of both seen and unseen objects which are ascertained, by all the means of cognition or even that extra-worldly joy which consists in enjoying an aesthetic experience – to both of these, the bliss that follows from full repose in God is far superior; and that aesthetic rapture is only an appearance of a particle or reflection of a drop or fraction of that bliss. But ordinary worldly pleasure is almost inferior to even that aesthetic pleasure because it is not without plenty of pain or misery.”<sup>27</sup>

This plain inconsistency can only be explained if we take Abhinavagupta’s statement comparing *rasāsvāda* with *parabrahmāsvāda* as a mere *arthavāda* (praise, eulogy) with a view to glorifying *rasa*.

The protagonists of the view that all *rasas* are pleasurable attempt to show that *bhāvanā* (generalisation, universalisation, idealisation) or *vyañjanā-vyāpāra* (the power or function of suggestion) effects, temporarily though, the removal of delusion of mind

25. अयं हि लोकोत्तरस्य काव्यव्यापारस्य महिमा, यत्प्रयोज्या अरमणीया अपि शोकादयः पदार्थाः आह्लादमलौकिकं जनयन्ति । विलक्षणो हि कमनीयः काव्यव्यापारज आस्वादः प्रमाणान्तरजादनुभवात् ।  
– *Rasagaṅgādhara* pp. 31–32

26. भाविते च रसे तस्य भोगः.....परब्रह्मास्वादसविधः ।..... परब्रह्मास्वादसब्रह्मचारित्वं चास्त्वस्य रसास्वादस्य ।  
– *Locana* pp. 183–190

27. सकलप्रमाणपरिनिश्चितदृष्टादृष्टविषयविशेषजं यत्सुखं, यदपि वा लोकोत्तरं रसचर्वणात्मकं तत् उभयतोऽपि परमेश्वरविश्रान्त्यानन्दः प्रकृष्यते तदानन्दविपुष्मात्रावभासो हि रसास्वाद इत्युक्तं प्रागस्माभिः । लौकिकं तु सुखं ततोऽपि निकृष्टप्रायं बहुतरदुःखानुषङ्गादिति तात्पर्यम् । – *Locana* III p. 510



(*moha*) or ignorance (*ajñāna*) that envelops the mass of bliss innate to the self (*ātman*); and thereby enable the *sahṛdaya* to appreciate and enjoy the transcendental joy or delight of the self or the bliss of *brahman*. The advocates of the view that *rasas* are only *laukika* (worldly, the same as emotions or states of mind as in actual life) and are pleasurable or painful in accordance with the pleasant or painful emotions may raise the following objection : "It passes one's comprehension how a literary function like *bhāvanā* or *vyañjanā* can transform what is unpleasant into pleasurable *rasa*. One may admit with the followers of the Vedānta *darśana* that the cover of delusion of mind or ignorance enveloping the Self or *Cit* or *Caitanya* is removed or rent asunder through knowledge of the Ultimate Reality (*paramātmān* or *parabrahma*) in the case of a person who aspires after *mokṣa* (liberation) and is possessed of the four well-known requisites (including *śamadamādi-sādhana-sampat*) and undertakes the study of Vedānta, etc., but there is hardly any justification or evidence enough for investing *bhāvanā* or *vyañjanā* with such extraordinary and incredible power." In reply the *kevalānandavādins* (those who hold that all *rasas* are pleasurable) may say : "The facts or events treated poetically may, as parts of the actual life produce pleasure or pain but when they are contemplated in their idealised or generalised form they give rise to pleasure and pleasure alone. As a result of this contemplation of literary objects in their idealised character they become impersonal in their appeal and therefore enjoyable in and for themselves. In other words, the *sahṛdaya* in appreciating poetry or drama or creative literature in general rises above the duality of pleasure or pain as commonly understood, and enjoys higher pleasure or delight. *Bhāvanā*<sup>28</sup> leads to spontaneous and complete selflessness or forgetting one's private self and it in its turn yields pure joy unmixed with pain or sorrow or any kind of mental tension. And in this regard it is comparable to *brahmāsvāda*; and in regard to such pleasurable experience *sahṛdayas* alone are authority." It is doubtful if this reply would satisfy or convince *sukha-duḥkhātma-vādins*. Modern literary thinkers too may not accept the position that in aesthetic experience one enjoys one's own consciousness that consists of a compact mass of bliss. They, in fact, regard the postulate or concept of *ātmānanda* or *brahmānanda* as irrelevant in the context of enjoyment of *rasa*.<sup>29</sup>

28. Cf. the gloss in *Locana* on the phrases of *Dhvanyāloka* (*kāvya-tattvārtha-bhāvanā-vimukhānām*) :

काव्यस्य तत्त्वभूतो योऽर्थस्तस्य भावना वाच्यातिरेकेणानवरतचर्चणा तत्र विमुखानाम् ।

— *Locana*, p. 94

29. Here we leave out of consideration the views of Bhoja, Śārādātānaya, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, etc., as Raghavan has already dealt with them in his two works : Bhoja's *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* and *the Number of Rasas*.



## RASA AND ITS ĀŚRAYA (LOCATION, SEAT)

The *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata is the oldest work on aesthetics in Sanskrit. Of all the chapters in this work the sixth chapter on *rasa* is the most significant as it deals with the theory of literary beauty—the *rasa* theory. The two traditional verses incorporated in this chapter, numbered 32 and 33, and the prose passage immediately preceding these verses are instructive regarding Bharata's own view about the location of *rasa*. The traditional verses he cites in support of his views stated in the prose passage : “.....What is it you call *rasa* ? (Or, what is the meaning of the word *rasa* ?) We reply : ‘it is called *rasa* because it can be relished. How is *rasa* relished ? Just as gourmets relish the flavour of food prepared with various spices and obtain pleasure etc., even so sensitive spectators (*sumanasah prekṣakāḥ*) relish the dominant or permanent emotions (*sthāyibhāva*) manifested or suggested by the acting out of the *bhāvas* (*vibhāvas* and *vyabhicārins*) and which are presented with the three kinds of dramatic representation, viz., that which uses speech, that which uses the body and that which is *sāttvika* (involuntary), obtains pleasure, etc. Therefore they are called *nāṭyarasas* (dramatic sentiments, sentiments in drama).<sup>1</sup> On this subject there are the following two traditional stanzas :

“As gourmets relish food prepared with various ingredients (of pleasant flavour) and various condiments, so *sahṛdayas* (*rasikas*, lit. people with empathy) enjoy mentally (with a mind completely concentrated) the permanent emotions presented (connected) with their (appropriate) *vibhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *anubhāvas*.”

From the passage and the stanzas translated above it would seem that Bharata held the view that the permanent emotions are themselves *rasas* and that they are found in the drama. In other words, according to Bharata's view, it is in the drama itself that *rasa* is located.

According to Bhaṭṭa Lollāṭa's view, that which is known as a permanent emotion (*sthāyibhāva*) in its unintensified or undeveloped form becomes intensified or developed through its union with the *vyabhicāribhāvas*, etc., and becomes *rasa* located in the character that is being portrayed (*anukārya*). *Rasas* are called *nāṭyarasas* because they

1. रस इति कः पदार्थः । उच्यते—आस्वाद्यत्वात् । कथमास्वाद्यते रसः । यथा हि नानाव्यञ्जनसंस्कृतमन्नं भुञ्जाना रसानास्वादयन्ति सुमनसः पुरुषा हर्षदीर्घाधिगच्छन्ति तथा नानाभावाभिनयव्यञ्जितान् वागङ्गसत्त्वोपेतान् स्थायिभावानास्वादयन्ति सुमनसः प्रेक्षका हर्षदीर्घाधिगच्छन्ति । तस्मान्नाट्यरसा इत्यभिव्याख्याताः ।



are portrayed in drama (*Dhvanyāloka-Locana*, p. 184). In the *Abhinavabhāratī* (Vol. I, p. 272) and in the somewhat amplified text of Hemacandra (*Kāvyaṇuśāsa*) this view is presented as follows : “*Rasa* is the permanent emotion itself intensified by the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. (i.e. *sāttvikabhāvas*). The *rasa* is present both in the character that is portrayed (*anukārya*) and in the actor who represents the character (*anukartā*). *Rasa* is present/exists primarily in the character as has been represented by the poet in his dramatic work. When the actor, through his sustained training, discipline and art presents the character on the stage the *rasa* is present in him secondarily.”<sup>2</sup>

Śaṅkuka who criticises Lollaṭa's view differs with him regarding the location of *rasa*. According to his view *rasa* is simply a permanent emotion or rather, the reproduction or reenactment of the permanent emotion of the character (say, Rāma); and because it is a reproduction it is called by a different name : *rasa*. This reproduced permanent emotion is inferred, on the strength of the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas* as existing in the actor (*anukartā*). In other words, according to Śaṅkuka the *rasa* is located in the actor and actor alone. In another context (*A. Bh.* I., p. 292) Abhinavagupta quotes Śrīśaṅkuka : “In a dramatic performance the sensitive spectator enjoys the *rasas* in the actor, and then perceives the (permanent) emotion as existing in the character. In everyday life, however, *prakṛti* (reading emended to *prakṛta-bhāva*) a particular *bhāva* (emotion) leads to its corresponding *rasa*..... “This is not true” says Abhinavagupta. For the sensitive spectator is not aware of any distinction between the character reproduced and the actor.”<sup>3</sup>

The *Locana* commentary on the *Dhvanyāloka* (p. 184) too criticises Lollaṭa's view. This criticism partly agrees with Śaṅkuka's criticism and partly with Bhaṭṭanāyaka's criticism as recorded in Ch. I. p. 272 and p. 276 : There is no *rasa* in the character that is portrayed, say Rāma, who is removed both in space and time from the spectators. If one were to say that it is present in the actor, there would arise the difficulty, viz., the actor who would be absorbed in aesthetic rapture would not be able to follow the *laya* (tempo ?) and other dramatic conventions. If one were to say that *rasa* is present in the sensitive spectator, how could there be aesthetic pleasure ? On the

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2. तेन स्थाय्येव विभावानुभावादिभिरुपचितो रसः । स्थायी भवत्वनुपचितः । स चोभयोरपि । मुख्यया वृत्त्या रमादौ अनुकार्येऽनुकर्तर्यपि चानुसन्धानबलात् — इति । — *A. Bh.* Vol. I. p. 272.
  3. श्रीशङ्कुस्तवाह — ‘अनुकर्तरि रसानास्वादयतोऽनुकार्ये भावप्रतीतिः प्रयोगे । लोके प्रकृतिः रसं निष्पादयति’ इति । .....एतदप्यसत् । नहि सामाजिकोऽनुकार्यानुकर्तृविभागमवैति ।

— *A. Bh.* Vol. I. p. 292.



contrary in *karuṇa-rasa* the sensitive spectator would experience nothing but sorrow.”<sup>4</sup> In this passage too, Śaṅkuka’s view regarding the location of *rasa* is further confirmed.

According to Bhaṭṭanāyaka, *rasa* is perceived neither as located in oneself nor in someone else. In other words, *rasa* is not located in the spectator nor in the original character that is portrayed or in the actor who plays the role of the original character. If *rasa* were to arise or exist in the spectator how could there be the thrill of delight and wonder (*camatkāra*) ? On the contrary in *karuṇa-rasa* he would experience sorrow. If *rasa* were to exist in someone else – the original character or the actor who plays his part – then the spectator would remain indifferent. *Rasa* is not perceived the way other things are seen in the world. In other words, it is not the result of the ordinary *pramāṇas* such as *pratyakṣa* (perception) etc. When *rasa* (really, the permanent emotion) of, say, *Rāma*, etc., is universalised by *bhāvanāvyāpāra* (the process of universalisation or generalisation) it is enjoyed by the spectator through the *bhogīkaraṇa* or *bhokṛtvāvyāpāra*. This aesthetic enjoyment consists of ‘repose in the bliss which is the true nature of one’s own self’ and ‘which approximates the bliss that comes from realising (one’s identity) with the highest Brahman.’<sup>5</sup>

This description is silent as to whether the permanent emotion of the spectator is awakened by the *vibhāvas*, etc., whether it colours the mass of bliss of the self that is enjoyed by him (the spectator). Bhaṭṭanāyaka, however, explicitly speaks of the permanent emotion of the original character as universalised and then enjoyed. In accordance with Bhaṭṭanāyaka’s view the universalised permanent emotion of the original character, *Rāma* etc., presented by the actor playing the part of *Rāma*, etc., is enjoyed by the spectator. The permanent emotion of the original character, when universalised, includes the permanent emotion of the spectator too. So we may not be wrong if we infer that Bhaṭṭanāyaka held the view that the spectator himself is the seat of *rasa*.

It is Abhinavagupta who categorically and unambiguously states his position regarding the location of *rasa* in the course of his discussion about the nature of *rasa* and its enjoyment in his two commentaries—*Abhinavabhāratī* and *Locana* on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* and *Dhvanyāloka* respectively. The relevant passages from these commentaries may be reviewed here :

4. ....इति नानुकार्ये रसः । अनुकर्तरि च तद्भावे लयाद्यननुसरणं स्यात् । सामाजिकगते वा कश्चमत्कारः । प्रत्युत करुणादौ दुःख-प्राप्तिः । — *Locana* on *Dhv.* II, p. 184

5. निबिडनिजमोहसंकट[ता-निवृत्ति]कारिणा विभावादिसाधारणीकरणात्मना.....भावकत्वव्यापारेण भाव्यमानो रसो रजस्तमोऽनुवेधऽवैचित्र्यबलाद् द्रुतिविस्तारविकासलक्षणेन सत्त्वोद्रेकप्रकाशानन्दमयनिजसंविद्धिश्रान्तिलक्षणेन परब्रह्मास्वादसविधेन भोगेन परं भुज्यत इति । — *A. Bh.* I., p. 277



(1) *A. Bh.* VI. 33 : While commenting on *NŚ.* VI. 33. Abhinavagupta says : “*Rasas* arise from drama which is a combination (of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*); or rather, *rasas* are themselves drama. For a drama is only a combination or collection (*samudāya*) of *rasas* (that is, a drama depicts a variety of *rasas*). *Rasas* are found only in the drama (and never in our everyday life). In poetry too, when it is dramatised mentally (acted out before one's mind's eye) *rasa* is created. Our teacher (Bhaṭṭa Tauta) says that *rasa* arises in a poem if we see things as if they were happening before our very eyes. As he observes in his *Kāvyaakautuka* : “In a poem that is not (mentally) enacted, there is no possibility of having aesthetic relish or enjoyment.” Therefore *rasas* are found only in drama and not in the everyday world; and poetry is drama itself.

And therefore aesthetic relish or enjoyment is not found in the actor.....The actor is only the means for the spectator's aesthetic relish or enjoyment. This is why the actor is called a *pātra* (1. vessel, glass, 2. character in a drama). An ordinary vessel (e.g., wineglass) is not able to taste the wine contained in it. It is only a means to tasting the wine for someone else).<sup>6</sup>

(II) *A. Bh.* VI. 33, p. 292 : In our (considered) opinion in aesthetic relish or enjoyment what is tasted or enjoyed is one's own consciousness which consists of a mass of bliss. How can there be any question of sorrow ? Such varied permanent emotions as love, sorrow, etc., only serve to lend variety to the relish or enjoyment of the (otherwise pure compact mass of) consciousness. Acting or dramatic representation and such other activities serve in awakening the dormant permanent emotions.<sup>7</sup>

(III) *A. Bh.* VI. 38, p. 294 : Just as the seed stands as the root-cause of a tree, even so the *rasas* stand as the root-cause of the *bhāvas*. ....The dramatic representation of the actor which is based on the (dramatic) poem is ultimately based on the generalised (or universalised or idealised) *saṁvit* (emotion or feeling) – not on the poet's personal emotion or feeling as it actually was but as transfigured by his poetic sensibility and creative imagination (*pratibhā*). It is that very idealised emotion or feeling that is really speaking the *rasa*..... Thus the *rasa* existing in the poet is like the seed which is

6. तस्मादिति । नाट्यात् समुदायरूपाद् रसः । यदि वा नाट्यमेव रसाः । रससमुदायो हि नाट्यम् । नाट्य एव च रसाः । काव्येऽपि नाट्यायमान एव रसः । काव्यार्थविषये हि प्रत्यक्षकल्पसंवेदनोदये रसोदय इत्युपाध्यायाः । यदाहुः काव्यकौतुके “प्रयोगत्वमनापन्ने काव्ये नास्वादसम्भव” इति ।... तेन नाट्य एव रसा न लोक इत्यर्थः । काव्यञ्च नाट्यमेव । अत एव च नटे न रसः । .....नटे तर्हि किम् । आस्वादोपायः । अत एव च पात्रमित्युच्यते । न हि पात्रे मद्यास्वादः । अपि तु तदुपायकः । तेन प्रमुखपात्रे नटोपयोग इत्यलम् । — *A. Bh.* Vol. I., pp. 290–291

7. अस्मन्मते संवेदनमेवानन्दधनमास्वाद्यते । तत्र का दुःखाशङ्का । केवलं तस्यैव चित्रताकरणे रतिशोकादिवासनाव्यापारः । तदुद्बोधने चाभिनयादिव्यापारः । — *A. Bh.* Vol. I., p. 292



the root-cause of a tree. For the poet is just like the spectator. For this very reason it has been said by Ānandavardhanācārya "if the poet is full of the erotic sentiment" etc. Therefore a dramatic poem is like a tree. The dramatic representation by the actor is like the flower, etc. The spectator's aesthetic enjoyment is like the fruit. Consequently everything is full of *rasa*.<sup>8</sup>

(IV) *Dhvanyālokalocana* 1.5, pp. 85–87 : Abhinavagupta interprets the famous incident of *krauñca-vadha* narrated in the beginning of the *Rāmāyaṇa* in an extraordinary way. The poetic utterance, "*mā niṣāda*" etc., according to him, is not to be viewed as the expression of Vālmīki's (the poet's) personal feeling of sorrow. For, if he were grieved on account of the bird's sorrow or grief then the vital statement of Ānandavardhana's *Kārikā* (1.5) that *rasa* is the soul – the very essence of *kāvya* (poetry or creative literature) would have no basis. For there can be no sorrow or grief in *rasa* which is, in Abhinavagupta's own words, '*sukha-pradhāna*' and '*ānandarūpa*'—pleasurable. Nor is it possible for one who is tormented by grief to engage himself in poetic creation (at the very moment of his grief). In other words, one who is plunged in sorrow cannot create. The act of poetic creation takes place later when the experience has been fully assimilated and is then contemplated.<sup>9</sup> Bhaṭṭanāyaka who preceded Abhinavagupta held an identical view; he says in his *Hṛdayadarpaṇa* : "The poet does not gush back *rasa* until he is completely filled with it."<sup>10</sup> To put it in modern terminology, "it is when the poet is fully under the spell of such unique form of *rasa*—experience that he spontaneously expresses himself in the form of poetry."<sup>11</sup> Abhinavagupta's own teacher, Bhaṭṭa Tauta, held a similar view; "The aesthetic experience is the same in the case of the hero of a poem (or

8. बीजं यथा वृक्षमूलत्वेन स्थितं तथा रसाः । .....कविगतसाधारणीभूतसंविन्मूलश्च काव्यपुरःसरो नटव्यापारः । सैव च संवित् परमार्थतो रसः । .....तदेवं मूलं बीजस्थानीयः कविगतो रसः । कविर्हि सामाजिकतुल्य एव । तत एवोक्तं "शृङ्गारी चेत् कविः" इत्याद्यानन्दवर्धनाचार्येण । ततो वृक्षस्थानीयं काव्यम् । तत्र पुष्पादिस्थानीयोऽभिनयादिनटव्यापारः । तत्र फलस्थानीयः सामाजिकरसास्वादः । तेन रसमयमेव निश्चयम् ।

— A. Bh. Vol. I. p. 294.

9. न तु मुनेः शोक इति मन्तव्यम् । एवं हि सति तद्-दुःखेन सोऽपि दुःखित इति कृत्वा रसस्यात्मतेति निरवकाशं भवेत् । न च दुःखसंतप्तस्यैषा दशेति । एवं चर्वणोचितशोकास्थायिभावात्मककरुणरस-समुच्च(च्छ)लनस्वभावत्वात् स एव काव्यस्यात्मा सारभूतस्वभावोऽपरशाब्दवैलक्षण्यकारकः ।

— Locana on Dhv. I.5, pp. 86–87

10. एतदेवोक्तं हृदयदर्पणे—

'यावत्पूर्णं न चैतेन तावन्नैव वमत्यमुम्' इति । — Locana on Dhv. I.5, pp. 86–87.

11. Art Experience.



a play), the poet himself, and the reader of the poem or spectator of a play when recited or enacted respectively.”<sup>12</sup>

These passages inform us that the seat of *rasa* differs, according to Abhinavagupta, depending upon our different points of view : (i) *Rasa* is not found in our everyday world; it is found only in drama—in the sense that it has the capacity to arouse *rasa* in a reader or a spectator. (ii) *Rasa* is primarily located in the poet or playwright for it is only when he is fully filled with it that he spontaneously expresses it in his poem or play. (iii) It is however located, in its real sense in the sensitive reader or spectator.

Incidentally, it may be noted, that Dhanañjaya and Dhanika, the authors of *Daśarūpaka* and the commentary *Avaloka* on it respectively assert :

“Aesthetic experience is possible in the actor.”<sup>13</sup>

In his commentary on *NŚ. VI.10* Abhinavagupta quotes Bhaṭṭa Lollaṭa's view : “Aesthetic experience is possible in the actor, through his *vāsanās* (for he has himself experienced such feelings in his previous existences); and through concentrated attention he can continue to follow the *laya* (tempo) and other dramatic conventions.”<sup>14</sup>

Regarding Bhoja's view Dr. Raghavan observes : “To Bhoja, *rasa*, as ordinarily understood, means what is meant to Daṇḍin and Lollaṭa, the *prakarṣa* of the *sthāyibhāva*. It is in the character, in the poet, in the actor, and in the composition. To him *rasa* does not mean *primarily only* the aesthetic subjective *saṁvāda* of the *sahṛdaya* and thus to him the *sahṛdaya* is not the only *primary seat* of *rasa*. Of his main concept of *rasa* as the one principle of *alambkāra* underlying all feelings and activities, by which characters come into various moods, the poet is enabled to portray them, the actor is enabled to enact them, and the *rasika* is enabled to enjoy them, the seat is the soul of all cultured men.”<sup>15</sup>

Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the authors of the *Nāṭyadarpaṇa* declare their position in these words : “Generally, they say, an actor does not experience *rasa*, but there is no inviolable rule that he cannot do so. A prostitute displays sexual pleasure in order to arouse her customer's sexual excitement (only) out of greed for money. But

12. यदुक्तमस्मदुपाध्यायभट्टतौतेन —

नायकस्य कवेः श्रोतुः समानोऽनुभवस्ततः इति । — *Locana* on *Dhv.* I.6, p. 92.

13. काव्यार्थभावनास्वादो नर्तकस्य न वार्यते । — *DR* IV.42(b).

14. ....नैतदिति भट्टलोहटः । रसभावानामपि वासनावेशवशेन नटे सम्भवादनुसन्धिबलाच्च लयाद्यनुसरणात् ।  
— *A. Bh.* Vol. I. Ch. VI. 10, p. 264.

15. *Bhoja's Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*, 1963, edn., pp. 433–34.



it can happen that sometimes she too will experience profound sexual pleasure. Similarly a singer (generally) gives pleasure (only) to others, but at times he too derives pleasure (from his singing). In the same way, even an actor when he imitates the feelings of loss etc. that Rāma feels, may suddenly find he has totally identified himself with Rāma.”<sup>16</sup>

Abhinavagupta takes a firm stand, as seen above, that there can be no *rasa* in an actor (i.e., the actor cannot be the seat of *rasa*). The majority of thinkers follow Abhinavagupta regarding the location of *rasa*. Paṇḍitarāj Jagannātha, for instance, clearly says, when he defends the ninth *rasa*, *śānta* :

“The logical reason, that there is absence of *śama* (i.e. *śama* is not possible in an actor) does not stand to reason, because we do not accept that the revelation (i.e. aesthetic pleasure or relish or enjoyment) of *rasa* ever takes place in an actor (i.e. the actor is never the location of *rasa*).”<sup>17</sup>

16. *Aesthetic Rapture, Vol. II : Notes*, f. n. 351.

17. तथा हि—नेते सम्भवाद् इति हेतुसङ्गतः नेते रसाभिव्यक्तेस्वीकारात् । — *Rasagaṅgādhara* I, p. 36.



## RASA THEORY AND PURUṢĀRTHAS

*Kāvya* (poetry including drama) differs from *śāstra* (science). The former is the product of *pratibhā* (creative imagination, genius) whereas the latter, of *prajñā* (intellect, intelligence).<sup>1</sup> Again, *prīti* or *ānanda* (pleasure, delight) is the chief goal of *kāvya* whereas *vyutpatti* (instruction in the four goals, of human life), of *śāstra*.

Now, writers on poetics and dramatics deal with the topic of *kāvya-prayojana* (purposes of poetry) at some length. Among the various purposes the two most noteworthy are *prīti* (or *ānanda*) and *vyutpatti*. Bharata says that *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* are the topics presented in drama and that *nāṭya* is *krīdanīyaka*, *viśrāntījanana* and *vinodakaraṇa*.<sup>2</sup> In other words, *vyutpatti* and *prīti* (or *viśrānti* or *vinoda*) are the two purposes of poetry. On the authority of Ānandavardhana, Bharata may be regarded as holding the view that instruction in four goals of human life is the major goal of drama and delight only a secondary purpose.<sup>3</sup>

Abhinavagupta refers to the view of some earlier critics (*anye*) that drama produces only joy or delight in the spectators and not such feelings as sorrow, etc.<sup>4</sup> Dhanañjaya in his *Daśarūpaka* declares that dramas overflow with joy and it is silly to say that their only purpose is *vyutpatti* as in the case of *itihāsa*, etc.<sup>5</sup> Dhanika, his commentator,

1. द्वे वर्त्मनी गिरं देव्याः शास्त्रं च कविकर्म च ।  
प्रज्ञोपज्ञं तयोर्गद्यं प्रतिभोद्धवमन्तिमम् ॥
2. क्वचिद् धर्मः क्वचित् कामः क्वचिदर्थः क्वचिच्छमः । — *Nāṭyaśāstra* I.106.  
cf. तुष्यन्ति तरुणाः कामे विदग्धाः समयान्विते ।  
अर्थेष्वर्थपराश्रैव मोक्षेष्वथ विरागिणः ॥ — *Nāṭyaśāstra* XXVII, 59.  
क्रीडनीयकम् (I.11)  
विश्रान्तिजननम् (I.80)  
विनोदकरणम् (I.86)
3. शृङ्गारसाङ्गैरुन्मुखीकृताः सन्तो हि विनेयाः सुखं विनयोपदेशान् गृह्णन्ति । सदाचारोपदेशरूपा हि नाटकादिगोष्ठी  
विनेयजनहितार्थमेव मुनिभिरवतारिता । — *Dhvanyāloka* III.30 *Vṛtti*.  
मुनिभिरिति — भरतादिभिरित्यर्थः । — *Locana* — III.30, p. 399
4. सामाजिकानां हि हर्षैकफलं नाट्यं न शोकादिफलम् । — *Abhinavabhāratī*, Vol. I., p. 289.
5. आनन्दनिस्स्यन्दिषु रूपकेषु व्युत्पत्तिमात्रं फलमल्पबुद्धिः ।  
योऽपीतिहासादिवदाह साधुस्तस्मै नमः स्वादुपगङ्गमुखाय ॥ — *Daśarūpaka* 16.  
तत्र केचित् 'धर्मार्थकाममोक्षेषु वैचक्षण्यं कलासु च ।  
करोति कीर्तिं प्रीतिं च साधुकाव्यनिषेवणम् ॥' — *Bhāmaha*, I.2



says – some claim : “Reading and study of good poetry confers fame and pleasure as well as proficiency in the four goals of human life *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* and proficiency in the fine arts as well.” They thus wish to show that the purpose of poetry is to give knowledge of the three goals of human life, etc. The purpose of the ten types of drama, according to the author of *Daśarūpaka* is sheer aesthetic enjoyment, which is of the form of the highest delight or bliss that is inwardly felt and not merely instruction of the three goals of life, etc. Abhinavagupta deals with this topic in his commentary *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka*. At one place he says : “Although *vyutpatti* and *prīti* for the reader are both present..... nevertheless *prīti* is the main thing..... Even of instruction in the four goals of human life *ānanda* (delight) is the final and major result.”<sup>7</sup> At another place he says that *prīti* yielded by poetry is only a means of bringing about the *vyutpatti*.<sup>8</sup> Still at another place he says that the thrill of delight and surprise produced by poetry is only an accessory of *vyutpatti*.<sup>9</sup> These statements are obviously contradictory. But this contradiction Abhinavagupta cleverly removes. He argues : princes, etc., must be instructed (*vyutpādya*). The best way to instruct people in the four goals of human life is by entering their hearts (*hrdayānupraveśa*), which is just another name for *rasa* in general (*hrdayānupraveśaśca rasāsvādamaya eva*). And this *rasa* comes about, thanks to the presentation of the *vibhāvas*, etc. which are essential to *vyutpatti* in the means to the four goals of human life. These *vibhāvas* must be appropriate to *rasa*, then only the engrossment in the aesthetic experience will become the cause of *vyutpatti* which naturally follows; so *prīti* is the cause of *vyutpatti*..... Nor are *prīti* and *vyutpatti* really different from one another, for they both have the same cause : The *vibhāvādyaucitya* is the cause of *prīti* that we derive from poetry. Similarly, the *vibhāvādyaucitya* is the cause of *vyutpatti* that we derive from poetry. Thus, both *prīti* and *vyutpatti* depend on *vibhāvādyaucitya*. Since both are the outcome of one (and the same) cause, they are not different from one another.<sup>10</sup>

6. इत्यादिना त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिं काव्यफलत्वेनेच्छन्ति तन्निगसेन स्वसंवेद्यः परमानन्दरूपो रसास्वादो दशरूपाणां फलम्, न पुनरितिहासादिवत् त्रिवर्गादिव्युत्पत्तिमात्रमिति दर्शितम् । नम इति सोल्लुण्ठम् । – *Avaloka* 1.6

7. श्रोतॄणां च व्युत्पत्तिप्रीति यद्यपि स्तः । .....तथापि तत्र प्रीतिरेव प्रधानम् । .....चतुर्वर्गव्युत्पत्तेरपि चानन्द एव पार्यन्तिकं मुख्यं फलम् । – *Locana*, pp. 40–41.

8. रसास्वादवैवश्यमेव स्वरसभाविन्यां व्युत्पत्तौ प्रयोजकमिति प्रीतिरेव व्युत्पत्तेः प्रयोजिका ।

– *Locana*, p. 336.

9. प्रीतिरेव चालौकिकचमत्काररूपाया व्युत्पत्त्यङ्गत्वात् । – *Locana*, p. 455.

10. प्रीत्यात्मा च रसः.....। न चैते प्रीतिव्युत्पत्तौ भिन्नरूपे एव, द्वयोरप्येकविषयत्वात् ।

– *Locana*, pp. 336–37



Now, about the *rasa* theory : A brief statement may be made here regarding the nature of *rasa* : *kāvya* yields pleasure or delight by depicting *rasas*. In *kāvya*, *rasa* occupies the first and foremost position. There are eight or nine permanent emotions (*sthāyibhāvas*) like love (*rati*), sorrow (*śoka*) and the like. These permanent emotions, when combined with their respective *vibhāvas* (fundamental determinants), *anubhāvas* (consequents), *sāttvikabhāvas* (involuntary states) and *vyabhicārībhāvas* (transitory feelings) attain the condition or state of *rasa* like *śṛṅgāra*, *karuṇa* (the erotic and the pathetic sentiments). Of these nine permanent emotions, some are conducive to the four *puruṣārthas* : 1. *rati* (love), 2. *krodha* (anger), 3. *utsāha* (dynamic energy) and 4. *śama* (tranquillity or calmness) which primarily consists of world-weariness. And because they conduce to the four *puruṣārthas*, they are regarded as predominant. In the performance of the different types of drama, the corresponding *rasas* of these permanent emotions namely, 1. *śṛṅgāra*, 2. *raudra*, 3. *vīra*, 4. (*bībhatsa* and) *śānta* are present as the very life of the four *puruṣārthas*.

But only a few writers on poetics and dramatics, it would seem, deal with this interesting and important topic : 'The *rasa*-theory and *puruṣārthas*.' Pratiḥārendurāja, Abhinavagupta, Hemacandra and his two famous disciples, Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra deserve particular mention in this connection. Pratiḥārendurāja for the first time draws our attention to the fact that the nine *rasas*, *śṛṅgāra* and others, are the means of acquiring the four goals of human life (*puruṣārthas*).<sup>11</sup> He, however, does not expand his statement by adding suitable examples connecting specific *rasas* to specific *puruṣārthas*. It is Abhinavagupta who deals at length with this topic in the course of his commentary on the sixth chapter called *Rasādhyāya* and the 18th chapter called *Daśarūpakavidhāna*. The passages and the contexts connected with this topic may now be taken up for discussion :

### 1. *Nāṭyaśāstra* VI.15 :

Abhinavagupta while commenting on this verse makes a determined effort to explain the reasons behind the order of enumeration of the *rasas* followed by Bharata. While explaining the reasons he connects *rasas* with *puruṣārthas*. He connects *śṛṅgāra*

11. एते च शृङ्गारदयो नव यथायोगं चतुर्वर्गप्राप्त्युपायतया तदितरपरिहारनिबन्धनतया च रत्यादीनां स्थायिनां नवानां भावानां यः परिपोषस्तदात्मकाः अतस्तथाविधेन रूपेणास्वाद्यत्वादास्वादभेदनिबन्धनेन तान्त्रिकेण रसशब्देनाभिधीयन्ते । .....तदाहुः —  
चतुर्वर्गेतरौ प्राप्यपरिहार्यौ क्रमाद्यतः ।  
चैतन्यभेदादास्वाद्यात्स रसस्तादृशो मतः ॥ इति ।

— *Laghuvṛtti on Kāvyaśāstra-sāra-saṅgraha*, pp. 52. 53.



with the (third) *puruṣārtha kāma* (pleasure and love), *raudra* with *artha* (material prosperity, economics, politics, etc., are directed to the fulfilment of this end), *vīra* with *dharma* (moral and religious duty, righteousness, duty) and *śānta* with *mokṣa* (the liberation or redemption of the soul from the flow of existence, emancipation from recurring births).<sup>12</sup>

## 2. Nāṭyaśāstra VI.31 (rasasūtra) : apradhānā, the sixth rasavighna (obstacle to the realisation of rasa) :

“Among the permanent emotions, some are conducive to the goals of human life. These are the predominant ones. To specify, *rati* is conducive to *kāma* and *dharma* and *artha* connected with it. *Krodha* (anger), in persons in whom it predominates is conducive to *artha* but can also end in *kāma* and *dharma*. *Utsāha* ends in all three — *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. And *śama* which consists mostly in the disgust aroused by the knowledge of truth or reality, is the means of liberation. These four permanent emotions only are the predominant ones. “Even if they are not to be found in a predominant position all four together, and the emergence of one of them naturally postulates the subordination of the other three, nevertheless someone of them is always predominant in each drama, so that all of them are clearly recognised as being, in turn (that is, one in this drama and the other in another one), equally predominant. Moreover, if things are more closely examined, all four of them will be seen to be present in the same drama, in various passages (Acts or parts), in a pre-eminent position.”<sup>13</sup>

## 3. Nāṭyaśāstra VI.39.41 :

Bharata declares that there are four major or principal *rasas* which give rise to the other four. The original four are : 1. *śṛṅgāra*, 2. *raudra*, 3. *vīra* and 4. *bībhatsa*. Regarding these original four *rasas* Abhinavagupta remarks that they are pervaded with their respective *puruṣārthas* [1. *kāma* (and *dharma* and *artha* connected with it), 2. *artha*, 3. *dharma* and 4. *mokṣa*]. It is true that Bharata speaks of the fourth original *rasa* as *bībhatsa* and not *śānta*. And it is possible to criticise Abhinavagupta for

12. तत्र कामस्य सकलजातिसुलभतयात्यन्तपरिचितत्वेन सर्वान्प्रति हृद्यतेति पूर्वं शृङ्गारः । .....ततस्त्रिवर्गात्मक-  
प्रवृत्तिधर्मविपरीतनिवृत्तिधर्मात्मको मोक्षफलः शान्तः । — *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. I., 6.15.

13. तत्र पुरुषार्थनिष्ठाः काश्चित् संविद इति प्रधानम् । तद्यथा — रतिः कामतदनुषङ्गिधर्मार्थनिष्ठा,  
क्रोधस्तत्प्रधानेष्वर्थनिष्ठाः कामधर्मपर्यवसितोऽप्युत्साहः समस्तधर्मादिपर्यवसितः, तत्त्वज्ञानजनितनिर्वेदप्रायो  
शमश्च मोक्षोपाय इति तावदेषां प्राधान्यम् । यद्यपि चैषामप्यन्योन्यं गुणभावोऽस्ति तथापि तत्तत्प्रधाने रूपके  
तत् तत् प्रधानं भवतीति रूपकभेदपर्यायेण सर्वेषां प्राधान्यमेषां लक्ष्यते । अदूरभागाभिनिविष्टदृशा तु  
एकस्मिन्नपि रूपके पृथक् प्रधान्यम् । — *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. I., VI. *Rasasūtra*.

— as translated by Gnoli, *Aesthetic Experience*, pp. 70–71.



introducing his own view here disregarding Bharata's authority. R. P. Kangle goes a step further and asserts in his Notes (*Rasa-bhāva-vicāra*, p. 224) that it is impossible to connect *bībhatsa* (*rasa*) with any of the four *puruṣārthas*. Abhinavagupta himself, however, unambiguously declares later in his commentary (NŚ. XVIII. 110) : "*śānta* and *bībhatsa* occur in connection with *mokṣa*". Abhinavagupta defines *śānta*, the *sthāyin* of *śānta* as *tattvajñāna-janita-nirveda-prāyaḥ*. This *nirveda* and *jugupsā*, the *sthāyin* of *bībhatsa* are akin to each other. So Abhinavagupta is justified in saying that *śānta* and *bībhatsa* occur in connection with *mokṣa*. Being pervaded by *puruṣārthas* these four original *rasas* attain extraordinary beauty. The remaining four derivative *rasas*, *hāsyā*, etc. are pleasure-giving (*rañjaka*) and therefore they may be used as connected with their major *rasas*.<sup>14</sup>

#### 4 Nāṭyaśāstra XVIII.110 (p. 451) :

In a very important passage which opens with the words '*idamihā mīmāṃsyam*' and ends with '*tadāṅgatayā tatra bhavati*' (pp. 450-451), Abhinavagupta deals with the place of particular *rasas* in particular types of drama and the interrelation between *rasas* and *puruṣārthas*. Here we must consider this – in the types of drama like *utsrṣṭikāṅka* etc., one *rasa* alone is portrayed. This is no doubt true of the type *nāṭaka*, etc. Still in them, although they are fit for portraying all *rasas*, in *nāṭaka* and *prakaraṇa*, the *dharma* or *dāna* – or *yuddha-vīra* is, really speaking, predominant. For all the types of hero are characterised by heroism. In the type called *samavakāra*, though the presence of *śṛṅgāra*, etc. is indicated, either *vīra rasa* or *raudra rasa* alone is predominant. "Thus, *vīra*, *raudra*, *śṛṅgāra* (are used there) respectively, occurring in these works by being engendered by (the aims of the character portrayed) *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*, while *śānta* and *bībhatsa* occur in connection with *mokṣa*. But not every character can carry the main role in this (latter) case, only the occasional saint.<sup>15</sup> Although in the *nāṭaka*, *śānta* or *bībhatsa* may be the principal *rasa* when *mokṣa* is the principal goal, this is not a common practice, so they, although engendered by the best of human aims (the character's pursuit of *mokṣa*) are considered subordinate to the other *rasas* – *vīra*, *raudra* and *śṛṅgāra*. Thus, the main *rasa* of a drama is really governed by the *puruṣārtha* it portrays, but other *rasas* occur in support of it as a result of the variety of subject matter included."<sup>16</sup>

14. ये चात्रोत्पत्तिहेतव उक्तास्ते यथास्वं पुरुषार्थचतुष्कव्याप्ताः ।

तद्धि सौन्दर्यातिशयजननरूपम् । रञ्जका हासादयस्तदनुगामित्वेन रूपकेषु निबन्धनीयाः ।

– *Abhinavabhāratī* Vol. I., VI-41.

15. The word '*apaścimajanman*' means 'One who at the end of this life will be free from the life and death cycle.'

16. As translated by Prof. Wright, BSOAS, Vol. 26, 1963, p. 115.



## 5. Nāṭyaśāstra, XVIII (concluding verse) :

Abhinavagupta at the end of his commentary on Ch. XVIII (p. 459) remarks : “There are only these ten types of drama (*lakṣaṇāni*)..... their use for the (instruction in) the (four) *puruṣārthas* has already been shown in the course of our exposition of each one of them. Hence we do not repeat it here again.” With a view to verifying the truth of this claim, we take up the two types of drama called *nāṭaka* and *prakaraṇa*.

In the course of his exposition of Bharata's definition of *nāṭaka*, Abhinavagupta explains the phrase ‘*nānāvibhūtibhir yutam*’ as ‘endowed with the splendour of the four goals of human life : *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa* as ‘fruit’ (*phala*)’. Among these four goals, says he, *artha* and *kāma* should be mainly depicted as all people yearn for them. Keeping this in mind Bharata adds in the definition of *nāṭaka* ‘(*yutam*) *ṛddhivilāsādibhir*’. By ‘*ṛddhi*’ Bharata indicates the goal of ‘*artha*’ and by ‘*vilāsa*’ that of ‘*kāma*.’ A poet, therefore, must not show in his drama that a king (of course, the hero) making a gift of his kingdom to *brāhmaṇas* and himself accepting *vānaprasthāśrama* (the third stage of one's religious life – of an anchorite or hermit). For a common man longs for immediate and concrete *phala*, objective, goal of human life. A fruit like heaven of the performance of a sacrifice is doubtful for him and is to be attained only after death !

In the case of *prakaraṇa*, following Bharata (NŚ XVIII.47), Abhinavagupta says that the same ‘fruit’ mentioned in regard to the *nāṭaka* is to be had by extension for *prakaraṇa* as well. The only difference is : in *nāṭaka* the ‘fruit’ (one or two or three goals of human life – *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma*) accrues to the hero ‘*rājaṛṣi*’ (a royal sage), whereas in *prakaraṇa* to a middling character – a *brāhmaṇa*, a merchant, *amātya*, etc.

Abhinavagupta has linked the following six types of drama with the *puruṣārthas* : 1. *nāṭaka*, 2. *prakaraṇa*, 3. *samavakāra*, 4. *ḍima*, 5. *vyāyoga* and 6. *īhāmṛga* and the additional type *nāṭikā*. He asserts that the governing sentiment of *nāṭikā* is *śṛṅgāra* (and thus it is connected with the third *puruṣārtha*, viz., *kāma*). Regarding the three types, *utsṛṣṭikāṅka*, *prahasana* and *bhāṇa* he observes that *karuṇa*, *hāsyā* and *vismaya* (i.e. *adbhuta*) are their predominant sentiments respectively and thus they mainly serve to entertain and give pleasure to spectators. Thus, these types differ from the above-mentioned types *nāṭaka*, *prakaraṇa*, etc., which give instruction, indirectly though, in the four goals of human life. As regards the remaining type *vīthī*, Bharata says that it is rich in characteristics of all *rasas* (*sarva-rasa-lakṣaṇādhyā*). Abhinavagupta, however, is silent regarding its link with *puruṣārthas*.

Incidentally, it may be noted that Hemacandra in his *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* (Ch. VIII, Sūtra 3, pp. 443–445) deals with this very topic of types of drama and their use for



the four goals of human life. He is certainly influenced by Abhinavagupta, but his treatment is refreshingly somewhat new. Rāmacandra and Guṇacandra, the two famous disciples of Hemacandra dwell on this topic in the course of their exposition of the types of drama. They follow, it would seem, both Abhinavagupta and Hemacandra.

Regarding *mahākāvya*, Bhāmaha says that although it portrays all the four *puruṣārthas*, it shall predominantly inculcate *artha* (*Kāvyaśāstrakāra*, I.20-1). Daṇḍin too gives '*caturvargaphalāyattam*' as a feature of *mahākāvya*; it promotes the four goals of human life, *dharma*, *artha*, *kāma* and *mokṣa*.

To conclude, *rasas* occupy the first and foremost position in dramatic poetry. The main *rasa* of a drama, however, is really governed by the *puruṣārtha* it portrays, and other *rasas* occur in support of it as a result of the variety of subject matter included in it. There are a few critics who look upon *prīti* or *ānanda* (pleasure or delight) as the major goal of poetry; but a majority of them insist on instruction in the four goals of human life as very important and *rasas* as means to that end. Abhinavagupta does not regard *prīti* and *vyutpatti* as two distinct or different things as their source '*vibhāvādyaucitya*' is one and the same. He deserves all praise for his deep and penetrating insight into the subtle relationship between *rasas* and *puruṣārthas*.



# MAHIMABHATTA'S VIEWS ON HOW RASAS ARISE AND THEY ARE ENJOYED BY SAHRDAYAS

Mahimabhātṭa's (MB) *Vyaktiviveka*<sup>1</sup> (VV) which means A Critique of *Vyakti*, the same as *Vyañjanā* (Suggestion) severely criticises Ānandavardhana's definition of *dhvani*, the opening verse of *Dhvanyāloka*, "kāvyasyātmā dhvanir...", divisions of *dhvani*, the theory of *vyañjanā*—which he considers as the very soul of *dhvani* — Kuntaka's theory of *vakrokti* and sets forth his own theory of language, *anautcityas* (improprieties) pertaining to 'śabda' (word), his own conception of poetry, purpose of poetry, poetic language, his own views on how *rasas* arise and they are enjoyed by *sahrdayas* and other related matters. Here we confine ourselves mainly to a critical discussion of MB's views on how *rasas* arise and they are enjoyed and incidentally deal with the poetic language.

MB states the *prima facie* view as follows :

"The permanent emotions, *rati* (love), etc. are particular states of *sukha* (pleasure, happiness, etc). When they are described in *kāvya* (poetry), etc. how can they give rise to the relishing or enjoyment of *sukha* (pleasure, happiness) [in the case of *sahrdayas* on the strength of which] *rasas* are metaphorically described as *vyaṅgya* (suggested) ? In fact, they are inferrable (*anumeya*). In everyday life one does not feel even a trace of pleasure while inferring emotions like *śoka* (sorrow) from their *liṅgas* (or *hetus* or *sādhana*s) i.e. marks or tokens. On the contrary, people experience great sorrow, fear and such other feelings. This is what we all observe. There is no extraordinary power in poetry which alone can cause this thrill of pleasure or delight which everyday life does not. The *vibhāvādis* (the word *ādi* includes *anubhāvas*, *vyabhicāribhāvas* and *sāttvikabhāvas*) which are nothing but *hetvādis* (the word *ādi* includes *kārya* and *sahakārikāraṇas*) of everyday life that act as *liṅga* or *gamaka* or *sādhana* and the same *bhāvas*—*rati*, etc. are inferred from them. So what *atīśaya*, excellence, extraordinary power—magical or mysterious power—is there in poetry whereby we derive aesthetic pleasure (*rasāsvāda*) in the field of poetry only and not in everyday life ? Thus, there is no possibility of any *prayojana* (purpose) for calling the *bhāvas* like *rati*, as *vyaṅgya*."<sup>2</sup>

1. Edition with commentary called *Madhusūdanī*, Kashi Sanskrit Series No. 121, Benares, 1936.
2. तत् कोऽतिशयः काव्यादौ यत् तत्रैव रसास्वादो न लोक इति प्रयोजनांशसम्भवादृत्यादिषु व्यङ्ग्यत्वोपचारेऽनुपपन्न एव । — VV, p. 66.



MB refutes this *prima facie* view as follows :

Wherever in poetry the permanent emotions (mental states), love and the like (*ratyādi*, the word *ādi* includes 'hāsa, śoka, krodha, utsāha, bhaya, jugupsā, and vismaya'—in all the eight *sthāyibhāvas*) are inferred from their respective *vibhāvādis*, there only arises *rasāsvāda*, which is apprehended (or perceived) by *sahṛdayas* alone. This is the very nature of things and does not deserve to be questioned by *prāmāṇika* (honest) persons.

It has been declared by Bharata : “*Rasa* arises from a combination of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*.” It has also been said : “*Rasa* manifests through a combination of various *bhāvas* (*bhāva-saṃyojana-vyaṅgyaḥ*), it is perceived by an extraordinary form of consciousness (*para-saṃvitti-gocaraḥ*), it is an experience of the nature of a relishing or tasting (*āsvādanātmānubhavaḥ*) and it remains concealed in the layers of the meanings of the sentences concerned (*kāvyaārthaḥ*)”<sup>3</sup>

In everyday life *vibhāvādis* do not at all exist. *Hetvādis* alone exist. Nobody should ever think that the *vibhāvādis* and the *hetvādis* are identical. The *hetvādis* are one thing and the *vibhāvādis* another. For the nature and character of these two sets are quite different from each other. To explain : In everyday life we find that certain permanent emotions like *rati*, love belong to, say *Rāma*, etc.; a poet identifies himself with *Rāma* and his emotions and describes them in his *kāvya*. These emotions, when presented (on the stage with the four kinds of acting) give rise to (*bhāvayanti*) various *rasas* and therefore they are called *bhāvas*.

*Sitā*, etc., who are the *hetus* (causes) of the various emotions in our everyday life, when described in *kāvya* are called *vibhāvas* in accordance with the etymology ‘*vibhāvvyante bhāvā ebhir iti vibhāvāḥ*, through them the various *bhāvas* (*sthāyins* and *vyabhicārins* are understood (and appreciated) by the spectators. Incidentally, it may be noted that the *Nāṭyaśāstra* explains *vibhāva* as *vijñāna* and says that *vibhāva* is nothing but ‘*kāraṇa, nimitta, or hetu*’ and adds that many matters including *sthāyins* and *vyabhicārins* depending upon acting are specially understood from them (the prose passage preceding *Nāṭyaśāstra*, VII.4).

*Mukhaprasāda* (a pleased countenance) and the like, which are the effects of the various feelings and emotions when described in *kāvya* cause spectators to experience the corresponding feelings and emotions and therefore are called *anubhāvas*.

3. भावसंयोजनव्यङ्ग्य(ः?) परि(पर)संवित्तिगोचरः ।

आस्वादानात्मानुभवो रसः काव्यार्थ उच्यते ॥ — *Ibid*, p. 67.



The various *rasas* are regarded only imitations of the *sthāyibhāvas* :

*Sthāyyanukaraṇātmano hi rasā īṣyante* – p. 71. And the *rasas* are, beyond any shadow of doubt, of the supreme importance. The *sthāyibhāvas* and their corresponding *rasas* stand in the relation of *bimba* (the original) and its *pratibimba* (reflection) : *teṣāṃ bimba-pratibimba-nyāyenāvasthānāt* – p. 72.

Ruyyaka in his commentary, called *Vyaktivivekavyākhyāna*, thus explains the two terms – *bimba* and *pratibimba*; *anukāryasya bimbatvam anukaraṇasya pratibimbatvam*. – p. 73.

In other words, the persons, their feelings and emotions, the events, conflicts, etc., which poets draw upon for their *kāvya* are *akṛtrima* (real), whereas their presentation and description in poetic language are *kṛtrima* (artistic, lit. artificial). For they are of the nature of *anukaraṇa* (imitation). Thus, there is a difference between the two sets i.e., (i) the *vibhāvādis* and (ii) the *hetvādis*, with regard to their nature (*svarūpa*), for one is artificial or artistic, whereas the other is real; so too there is a difference between these two sets with regard to their sphere of activity (*viśaya*). For one relates to the province of poetry (*kāvya*, both dramatic and non-dramatic), whereas the other, to the real and actual everyday world (*loka*). When there is such a wide difference, the identity between the two cannot be established. Such being the case, when the *vibhāvādis* produce an apprehension or perception (*prāṇīti*) in regard to the permanent emotions like love (*rati*), etc. which are non-existent (in the actor), however their perception or apprehension being very real, they can, in the primary sense, be described as inferable (*prāṇīyamāna*) or implied (*gamya*). And the very experience of this apprehension or perception itself is what we call aesthetic pleasure or relish or enjoyment (*rasāsvāda*).<sup>4</sup>

Or let alone the case of love (*rati*), etc., which is always beyond the range of sight (*parokṣa*). Even a thing which is perceptible (*pratyakṣa*), when directly perceived does not give the *sahṛdayas* so much delight (*camatkāra*) as it gives when described by a true (gifted) poet. For it has been said : “Things (*bhāvas*) which are presented in a poetic or dramatic work through the poet's creative imagination seem, because of our identification, even more charming or beautiful to us than the things which we actually perceive with our own eyes.”<sup>5</sup>

4. तदेवं विभावादीनां हेत्वादीनां च कृत्रिमाकृत्रिमतया काव्यलोकविषयतया च स्वरूपभेदे विषयभेदे चावस्थिते सत्येकत्वासिद्धेर्यदा विभावादिभिर्भावेषु रत्यादिष्वसत्येष्वेव प्रतीतिरुपजन्त्यते तदा तेषां तन्मात्रसारत्वात् प्रतीयमाना इति गम्या इति च व्यपदेशा मुख्यवृत्त्योपपद्यन्त एव । तत्प्रतीतिपरामर्श एव च रसास्वादः स्वाभाविक इत्युक्तम् । – *Ibid*, p. 73.

5. कविशक्त्यर्पिता भावास्तन्मयीभावयुक्तिः ।

यथा स्फुरन्त्यमी काव्यान् तथाध्यक्षतः किल ॥ – *Ibid*, p. 73.



There is great resemblance between these ideas of MB and the ideas which Bhoja expresses in his *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa* (Vol. I, p. 2.) : "Things are not so charming when they are seen directly as when they are narrated by men of gifted speech. As it has been said : The things that we see around do not please the mind as much as when they are presented in a proper manner in proper words by reputed poets."<sup>6</sup>

Incidentally, it may be stated that it is rather difficult to say of the two, Mahimabhaṭṭa and Bhoja, who is echoing whom, as they lived almost in the same age.

MB, being a *naiyāyika*, glorifies inference (*anumāna*) : "Even that thing does not delight them (when seen) as much as when it is inferred by them. This is the very nature of things (*svabhāva*) and it does not deserve to be questioned. It has been said :

"A thing (say, a permanent emotion, *sthāyibhāva*) inferred from *hetvādis*, in our real life does not delight us so much as it does when inferred from the *vibhāvas*, etc., that are described in *kāvya*. The expressed meaning does not delight us so much as when it is inferred."<sup>7</sup>

In support of his own statement he quotes a passage from Ānandavardhana, the Dhvanikāra : "For an essential idea (*sārārūpaḥ arthah*), if it is revealed without stating it in so many words attains a far greater beauty."<sup>8</sup> And perception of aesthetic beauty is the all-in-all in *kāvya*. By that much only those who deserve to be instructed receive instruction as regards Dos (*vidhis*) and Don'ts (*pratiṣedha*).<sup>9</sup> MB then quotes an authority to show that even mistaken apprehension or cognition is through *sambandha* (obtaining the expected thing) a true source of knowledge (*pramā*). Between two persons approaching two lights (seen from distance), the one produced by a jewel, the other

6. तत्र न तथा पदार्थाः प्रत्यक्षेण प्रतीयमानाः स्वदन्ते, यथा वाग्मिनां वचोभिरावेद्यमानाः । तदाह—  
अत्यणिवेसा ण वि तह चित्तविआसं कुणंति सच्चविआ ।

जह उण ते उम्मिलंति सुकविवआहिं सुसीसंता ॥

[अर्थनिवेशा नापि तथा चित्तविकासं कुर्वन्ति दृष्टः ।

यथा पुनस्ते उन्मीलन्ति सुकविवचोभिः कथ्यमानाः ॥] — *Ibid*, p. 74.

7. सोऽपि च तेषां न तथा स्वदते यथा तैरेवानुमेयतां नीत इति स्वभाव एवायं न पर्यनुयोगमर्हति ।  
तदुक्तम् —

नानुमितो हेत्वाद्यैः स्वदतेऽनुमितो यथा विभावाद्यैः ।

न च सुखयति वाच्योऽर्थः प्रतीयमानः स एव यथा ॥ — *Ibid*, p. 74.

8. ध्वनिकृताप्युक्तम् — 'साररूपो ह्यर्थः स्वशब्दानभिधेयत्वेन प्रकाशितः सुतरां शोभामावहति । इति ।

— *Ibid*, p. 74.

9. प्रतीतिमात्रपरमार्थं च काव्यादि तावतैव विनेयेषु विधिनिषेधव्युत्पत्तिसिद्धेः । — *Ibid*, P. 74.



by a lamp (without being aware of what they really are, but) with the idea that it is a jewel, there exists a difference regarding causal efficiency but not in regard to their mistaken notion.

In some cases, even the mistaken cognition is endowed with causal efficiency in the above case for example, the mistaken cognition allows the concerned person to find a real jewel. In other words, even an error, according to Dharmakīrti, if it does not delude the person concerned is a source of right knowledge.<sup>10</sup>

Therefore in real life from real causes, etc., real love, etc. are apprehended. There these *ratyādis* (love and the like) mental states (or permanent emotions) are inferable only and there is not a shade of suggestion. Whence can there be a possibility of even a trace of aesthetic pleasure (*sukhāsvāda*)? This itself makes *kāvya* superior to our real world. So it is only proper that *ratyādi* (love and other emotions) which are inferable should alone be metaphorically called *vyāṅgya* (suggested) with aesthetic pleasure as the purpose (*prayojana*), one of the three conditions for resorting to *upacāra* (metaphor)<sup>11</sup> (p. 75).

Later on towards the end MB declares : The apprehension of *rasādis* which we have from the *vibhāvādis* deserves to be included in Inference (*anumāna*) only. For the apprehension of the *vibhāvādis* is the means (*sādhana*) to the apprehension of *rasādi* (the *sādhya*, the end). The *vibhāvādis* present themselves as the *hetvadis* of the various permanent emotions (*ratyādis*) and as they cause the *sahṛdayas* to infer the *ratyādis*, manifest *rasādis*. As the *ratyādis* are in the actual process of inference and reach the stage of aesthetic relish or enjoyment, they are called *rasas*<sup>12</sup> (p. 417). Therefore there is inevitably a sequence (*krama*) between the two *pratītis* – (the *vibhāvādi-pratīti* and the *rasādi-pratīti*) This sequence, however, is not perceived because of the *āśubhāvitā* (the same as *lāghava*) – the extreme quickness with which the second *pratīti* follows the first. In other words, there was no such thing as immediate apprehension of *rasādi* but that between the *vibhāvādis* and the *rasādis* (the factors and the result), there intervened some space, however short, during which the function

10. तदुक्तम् – 'भ्रान्तिरपि संबन्धतः प्रमा' इति ।

"मणिप्रदीपप्रभयोर्मणिबुद्ध्याभिधावतोः ।

मिथ्याज्ञानविशेषेऽपि विशेषेऽर्थक्रियां प्रति ॥" – *Pramāṇavārtika* II.57.

11. एष एव लोकतः काव्यादावतिशय इत्युपपद्यत एव सत्यादौ गम्ये सुखास्वादप्रयोजनो व्यङ्ग्यत्वोपचार इति । – VV. p. 75.

12. यापि विभावादिभ्यो रसादीनां प्रतीतिः सानुमान एवान्तर्भावमर्हतीति ।

"विभावानुभावव्यभिचारिप्रतीतिर्हि रसादिप्रतीतेः साधनमिष्यते ।

ते हि रत्यादीनां भावानां कारणकार्यसहकारिभूतास्ताननुमापयन्त एव रसादीन् निष्पादयन्ति । त एव हि प्रतीयमाना आस्वादपदपदवीं गताः सन्तो रसा इत्युच्यन्ते । – VV.III. p. 417.



of inference was active. Thus Mahimabhaṭṭa claimed that *dhvani* could always be reduced to inference (*anumāna*).<sup>13</sup>

The main points in MB's exposition of the *Rasa* Theory may be stated as follows :

- (i) *Rasādis* are of the nature of imitation of their corresponding *sthāyibhāvas*. The relation between the *sthāyibhāva* and its corresponding *rasa* is that of *bimba-pratibimba-bhāva*.
- (ii) There is sequence between the *vibhāvādi-pratīti* and *rasādi-pratīti*.
- (iii) The *vibhāvādi-pratīti* is the *sādhana* (means) and *rasādi-pratīti*, the *sādhya* (the end).
- (iv) Although the *vibhāvādis* are *kṛtrima* (lit. artificial or not real) and the mental states *rati*, etc. they lead to, be unreal, the relishing or enjoyment (*āsvāda*) of *rasa* is very much real. It is admitted by great philosophers that even a mistaken cognition leads to *pramā* – correct apprehension or true knowledge.
- (v) Things directly seen do not delight us so much as they do when described by gifted poets. So too things inferred from *hetvādis* in our real life do not delight us as they do when inferred from the *vibhāvādis*. So too the expressed meaning does not delight us, so much as does the implied meaning (*pratīyamāna artha*). This is the very nature of things and it does not deserve to be called into question.
- (vi) There is no trace of pleasure from the *rati* (love) and the like when inferred from *hetvādis* in our everyday life, but when the *rati* (love) etc., are inferred from the *vibhāvādis* in *kāvya*, we derive unique aesthetic pleasure. Regarding this aesthetic pleasure as the *prayojana* (purpose) [one of the inevitable conditions of *upacāra*] for resorting to *upacāra* (metaphor) you may call these inferred *ratyādis* as *vyāṅgya* (suggested).

Is Mahimabhaṭṭa indebted to Śaṅkuka for his *Rasa* Theory?

MB declares at the end of his work that he has presented here what has not been touched or written by his predecessors. Let us examine how far his claim to originality in regard to *rasa-niṣpatti* (how *rasas* arise) and *rasāsvāda* (how they are enjoyed) is just or well-grounded. Even a cursory glance at the main points of MB's *Rasa Theory* would show that there is a remarkable similarity between the views of Śaṅkuka

१३. इत्यवश्यंभावी तत्प्रतीतिक्रमः । केवलमाशुभावितयासौ न लक्ष्यते यतोऽयमद्याप्य (? मत्राप्य) भिव्यक्तिक्रमः ।'' इत्युक्तम् । — Ibid, p. 417.



and MB. Śaṅkuka is decidedly MB's predecessor. Śaṅkuka's commentary on the *Nāṭyaśāstra* is irretrievably lost, but his views on *rasa-niṣpatti* and *rasāsvāda* have been quoted at some length by Abhinavagupta in his own commentary *Abhinavabhāratī*, on the *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

In a modern study of Mahimabhaṭṭa's *Vyaktiviveka* however the author argues that Mahimabhaṭṭa possibly could not have "seen" *Abhinavabhāratī* which contains Śaṅkuka's *anumitivāda* (theory of inference-*anumāna*). For there is no sign or indication in his VV to assert that MB had "seen" it; it is further contended : "It is also significant that MB does not refer to the analogy of the horse in the picture (*citraturaganyāya*), described by Śaṅkuka, to demonstrate the relation between the actor and the character."<sup>14</sup>

We may grant that MB had not seen *Abhinavabhāratī*, but there are no two opinions regarding MB's acquaintance with Abhinavagupta's *Locana* commentary on Ānandavardhana's *Dhvanyāloka*. For MB has cited a passage from *Locana* to criticise Abhinavagupta for his defence of Ānandavardhana referring to him sarcastically as "*kecid vidvanmāninaḥ*".<sup>15</sup> Abhinavagupta records a number of views on *rasa* in his *Locana* in the course of his comments on *Dhvanyāloka* II.4. One of these views is admittedly of Śaṅkuka, although it is stated here without attributing it to him and simply adding at the end '*iti kecit*'. The relevant portion of this passage is reproduced here below (as translated by Masson and Patwardhan in their work *Śāntarasa*) :<sup>16</sup>

Therefore, (here is Śaṅkuka's view:) "When this *sthāyi* (*bhāva*), is combined with the *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*, there results an experience (*pratipatti*) of the *sthāyibhāva* (love, etc. which is inferred as existing in the actor... the nature of this experience is the enjoyment of the *sthāyibhāva* (thus inferred as existing in the actor)... This *rasa* does not depend on any other thing beyond the actor who is apprehended (by the spectator) as non-different from the character being portrayed, and the spectator who is the relisher (of the *ratibhāva*, etc., inferred by him as existing (in the actor.) Only that much, (and nothing more is required for the aesthetic experience of the *rasa*). Therefore *rasa* exists only in the drama, and not in the characters to be portrayed, etc. This is the view of some (i.e., of Śaṅkuka)."

It deserves our notice that in this passage the famous *citra-turaga-nyāya* is absent, it is attributed to Śaṅkuka by Mammaṭa in his *Kāvyaprakāśa*. *Locana*, however, gives it after Śaṅkuka's views have already been expounded with the opening words "*anye*

14. Read : *A Study of Mahimabhaṭṭa's Vyaktiviveka* by Dr. C. Rajendran, Professor of Sanskrit, University of Calicut, 1991, p. 118.

15. अत्र केचिद्विद्वन्मानिनो द्विवचनसमर्थनामनोऽथाक्षितचित्ततया... — VV, pp. 90–91.

16. *Śāntarasa*, BORI edn., Pune 1969, p. 69, f. n. 4.

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tu", "Others say." As neither *Abhinavabhāratī* nor *Locana* attributes the *citra-turaganyāya* to Śaṅkuka, we need not read any special significance if MB does not refer to it.

It is probably for the first time Mammaṭa has attributed this *nyāya* to Śaṅkuka by combining the two views, one of 'iti kecit' and another, 'anye tu' which are set forth consecutively here in *Locana*.

It would therefore be reasonable to draw the inference that MB had read these various views about *rasanīṣpatti* and *rasāsvāda* including the one which is admittedly that of Śaṅkuka. We are therefore justified in concluding that MB's claim to originality as far as his views on how *rasas* arise and they are enjoyed are concerned is not sustained.

If however, one were still to insist that MB is original in his views on how *rasas* arise and how they are enjoyed then we will have to rest contented with the thought that "great minds think alike".

#### Aesthetic experience in (non-dramatic) poetry :

According to MB, the *sthāyibhāva*, when inferred from the *liṅga* or *sādhana* (mark, logical reason) viz. the combination of the *vibhāvādis*, becomes *rasa* and the *sthāyibhāva* thus inferred is the source of aesthetic pleasure for the spectators. He further asserts that the *sthāyibhāva*, when inferred from *hetvādis* (real causes etc.) in everyday life does not delight us as it does when inferred from the *vibhāvādis* in poetry (including dramatic poetry) and that it is the very nature of things that the *vibhāvādis* lead to a delightful apprehension of *rasa* and does not deserve to be called in question :

*So'pi ca teṣām na tathā svadate yatha tairevānumeyatām nīta iti svabhāva evāyam na paryanuyogam arhati* – pp. 73-74.

When you appeal to *svabhāva*, all debate, discussion and reasoning or argumentation ends !

It would not be out of place if we refer here to the views of literary thinkers who have touched this topic briefly in the course of their exposition of the *rasa* theory – although as a rule they discuss the problem keeping in view dramas, the stage, the actor and the spectator. From *Abhinavabhāratī* we learn that Bhaṭṭa Tauta in his *Kāvyakautuka*, a work on poetics gave more importance to drama than to poetry. Abhinavagupta observes – "Our teacher (Bhaṭṭa Tauta) says that *rasa* arises in a poem if we see things as if they were taking place before our eyes." As he has said in his *Kāvyakautuka*, "In a poem that is not enacted (on the stage of our mind), it is not possible to have a true aesthetic experience (*āsvāda*). When things (*bhāvas*) such



as gardens, lovely women, the moon etc., are well and elegantly described by a polished (?) imagination, then they appear as if they were actually taking place before our very eyes (i.e. as if we saw them acted out)."<sup>17</sup>

Immediately after this quotation Abhinavagupta quotes the view of some other literary thinkers using the words "Anye tu:"

Others however say that there is aesthetic pleasure (*rasa-carvaṇā*, aesthetic enjoyment or relish) even in poems, because of the greatest beauty produced by *guṇas* (poetic qualities) and *alamkāras* (figures of speech).<sup>18</sup>

This view agrees, partially though, with Bhāṭṭa Nāyaka's view of aesthetic experience in poetry :

*Rasa* is manifested by a special power assumed by works in poetry and drama, the power of generalisation or universalization (*bhāvana*) which power consists of the action of generalizing the *vibhāvas*, etc., it has the faculty of suppressing the thick layer of mental stupor (*moha*) obscuring our consciousness; in poetry it is marked by the absence of poetic defects (*doṣas*) and the presence of *guṇas* (poetic qualities) and *alamkāras* (figures of speech); in drama it is characterized by the fourfold *abhinaya* (acting or dramatic representation). *Rasa*, revealed by this special power, is then enjoyed with a particular *bhoga* (a special kind of enjoyment) different from *anubhava* (direct experience), *smṛti* (memory) and the like. This enjoyment is characterized by a resting (*viśrānti*) in one's own consciousness (*saṁvit*) which due to the exuberance (*udreka*) of the state of *sattva*, is pervaded by *ānanda* (delight or bliss) and light (*prakāśa*), and approximates the bliss that comes from realizing one's identity with the highest Brahman (*parabrahmāsvāda-savidha*).<sup>19</sup>

Abhinavagupta states his own view about aesthetic experience in poetry first in his commentary *Locana*, on *Dhvanyāloka* and later on again in his commentary *Abhinavabhāratī* on *Nāṭyaśāstra*.

In *Locana* he says : "Rasa applies to non-dramatic poetry as well. In place of realism (*lokadharmī*) and dramatic conventions (*nāṭyadharmī*) that apply to the theatre we have in poetry the two modes of description called Natural Description (*svabhāvokti*) and striking mode of speech (*vakrokti*) which convey *rasa* by means of transcendental (*alaukika*) *vibhāvas*, etc. which are presented by words possessing such poetic qualities as clarity or lucidity (*prasāda*), sweetness (*mādhurya*) and vigour (*ojas*).

17. *Nāṭyaśāstra* Vol. I GOS edn., Baroda, 1992, pp. 284-85.

18. *Ibid*, p. 285 अन्ये तु काव्येऽपि गुणालङ्कारसौन्दर्यातिशयकृतं रसचर्वणमाहुः ।

19. *Ibid*, p. 271, opening paragraph.



Or we admit that aesthetic experience in poetry is distinct from that which we experience in drama since the means (*upāyas*) whereby it is brought about in the two cases differ. This apprehension of *rasa* in drama is different from everyday cases of inference although it depends on inference in the initial stages. In poetry too the apprehension of *rasa* is different from other types of verbal cognition (like the wellknown *abhidhā* or *lakṣaṇā*) but in the initial stages it depends on *abhidhā* as a means of reaching the other suggested meaning.”<sup>20</sup>

In his *Abhinavabhāratī* (on *NS. VI.33*) Abhinavagupta concludes : “*Rasas* come from drama, which is a combination of *vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas*, etc. Or we can say that *rasas* are nothing other than drama. For a drama is only a collection of *rasas*. *Rasas* are only found in the drama (or if we read *na* : *rasas* are not only found in the drama). To the extent that poetry resembles drama, *rasa* is also found in poetry.. Poetry is primarily after all only drama. Aesthetic experience is fully accomplished by means of appropriate language, style, intonation, costume, etc. For in poems that consist of cantos etc. we often find such inappropriate thing as the heroine speaking in Sanskrit only because the writer is limited in his capacity (? the reading ‘*śakti-rahitatvāt*’ is rather doubtful)... It has been said (by Vāmana) : ‘Among the sustained larger works the ten types of drama are the most praiseworthy’. All kinds of non-dramatic poetry beginning with ornate epic poems and ending with isolated stanzas, dispense with the orderly arrangement of the various constituents of drama such as the five *sandhis*. The subject matter of the ten types of drama is itself *nāṭya*... The impact of the subject matter of literature on spectators and readers is very diverse, since it can be either clear or unclear (i.e., powerful or not) depending on the degree of sympathetic response (elicited in the spectator)... Therefore *rasas* are only found in drama, and not in the everyday world. And poetry is nothing other than drama.”<sup>21</sup>

Elsewhere too Abhinavagupta says : “When all the three (*vibhāvas*, *anubhāvas* and *vyabhicāribhāvas*) are described giving them equal prominence (or importance) we have a heightened effect of aesthetic experience. This is only possible in a long continuous work (*prabandha*). In fact, it is only possible in ten types of drama. As Vāmana has said : “Among long continuous works the ten types of drama are the best or the most praiseworthy, for it is variegated and hence complete or full and wonderful like a picture.”<sup>22</sup>

20. Based on the translation in *Śāntarasa* (pp. 70–73).

21. As translated in *Aesthetic Rapture* Vol. II, Notes : by Masson and Patwardhan, Deccan College, Poona 1970, (pp. 71–72).



*Muktakas* (isolated, independent stanzas) depend, Abhinavagupta feels, on drama. "When reading such stanzas the sensitive reader prepares (or better supplies) the context by considering what has taken place earlier, what later, who is the speaker, what is the occasion, etc." Because of this in the case of readers who are *sahṛdayas* through the force of their former (*prāktana*) merit and study of (or practice in) poetry... even though the *vibhāvādis* be very limited the subjectmatter of the poem (*kāvyaārtha*) appears to them very clearly as if they were witnessing it before their very eyes... For such readers, poetry gives them both *prīti* (pleasure) and *vyutpatti* (moral instruction) although the poem is not acted out... When they witness a dramatic performance, there is an even greater effect (*nirmalīkaraṇa* – receptivity of the mind) according to the maxim that the bright rays of the moon, when they fall (on a bright object, say, mirror), make it all the more bright. For readers who are not *sahṛdaya*, drama helps them to achieve receptivity of the mind.<sup>23</sup>

Ānandavardhana showers praise on the poet Amaru in these glorious words : "There are poets who are intent on producing *rasa* in *muktakas* as in *prabandhas*. For example, the poems of the poet Amaru are famous for their profusion in the *śṛṅgāra-rasa* and for being as good as larger works."<sup>24</sup>

Following Vāmana, Abhinavagupta remarks that drama alone gives complete *rasāsvāda* and adds that *muktakas* give delight only when the reader is able to supply appropriate context. A poet's powerful, graphic and picturesque descriptions of the *vibhāvādis* make the *muktaka* living like an enacted drama before the mind's eye of the *sahṛdaya*. That is why Abhinavagupta declares:

'Kāvyē'pi nāṭyāyamāna eva rasaḥ'

And, 'Kāvyañca nāṭyameva'

22. किन्तु समप्राधान्य एव रसास्वादस्योत्कर्षः । तच्च प्रबन्ध एव भवति । वस्तुतस्तु दशरूपक एव । यदाह वामनः – सन्दर्भेषु दशरूपकं श्रेयः । तद् विचित्रं चित्रपटवद् विशेषसाकल्यात् ।

– A. Bh. Vol. I, GOS edn. Vadodara, 1992, p. 281. The translation is based on *Aesthetic Rapture* Vol. II, pp. 65–66

23. ... तदुपजीवनेन मुक्तके । तथा च तत्र सहृदयाः पूर्वापरमुचितं परिकल्प्य ईदृगत्र वक्ताऽस्मिन्नवसरे इत्यादि बहुतरं पीठबन्धरूपं विदधते । तेन ये काव्याभ्यासप्राक्तनपुण्यादिहेतुबलादिति(भिः) सहृदयास्तेषां परिमितविभावाद्युन्मीलनेऽपि परिस्फुट एव साक्षात्कारकल्पः काव्यार्थः स्फुरति ।

– A. Bh. Vol. I, GOS edn., Vadodara, 1992, p. 281.

24. मुक्तकेषु प्रबन्धेष्विव रसबन्धाभिनिवेशिनः कवयो दृश्यन्ते । यथा ह्यमरकस्य कवेर्मुक्तकाः शृङ्गारसस्यन्दिनः प्रबन्धायमानाः प्रसिद्धा एव । – *Dhvanyāloka* (III.7) *Vṛtti* p. 325 *Bālapriyā* – edn.)



## APPENDIX

(Note : Here is Prof. M. V. Patwardhan's translation of Ācārya Hemacandra's sections in his *Kāvyaṇuśāsana* (MJV edn. Bombay 1964) dealing with the topic of the *sāttvikabhāvas* :

Now, he speaks of the *sāttvikabhāvas*.

*Sūtra* 79 : Stupefaction (*stambha*), perspiration (*sveda*), horripilation (*romāñca*), faltering voice (*svarabheda*, the same as *svarabhaṅga*), trembling (*kampa*, the same as *vepathu*) change of colour or paleness (*vaivarnya*), tears (*aśru*) and fainting or loss of consciousness (*pralaya*) – these are the eight *sāttvikabhāvas*.

*Alaṃkāracūḍāmaṇi* on the “*sūtra*” : The word *sattva* means vital force (or energy) (*elan vital*), because of the etymology, viz. : The mind is lodged in it, and because of its inherent goodness (*sattva = sādhutva*). The *sāttvikabhāvas* have their origin (or existence) in *sattva*, i.e., in the vital force and hence they are known by the name *sāttvika*. The *sāttvikabhāvas* are associated with the emotions (or psychic states) such as *rati* (love) etc., which arise (or emerge) from the bed-rock (*bhūmi*) of the vital force. They are distinct from the physical effects such as tears, etc. which are extraneous (to the vital force), and which are non-sentient in their nature or form (*jaḍa-rūpa*). They are produced (*āhṛtā*) only by the *vibhāvas* associated (as cause) with the psychic states, such as *rati* (love) etc., and are beyond the pale of aesthetic experience (*aticarvaṇā-gocareṇa vibhāvena*), and their presence [i.e., the presence of (the internal) *sāttvikabhāvas*] is intimated (or suggested) by their consequents.

To explain : The psychic states, when they enter into the predominantly earth-allied element in the vital force give rise to *stambha*—stupefaction i.e., the blocking (inhibition) of sensation (*cetanāceṣṭā*—physical movement); when they enter (i.e. affect) the predominantly water-allied element in the vital force, give rise to tears. But as *tejas* (heat) is intimately allied to the vital force, either intensely (acutely) or in a feeble manner (mildly), and it gives rise to perspiration and paleness of the body and as it (*tejas*) is the cause of that (perspiration and paleness ?) therefore it is spoken in that way (*tathā* ? sense not clear). When *ākāśa* (space) affects (*anugraha*), the vital force, there arises *pralaya* (fainting, loss of consciousness). But when *vāyu* (air) affects the vital force (? *vāyusvātantrye* ? obscure. We expect *vāyu-anugrahe* on the analogy of *tejas-anugraha* and *ākāśānugraha* as air (wind) affects/becomes infused in the vital force either slowly, swiftly or in a manner midway between the two, it becomes



transformed in the triple way viz., horripilation, tremor or trembling and faltering voice. Such is the view of those conversant with Bharata (i.e. with the *Nāṭyaśāstra* of Bharata).

*Viveka* on the above cited passage, p. 144 : “The bed-rock of the vital force”. The idea is as follows : The particular psychic states such as love, etc., first emerge into prominence as manifestations of consciousness. Then they affect (tinge) through the superimposition of their own natures the internal vital force. And this is not something that is incomprehensible. For instance, the infusion (or accession) first arises or manifests itself as something blazing up (or burning) (flushing, simmering) emending the text “*krodhāveśe antarā jvalateva*” to ‘*krodhāveśah antarā jvalanniva*’), and then perspiration follows (due to exasperation). With this very idea in his mind Bāṇabhaṭṭa has said : First austerities drop down (i.e., become ineffective) and then the fluid of perspiration begins to ooze (from the body). “(*Harṣacarita* I. p. 13).

When a particular psychic state attains to (or reaches) such a phase in that manner, it is also observed in the world to be restrained (or inhibited) from reaching a climactic point in the form of visible effects (or manifestations). For example: “The mind (heart) of the beloved one, prone to passion (love), as it becomes agitated (excited) at the sight of the moonlike face of her dear lover does not come to rest (i.e. does not become pacified), although the manifestation of physical effects such as perspiration has been restrained through (fear of) its being noticed by the elderly people (near about) (*gurusamkama* = *gurusamkrama* = *gurujanadarśanabhaya*). [In the *Viveka*, p. 145, *gurusamkrama* is explained as “*guru-viṣaye mā samkramīt*” and hence I understand it to mean “it should not come to the notice of elderly people near about.”]

*Viveka*, p. 145; the heart (mind) of the beloved one being prone to an upsurge of passion at the sight of (the face of) her dear lover, becomes agitated (or excited). And although the external physical effects of passion have been checked by her in order that they should not be noticed by elderly people (nearby), her heart (mind) does not become relaxed (restful) but is still full of agitation [restlessness (*kṣobhamaya*)] caused by *sāttvikabhāvas* such as internal perspiration, (tremor), etc. Further in the stanza there is suggested an illustration (*nidarśanam*) (illustrating the situation directly expressed, i.e., this stanza suggests a simile or comparison). To explain : the turbulent (*rai=rayin=vegavān=prakṣubdhaḥ*) ocean agitated up to its innermost depth (*āhrdayam*) at the sight of the moon possessing a pleasing face (orb), and though having its advancing inundating waves checked by the huge embankment (or reclining wall) (along the coast), it does not come to rest (i.e. does not cease to have rising waves). The word *sāgara* has both the masculine and neuter genders in Sanskrit : or though it has only the masculine gender in Sanskrit, there is the mutation of its gender (into



the neuter gender) in Prakrit. Thus in the stanza, the feeling of love, while giving up its purely psychic nature, does not lead to external, physical (visible, palpable) effects (such as perspiration, tremor, etc.) and so it is described or presented (here) (by the poet) as resting on the bed-rock of the vital force itself.

*Ratyādigatenaiveti*—By only the *vibhāvas* associated (as causes) with love, etc. and not by any other *vibhāvas*, for they are independent of proneness (or orientation) to particular external objects (sense not clear to me). Although *glāni*, *ālasya*, *śrama*, *mūrcchā*, etc., are devoid of *ālambanaviṣaya* (?), still as they are caused by external factors they are enumerated (or enlisted) among the *vyabhicāribhāvas*. The mental effects or psychical states such as stupefaction, etc., are not caused by external factors and hence they are called *sāttvikas*.

*Stambha viṣṭabdhā-cetanatvam iti*. The mind becomes overpowered by joy, etc., and hence it does not move out to join the sense-organs, as it no longer presides over the sense-organs which are restricted only to the vague (hazy, synthetic) perception of external objects, this perception not being analytical (*vikalpaparyantatāgamana-rahita*). For example :

“Thereafter even their natural agility vanished, like the flame of lamps depicted in pictures, while their lustre faded, the flame of their eyes ceased to stir, and their courage ebbed away.”

(—*Setubandha* II.45 as translated by K. K. Handiqui).

Similarly the following stanza is an example of tears (*bāṣpa*) caused by the infusion of *tejas* (heat) into the water-dominated element of the vital force.

“Put a check on (restrain or stop) your continuously flowing (gushing) tears by resorting to mental firmness. On this path, where you are not able to notice its ups and downs, your foot-steps are being placed unevenly by you.”

*Tivrātivratveneti* (intensely or in a feeble manner) :

Perspiration due to the infusion (of *tejas*) into the water-dominated element of the vital force is exemplified in the following stanza :

“When in the course of gambling (with dice) for amusement (or diversion) her embrace was first won (as a wager) by her dear consort, and then, thereafter, the charming [delightful offering of the lower lip (for being kissed) was won by her dear consort as a wager], he again inquired of his beloved about the (next) wager to be put forward by her, she silently stretched out (extended) her perspiring hand in order to throw (cast) the dice (*śāra-visāraṇāya-akṣa-utkṣepaṇāya*), while her cheeks began



to throb (quiver) because of the outburst of passion accumulated in the (mind) but held in check with a suppressed (inchoate) smile (*sāntarhāsa*)."

But when the water-dominated part of the vital force is penetrated by *tejas* in a feeble manner, there results paleness of the body (physical paleness or loss of colour), as in the following stanza :

"As that princess (Indumatī) seeking to choose a consort for herself (from among the assembled kings) (simply) passing by the various kings successively (without fixing her choice on any one of them), each of them became pale (lost colour) just as when a flame (torch) passing successively in front of the mansions on the principal street in a city, each mansion became pale (and plunged in gloom)." – *Raghu*. VI.67

*Pralaya iti* : Fainting (loss of consciousness) means the complete (*prakarṣeṇa*) absorption (or dissolution) of the faculties of the sense-organs into the vital force. For example :

Because of the swoon resulting from the severe impact (of the fire from Śiva's frontal eye) which blocked up (arrested) the functioning of her sense organs, Rati did not comprehend the nature and extent of the catastrophe that had overtaken her husband and because of this (ignorance on her part) a real favour was as it were done to her.

—*Kumārasambhava*. IV.73

'*Tasya*' means '*prāṇasya*'. (The infusion of) the vital force (by the mind element). '*Manda*' *iti*. When the vital force becomes infused with slow-moving air, horripilation is the result. For example :

"When my face was turned to his face, I turned my face down, and directed my glance at his feet; I closed my ears which were very eager to hear his speech; I concealed with my hands the perspiration on my cheeks breaking forth with horripilation. But, O my friends, what could I do when the seams of my bodice began to burst in a hundred places ?

—*Amaruśataka*. V. 11.

When the vital force is infused with air which is neither very slow-moving nor very fast-moving (but midway between the two) there is tremor (trembling or quivering of the body). For example :

"Be not puffed up with pride because your cheek is shining with the design of a blossom-spray painted thereon by your consort with his own hand. Cannot, O my friend, other women too have similar designs (painted on their cheeks by their husbands themselves) if it were not for the fact that tremor of their cheeks posed an insurmountable obstacle ?"



When the vital force is infused with very swift-moving air, faltering (or stammering) of the voice (choking of the voice) is the result (takes place). For example :

“When Kṛṣṇa (the enemy of the demon Madhu) left for Dvārakā, Rādhā embracing the tender branch (*lata*) of the Vanjula tree (Aśoka tree), bent down because of his jumping down from it (in the river Yamunā flowing near it) sang with such deep longing, her song turning into a loud wail and her throat so choked with profuse tears that the ducks swimming in the water began to cry plaintively (in sympathy).”

– First cited in the *Locana* on *Dhvanyāloka* I.4

p. 147, lines = 1–3 : the final position is this : The external *sāttvikabhāvas* such as stupefaction, etc., are physical attributes and they operate as *anubhāvas* suggesting the (corresponding) internal *sāttvikabhāvas*; and in reality they (ultimately) suggest psychic states such as love, world-weariness, etc.

p. 147, lines = 23–25 : Because these *sāttvikabhāvas* occur in connection with each one of the *rasas* and because they do not possess even a slight trace of independence (autonomy) not even like the *vyabhicāribhāvas* on the analogy of a king's servant engaged in his own marriage ceremony who is followed by the king (at the time of the marriage procession; i.e., in relation to his own servant the king occupies, for the time being, a position subordinate to that of his own servant) and because examples of the *sāttvikabhāvas* are easily available (in literature) they have not been cited in the *Vṛtti* (viz. *Alaṅkāra-cūḍāmaṇi*).









When the first group of patients with the disease was reported, the medical community was startled. The disease was new and the symptoms were unusual.

When the second group of patients was reported, the medical community was even more startled. The symptoms were even more unusual and the disease was even more mysterious.

As the third group of patients was reported, the medical community was in a state of confusion. The symptoms were so unusual that the disease was considered to be a new entity.

It was not until the fourth group of patients was reported that the medical community began to understand the disease. The symptoms were now familiar and the disease was no longer mysterious.

Since that time, the disease has been well understood and the medical community has been able to treat it successfully.











The theory of *rasa* is Abhinavagupta's major contribution to Aesthetics. His conception of *rasa* relates to poetry and drama. It can be equally applicable to other forms of art as well.

This monograph deals with the various aspects of his theory of *rasa* : whether *rasa* is *laukika* or *alaukika*; whether all *rasas* are pleasurable or some pleasurable and others painful; where is *rasa* located — is it in the poet or in the character or in the actor or in the spectator; whether the *sāttvikabhāvas* are only physical or mental or are they both; whether *rasas* are connected with the four *purusārthas*.

An earnest attempt is made here to provide satisfactory answers to these questions. Mahimabhatta's views on Abhinavagupta's *rasa* theory are also discussed.



"Dr. V. M. Kulkarni is one of the few scholars in India today dedicated to text-critical studies of alaṃkāra texts in general and to Prakrit citations by major theorists like Ānandavardhana, Abhinavagupta and Bhoja in particular. His keen insight and unrivalled mastery over the entire area of *Sāhitya Śāstra* have illumined many a dark corner in our masterpieces like the *Locana*, *Abhinavabhāratī*, and *Śṛṅgāraprakāśa*."

"Dr. V. M. Kulkarni has succeeded in recovering the right readings of the *Abhinavabhāratī* in some of the most crucial passages including the chapter of *rasa* (i.e. VI), passages which had baffled even eminent specialists."